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purportedly prepared prior to the tennination of my administration as Mayor Of Sun 
Valley on Januarv 3. 2012. 
3) I certify that prior to my viewing of the Questionable Patti Ball Report on or 
about December 4. 2012. that I never was orovided a copy of the Questionable Patti Ball 
Report, including specifically that I was never provided a copy of the Questionable Patti 
Ball Report prior to the termination of my tenure as Mayor Of Sun Valley on Januarv 3. 
?012 
4) I certify that on December 12, 2012 and December 13, 2012, I was provided a 
copy of a report (the "Final Patti Ball Report") !)fepared by Investigator Ball that 
significantly differs from the Questionable Patti Ball Report in that the Final Patti Ball 
Report included factual allegations and findings about misconduct of Sun Valley City 
Council Member Nils Ribi which are missing: from the Questionable Patti Ball Report. 
5) I certify that the Final Patti Ball Report also significantly differs from the 
Questionable Patti Ball Report in that the Final Patti Ball Report asserted multiple facts 
and made multiple conclusions about the conduct of Sharon R. Hammer that differ from 
thP f"M" "nil rnnrh'"'""" <1hont thP ronilnrt nf ~1-uarnn R -r::J"rnrnPr nnur fnnnrl iTI thP 
Questionable Patti Ball Report. 
6) I certify that in many sections of the Final Patti Ball Report that Investigator 
Ball had made factually incorrecrstatements. and had made several clearly incorrect 
2 
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:findings and conclusion, based on hearsay, doubtful and dubious statements of 
individuals that had been interviewed bv Investigator Ball related to allegations of 
misconduct ruJainst Ms. Hammer. 
7) I certify that in many sections of the Final Patti Ball Report that Investigator 
Ball made factuallv incorrect statements. and made several clearly incorrect :findings and 
conclusion, based on hearsay, doubtful and dubious statements of individuals that had 
been interviewed bv Investi!mtor Ball related to allegations of harassment hostility and 
other misconduct against Council Member Ribi, and that Investigator Ball had woefully 
failed to make a concerted effort to investigate the serious allegations of harassment and 
hostile work environment that had·been alleged against Council Member Ribi by Ms. 
8) I certify that as of December 13, 2011, I considered the Final Patti Ball Report 
to be the final work product requested of Investigator Ball. and indicated to Investigator 
Ball that her services to Sun Valley were completed. 
9) I have reviewed the December 2011 invoices of Investigator Ball (Investigator 
B) and Sun Vallev City Attorney Adam King (Exhibit C). The invoice of Investigator 
Ball (Exhibit B) confirms that on December 12, 2011 and December 13, 2011 that 
Investigator Ball presented to me a singular report. which was the Final Patti Ball Report. 
The invoice of City Attorney King (Exhibit C) confirms that as ofDecember 13, 2011 the 
Final Patti Ball Report was a singular report and~ "final". 
3 
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1 O) Based on the Final Patti Ball Report, and my authority to make final and 
bindini:t discinlinarv :findings pursuant Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policv 
And Procedures, I concluded that Ms. Hammer had not committed any infractions of Sun 
Valley policies related to a) her use of a Sun Valley automobile because I had authorized 
her to use the automobile at all hours for both Sun Valley and personal use, b) her use of 
flex time to compensate her for non-standard work hours she had been required to work 
over the course of2008 through 2011 because I had authorized her to use the flex time, 
and. c) her use of a Sun Valley credit card because Sun Valley Treasurer Michelle 
Frostenson and the Sun Valley City Council had already specifically approved as 
legitimate all expenditures Ms. Hammer had incurred on the Sun Valley credit card. 
1 I) Based on my :findings related to allegations of misconduct against Ms. 
Hammer. and my authority !)ursuant to Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies. 
I considered all disciplinary actions against Ms. Hammer to be concluded as of December 
13, 2011. 
12) Based on the Final Patti Ball Report and my own knowledge of Ms. 
Hammer's multiple com!)laints and my knowledge of Council Member Ribi' s conduct 
towards Ms. Hammer during 2009 through 2011, and my authority to make final and 
binding disciplinary :findings pursuant Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policy 
And Procedures, I concluded that Council Member Ribi had violated the Sun Valley 
Personnel Policv on Harassment (Section 7 .5) related to his treatment of Ms. Hammer on 
EXHIBIT L 686 
multiple occasions over the course of2009 through 2011, including that Council Member 
Ribi had assaulted Ms. Hammer durinir a break in a Sun V allev Citv Council meeting on 
September 15. 2011. 
13) I certify that between December 13, 2012 until my tenure as Mayor Of Sun 
Vallev tenninated on Januarv 3. 2012. I irave Investiirator Ball no authoritv to contact 
attorney Kirtlan Naylor, to discuss the issues associated with the investigation which 
resulted in the Final Patti Ball Report or to take any direction of any sort from Attomev 
Naylor. 
14) I certify that between December 13, 2011 and the termination ofmy tenure as 
Mayor Of Sun Vallev on January 3. 2012. I gave Investigator Ball no authority orno 
direction to modify the Final Patti Ball Report in any fashion or to prepare any additional 
or supplemental reports for Sun Valley related to the disciplinarv investigation she had 
been retained to perform on behalf of Sun Valley. 
15) I have reviewed the December of201 l invoice of Investigator Ball (Exhibit 
B) which indicates that in direct violation ofmy authority and without my knowledge or 
approval, between December 15, 2011 and December 20, 2011, Investigator Ball 
surre!)titiously communicated withAttomey Naylor and apparently prepared the 
Questionable Patti Ball Report at Attorney Naylor's direction without my authority, 
knowledge or direction. and dated the Questionable Patti Ball Report on December 20. 
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2011 to fraudulently assert that it had been completed during my tenure with my 
knowledge a<; Mavor Of Sun Vallev_ when it had not. 
16) I certify, that the Final Patti Ball Report did not include the language that 
apnears on the Questionable Patti B.all Reoqrt: ~lairn.iruz that "This Document Js Protected 
By Attorney Work Product Privilege", as at no time was Investigator Ball retained by 
Sun Vallev durin11 mv tenure as Mavor Of Sun V allev to nerform any legal work or to 
prepare her report in regards to pending litigation, as Investigator Ball was retained solely 
to nerform an internal Sun V allev discinlinary investiization. 
17) At no time during my tenure as Mayor Of Sun Valley through January 3, 
2012. did I authorize or seek that the Blaine County Prosecutor institute a criminal 
investigation of either Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley Fire Chief Jeff Carnes or any other Sun 
Vallev emnlovee. nor did I orovide Attomev Navlor with anv authoritv to do so without 
mv soecific anproval. which Attorney Navlor never obtained. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
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JoLynn Drage, Clerk 0/str/d 
Court Blaine Ooun , kiaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Nils Ribi, ) 
) 
Plaintiff /Counterdefendant ) 
) 






James R. Donoval, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING NON-PARTY CITY OF SUN VALLEY'S 
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH Page 1 of7 
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Toe City of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley"), a non-party to this matter filed a Motion to 
Quash Subpoena pursuant to I.R.C.P. 45(d) concerning a subpoena issued by the 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, James Donoval to Patricia Ball, an investigator hired by Sun Valley. 
Oral argument was heard on this matter on September 18, 2012. Because this Court finds that the 
materials sought in the subpoena are protected by the work product doctrine, Sun Valley's 
Motion to Quash Subpoena is granted. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
This case was initiated on December 30, 2011, when the Plaintiffs filed a complaint 
against Mr. Donoval. The lawsuit was filed seeking redress for allegedly defamatory and 
emotionally distressful statements made by Mr. Donoval in a series of written communications 
with members of the Sun Valley government and Ms. Brolin-Ribi in November 2011. There 
were three letters sent by Mr. Donoval to the mayor and members of the Sun Valley City Council 
between November 12, 2011 and November 17, 2011. All three of these letters either explicitly 
or implicitly threatened litigation against Sun Valley or members of its govermnent. On 
November 21, 2011, Mr. Donoval, on behalf of Sharon Hammer, filed a lawsuit against Sun 
Valley and members of its government. 
On November 17, 2011, Adam.King, the Sun Valley City Attorney, contacted Ms. Ball 
about the possibility of retaining her services for a fact-finding investigation regarding various 
allegations that could be the subject of litigation. On November 21, 2011, Sun Valley retained 
Ms. Ball for the purpose of conducting an investigation into alleged violations of City policy. On 
November 22, 2011, K.irtlan Naylor was assigned by Sun Valley's insurance carrier to provide 
legal defense to Sun Valley, and Mr. Naylor was to appointed as Ms. Ball's primary legal contact 
on November 28, 2011. Toe scope of Ms. Ball's investigation included allegations concerning 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH Page 2 of7 
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violation of city policy made against Ms. Hammer, as well as allegations made by Ms. Hammer 
against Nils Ribi in her November 21, 2011 lawsuit. In conducting this investigation, Ms. Ball 
interviewed witnesses, reviewed infonnation, and drafted a report. This report was concluded on 
December 20, 2011. Portions of this report were later provided to the Blaine County Prosecutor 
for review as to any criminal conduct. 
On July 22, 2012, Ms. Ball was served a subpoena by Mr. Donoval commanding Ms. 
Ba11 to produce all audio tapes of interviews, documents, communications, agreements, and 
reports obtained or produced in connection with Ms. Ball's investigation for Sun Valley. Ms. 
Ball informed Sun Valley of the subpoena, and Sun Valley filed the current motion to quash. 
LEGALSTANDARD 
A court has the discretion to quash or modify a subpoena if the subpoena is 
"unreasonable, oppressive, fails to allow time for compliance, [or] requires disclosure of 
privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies." I.R.C.P. 45(d). When a 
court has discretion, it must not abuse that discretion. A court does not abuse its discretion when: 
(1) it correctly perceives the issue as one of discretion; (2) acts within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. Clarkv. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 
810, 812 (2001). 
DISCUSSION 
Sun Valley argues that the subpoena issued to Ms. Ball should be quashed because: (1) 
the subpoena is facially invalid; (2) the subpoena seeks protected work product, and; (3) the 
subpoena seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege. The subpoena issued by Mr. 
Donoval to Ms. Ball is facially invalid. That deficiency, however, can be cured. Therefore, this 
MEMORA.NDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH Page 3 of7 
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Court will consider whether the information sought by the subpoena is protected by either the 
work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. 
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation 
of litigation "by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative ... only upon a 
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials .•. and that the 
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). If discovery of such material is ordered, ''the court shall protect 
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation . .,, Id 
There is ample support in the record that Ms. Ball was retained by Sun Valley in 
anticipation of litigation. and that her investigation was substantially focused on issues that 
appeared ripe for impending litigation. Aff. Ball,'13; Aff. King, 1 11. Ms. Ball was consulted 
after Mr. Donoval had threatened litigation, was retained on the same day Mr. Donoval initiated 
litigation. and conducted an investigation squarely related to that and other potential litigation. 
Aff. Ball, fl 3,5,6,10; Aff. King,,, 11,15,18. Therefore, the report Ms. Ball's report was 
prepared in large part for Sun Valley in anticipation of, or in conjunction with pending and 
anticipated litigation. Moreover, if Sun Valley retained Ms. Ball in substantial part to conduct 
her investigation in anticipation of litigation. as this Court finds it did, the materials produced as 
part of that investigation are protected under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). It is irrelevant whether Mr. 
Naylor was her primary contact, or whether Ms. Ball was retained as an attorney or merely an 
investigator. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3) protects material produced in anticipation oflitigation either for a 
party or for that party's representative. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH Page 4 of7 
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Mr. Donoval correctly points out that underlying facts are not protected by the work 
product doctrine. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383,395 (1981). However, the doctrine does 
protect disclosure of communications. Id. "Communications" are precisely what Mr. Donoval 
seeks in his subpoena. Donoval Subpoena at 2. :Mr. Donoval is free to depose any of the 
individuals interviewed by Ms. Ball in the course of her investigation in order to discover 
underlying facts which may be related to this case. He is not entitled to copies, however 
recorded, of Ms. Ball's interviews with witnesses or communications with Sun Valley 
representatives engaged in pursuant to Ms. Ball's duty as an investigator. He can obtain the 
underlying facts obtained by Ms. Ball in these interviews through other discovery methods. 
It is possible under certain circumstances to waive the work product doctrine. If work 
product is disclosed, and that disclosure is to an adversary, the protection is lost. Trustees of 
Elec. Workers No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14-15 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In this case, part of Ms. Ball's report was disclosed to the 
Blaine County Prosecutor. Blaine County and Sun Valley are not adversaries; rather they share a 
common interest. Disclosure to the Blaine County Prosecutor is consistent with maintaining 
secrecy from Sun Valley's adversaries. See U.S. v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(MCI's disclosure of work product to the government, for the purpose of aiding in the 
investigation of MCI's opponent did not waive work product immunity). "While the mere 
showing of a voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, it should not suffice in itself [to waive protection of work product]." Id. 
at 1299. Since there has been no showing that Sun Valley disclosed its work product to an 
adversary, it has not waived protection of its work product. 
:MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH Page 5 of7 
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Mr. Donoval has not shown that he cannot obtain the underlying facts through 
depositions, interrogatories, requests for production, or other discovery methods, he has shown 
neither a substantial need for Ms. Ball's materials, nor an undue hardship in attaining the 
substantial equivalent of these materials by other means. Moreover, he has not shown that Sun 
Valley has waived work product protection. Because Mr. :Qonoval has not met this burden under 
LR.C.P. 26(b)(3), and this Court finds that Ms. Ball was retained in anticipation oflitigation, and 
the materials she prepared were prepared in anticipation of litigation, those materials are 
protected. Because of this, there is no need to analyze whether those materials are protected from 
disclosure under the attorneyMclient privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the City of Sun Valley's MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA 
is hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated: ----,.-1,"/ f)-1--l/r'-+-"'l+-i/l,.,._4 _ _ , r -+-1 /:=-
signed I;/ ~A. "//_, j 
Jona~dy,Distri'ifit7 
~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/J / I I, Crysta.I Rigby, Deputy Cleric for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that on the 
~ day of October, 2012, I filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document: MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING NON-
PARTY CITY OF SUN VALLEY'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA to each of the persons 
as listed below: 
Kirtlan Naylort 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
James R. Donoval 
P.O. Box 1499 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
/U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
Via Facsimile 
.. / U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
_ Overnight Mail 
Via Facsimile 
CLERK OF TIIE DISTRICT COURT 
r\~ 
BY: __ V __ ~__._-=_,,_CA"""'"'"~-.... · -~--
CrystaIRigb1~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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James R. Donoval 
P.O. Box 1499 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
(312) 859-2029 
Idaho Atty No. 8142 
' 
{l 
FILED ~:~. ,: , .. '~ 
t" 
NOV 2 1 2011 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Countv, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) No. 
) 
NILS R1Bl, an individual; THE CITY OF SUN ) 
VALLEY, an Idaho municipal corporation; and, ) 
ADAM KING, an individual, ) 
ROB.ERT.J .. ELGEE 
relief only), ) 
Defendants. ) 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
PURSUANT TO THE IDAHO PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ACT 
NOW COMES the Plaintiff, SHARON R. HAMMER, and in support of her Verified 
Complaint states as follows: 
1) Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer") is a resident of Sun Valley, Blaine 
County, Idaho. In May of 2008, pursuant to a written City Administrator Employment 
Agreement, Ms. Hammer was hired as the City Administrator Of Defendant The City Of Sm1 
Valley, in Blaine County, Idaho ("Sun Valley") and (the "City Administrator"). The written 
City Administrator Employment Agreement has been amended and extended from time to 
time and is effective through at least May 31, 2012. In 1990, Ms. Hammer graduated with a 
Juris Doctor degree from Southern Illinois University Law School and was licensed in 
Illinois. In 1991, Ms. Hammer also received her law license in Tennessee. For several years 
Ms. Hammer practiced as a prosecuting attorney for Perry, County, Illinois and as the City 
1 
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City Attorney King provided legal advice to both Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer as to how 
to discipline Mr. Ribi for such harassment and assault (i.e. nothing can be done to Mr. Ribi), 
and even after multiple demands by Ms. Hammer's counsel that Mr. King cease participating 
in any matters related to Ms. Hammer or the Special Investigation. On infonnation and 
belief, City Attorney King's motivation in himself seeking to terminate Ms. Hammer and in 
assisting Mr. Rfoi in the termination of Ms. Hammer, is to increase the amount of work and 
fees that he would generate should Ms. Hammer be removed as the City Administrator. 
41) Idaho Statute 6-2015 provides for damages to any employee, as well as allowing 
for injunctive relief, against the municipality or its officials and employees who have violated 
the provisions of the Idaho Protection Of Public Employees Act by talcing any adverse action 
against an employee for any of the reasons previously cited in Idaho Statute 6-2104. 
42) At all times herein, Mr. Ribi was acting both individually and in his role as an 
elected official of Sun Valley. At all times herein, City Attorney King was acting both 
individually and in his role as the Sun Valley City Attorney. 
43) The act of Sun Valley investigation Ms. Hammer of any infractions of any type, 
after Ms. Hammer had provided notice of Mr. Ribi's harassment and assault of Ms. Hammer 
and Mr. Ribi's other violations of the Sun Valley Policies And Procedures, including City 
Attorney Kings overt and covert acts, is an "adverse action" as that phrase is described in 
section 6-2104 of the Idaho Protection Of Public Employees Act. 
23 
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46) Ms. Hammer has been damaged by the adverse actions of Mr. Ribi, City Attorney 
King and Sun Valley in investigating Ms. Hammer and by placing Ms. Hammer on 
administrative leave, even with pay, by the mere insinuation that Ms. Hammer is guilty of 
something that has not even been disclosed to her. Considering Ms. Hammer's long history 
of outstanding public service described herein, and Ms. Hammer having been just recently 
recognized for her preparation of the Sun Valley Budget for 2011 and the Sun Valley 
Comprehensive Financial Report for 20 IO (see Exhibit A and Exhibit B), any insinuation that 
Ms. Hammer is in any way guilty of anything will ruin her professional reputation and her 
standing in the community, potentially pennanently. 
47) In addition, Mr. Ribi's long history of harassment, abuse and assault of Ms. 
Hammer, the adverse actions taken by Mr. Ribi, City Attorney King and Sun Valley 
described herein in response to Ms. Hammer's complaints of harassment, abuse, assault and 
violations ?fSun Valley Policies And Procedures against Mr. Ribi, and the negative impact 
of being investigated and placed on administrative leave for no known reason, have caused 
Ms. Hammer physical, medical and emotional injuries which have been previously 
documented to her personal physician and her counselor/therapist and which continue. 
48) There has been absolutely no explanation made to Ms. Hammer, or any rational 
reason, for why Ms. Hammer has been placed on administrative leave as to her voluntary role 
as a Sun Valley firefighter and EMT, as has been ordered in the Administrative Leave Order. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Sparon R. Hammer prays that this Honorable Court enter 
judgment as follows: 
25 




a) Judgment in Ms. Hammer's favor and against Defendants Nils Ribi, Adam King 
and the City Of Sun Valley,jointly ~d individually, in the sum of One Million Dollars 
($1,000.000.00) or such other amount as shall be determined at trial for Nils Ribi's, Adam 
King's and the City Of Sun Valley's violation of the Idaho Protection Of Public Employees 
Act (6-2101 et seq.) in seeking to, and actually taldng, adverse action against Ms. Hammer in 
investigating Ms. Hammer, in attempting to force her resignation as the Sun Valley City 
Administrator, and in putting her on administrative leave; 
b) For an injunctive order requiring that the City Of Sun Valley fully reinstate Ms. 
Hammer to active duty status immediately due to the City Of Sun Valley failing to provide 
Ms. Hammer with any notice or other indication of what charges have been asserted against 
her requiring her to be placed on such administrative leave by the City Of Sun Valley; 
c) For an order immediately allowing Ms. Hammer to continue her role as a volunteer 
Sun Valley firefighter and EMT; 
d) Enter an injunctive order prohibiting Defendant Adam King from acting as legal 
counsel to the City Of Sun Valley, Mayor Wayne Willich, Mayor-Elect De Wayne Briscoe, 
the Sun Valley City Council, or any Sun Valley employee in any way in regards to any issue 
related to either Ms. Hammer or the Special Investigation ordered by the Sun Valley City 
Council on Monday, November 14, 2011, due to his previous legal advice to Ms. Hammer 
and due to his obvious conflict of interest in regards to any matters related to Ms. Hammer 
and her harassment and assault claims against Mr. Ribi; 
e) Enter an injunctive order prohibiting Defendant Nils Ribi from contacting or 
discussing any Sun Valley matters with any Sun Valley employees or with City Attorney 
King, and in particular Ms. Hammer, other than Mayor Willich, Mayor Elect Briscoe or other 
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current or about to be seated members of the Sun Valley City Council, and to fully cooperate 
with the pending Special Investigation. 
t) For an order requiring that ~he City Of Sun Valley cease and desist with any further 
investigation of Ms. Hammer or any acts of Ms. Hammer, including in regards to the Special 
Investigation, without first providing in camera notice to the Court of the specific reasons for 
the need for such an investigation and without first obtaining specific Court approval to 
commence and/or continue such investigation; 
g) For an order prohibiting any Sun Valley City Council member or employee, and in 
particular City Attorney Adam King, from disclosing any matters which were, or will be, 
discussed in any Executive Session of the Sun Valley City Council related to either Ms. 
Hammer or the Special Investigation, without further order of Court after an in camera 
request; 
h) For costs and attorney's fees as are allowed by law, and, 
i) For such other relief as this Honorable Court finds to be just, equitable and proper. 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL TRIABLE MATTERS AND FOR 
ENTRY OF ALLOW ABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF BY THE COURT 
,,,,,-) 
.! ,,;,•"/' ·, 
~i· ( . ; 
i :~ (:--. !/:,,~"a-~/ 
Respztfully Submitted 
Jame R. Donoval 
Atto ey For Sharon R. Hammer 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. DONOV AL 
(Matters Verse Nils Ribi) 
I, JAMES R DONOV AL, first duly swom on oath, depose and state as follows: 
1) That my name is James R. Donoval, that I am the Defendant-CowiterPlaintiff-
Third Party Plaintiff herein, and that I am competent to testify as to the matters herein. I 
certify pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Code Of Civil Procedure, that the facts alleged 
herein are true and accurate and are made with personal knowledge, and would further 
swear to such under oath and at trial if required. I also certify that all of the documents 
attached herein are true and accurate copies of correspondences I sent to the various 
parties or received myself, that the documents I prepared were served or otherwise 




delivered to only the recipients described herein or have been made part of pleadings 
filed in pending litigation. 
3) Over the course of the last three years, I have had multiple conversations with 
individuals about their concerns about Defendant Sun Valley City Council Member Nils 
Ribi's emotional stability, including with Sharon R. Hammer, who is the Sun Valley City 
Administrator, and, who is also my wife. During that period, on numerous occasions, I have 
had the opportunity to personally witness Mr. Ribi in action as a Sun Valley City Council 
Member and at other public and private functions. Prior to mid year 2010, I also held 
multiple personal conversations with Mr. R.ibi in which I was able to personally measure his 
character, his temperament and his emotional stability. 
4) Over the course of the last three years, I held multiple conversations with Ms. 
Hammer in which she disclosed to me multiple instances of Mr. Ribi harassing her, and being 
hostile towards her, in her duties as the Sun Valley City Administrator, and in which she 
expressed her concerns that Mr. R.ibi was potentially unstable and dangerous to at least her, 
as well as potentially other City Of Sun Valley employees. 
5) Over the course of the last three years I have been advised by individuals who have 
known Mr. R.ibi for an extended period of time that Mr. Ribi has taken medication for both 
migraine headaches and for dental problems, and that potentially those medications cause his 
temperament and conduct to be varied and unstable. 
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6) In late November of 2011, (had a personal conversation with former Sun Valley 
Mayor Jon Thorson who told me that when Virginia Egger was the Sun Valley City 
Administrator, that Mr. Ribi had multiple arguments with Ms. Egger, and that Mayor 
Thorson directed Mr. Ribi to seek counseling with Ms. Egger, which the City Of Sun Valley 
paid for, to treat Mr. Ribi's anger and hostility issues, at least with Ms. Egger. Prior to my 
call with fonner Mayor Thorson, several individuals related to the City Of Sun Valley had 
also disclosed to me the hostility that Mr. Ribi had s~own towards Ms. Egger. 
7) In early December, I had a personal phone conversation with William Sperling, 
who was Mr. Ribi' s former next door neighbor in Sun Valley. Mr. Sperling told me that 
between 2001 and 2005 that Mr. Ribi had harassed his wife on multiple occasions to the 
point that Ms. Sperling lodged harass!llent complaints with the City Of Sun Valley Police 
Department. Mr. Sperling told me that the predominant reason that they moved away from 
Sun Valley was to get away from Mr. Ribi. Prior to my calI with Mr. Sperling, several 
individuals related to the City Of Sun Valley had also disclosed to me that Mr. Ribi had 
harassed Ms. Sperling. 
8) On November 12, 2011, or thereabouts, I drafted the letter attached as Exhibit A of 
the Complaint herein (the "First Litigation Notice Letter"), and served the First Litigation 
Notice Letter on Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich, Sun Valley City Council Members Joan 
Lamb, De Wayne Briscoe, Nils Ribi, Robert Youngman, and City Council Members Elect 
Franz Suhadolnik and Michelle Griffith (hereinafter defined as the "Controlled Notice 
Group"). The First Litigation Notice Letter was clearly marked "STRICIL Y 
CONFIDENTIAL, Not For Public Distribution, In Contemplation Of Litigation". I certify 
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that the purpose of the First Litigation Notice Letter was to notify the Controlled Notice 
Group of potential litigation arising o?t of actions that had been taken against my client 
Sharon R. Hammer. I certify that I intended that no persons other than the Controlled Notice 
Group obtain or see the First Litigation Notice Letter. I certify that, except for including the 
First Litigation Letter in filings in the pleadings in the Hammer v. Ribi matter, I personally 
allowed no one other than the Controlled Notice Group to obtain or see the First Litigation 
Notice Letter. 
9) On November 16, 2011, or thereabouts, I drafted the letter attached as Exhibit B 
of the Complaint herein (the "Second Litigation Notice Letter"), and attached to the Second 
Litigation Notice Letter the draft Verified Complaint attached as Exhibit C of the Complaint 
herein (the ''Draft Complaint"), and served the Second Litigation Notice Letter and the Draft 
.. Complaint on the Controlled Notice Group. The Second Litigation Notice Letter and the 
Draft Complaint was clearly marked ,"STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, Not For Public 
Distribution, In Contemplation Of Litigation". I certify that the purpose of the Second 
Litigation Notice Letter and the Draft Complaint was to notify the Controlled Notice Group 
of potential litigation arising out of actions that had been taken against my client Sharon R. 
Hammer. I certify that I intended that no persons other than the Controlled Notice Group 
obtain or see the Second Litigation Notice Letter or the Draft Complaint. I certify that, except 
for including the Second Litigation Notice Letter in filings in the pleadings in the Hammer v. 
Ribi matter, I personally allowed no one other than the Controlled Notice Group to obtain or 
see the Second Litigation Notice Letter. I certify that I personally allowed no one other than 
the Contro1led Notice Group to obtain or see the Draft Complaint. 
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10) Between November 12, 2011 and November 16, 2011, when I issued the First 
Litigation Notice Letter, the Second Litigation Notice Letter and the Draft Complaint to the 
Controlled Notice Group, based on my personal observations of Mr. Ribi, my multiple 
conversations with Ms. Hammer and my multiple conversations with individuals associated 
with the City Of Sun Valley, I held a sincere personal belief that Mr. Ribi was emotionally 
unstable and potentially seriously medically or emotionally ill, and that he was!- potential 
danger to Ms. Hammer and other City Of Sun Valley employees. 
11) On November 12, 2011 and November 16, 2011, when I issued the First 
Litigation Notice Letter, the Second Litigation Notice Letter and the Draft Complaint to the 
Controlled Notice Group, I did not do so with any malice towards Mr. Ribi, but did so to a) 
provide notice to the City Of Sun Valley of potential legal claims Ms. Hammer had against 
the City OfSwi Valley and Mr. Ribi, and b) with the sincere belief that the City Of Sun 
Valley should be made aware of the potential that Mr. Ribi was emotionally unstable and 
potentially seriously ill, and that he was a potential danger to Ms. Hammer and other City Of 
Sun Valley employees. 
12) On November 21, 2011, on behalf of Ms. Hammer, I filed.a Verified Complaint 
against Sun Valley City Council Member Nils Ribi, the City Of Sun Valley and Sun Valley 
City Attorney pursuant to the Idaho Protection Of Public Employees Act (Idaho Statutes 6-
2010 et seq.) (the "IPPEA") in Blaine County, Idaho (Hammer v. Ribi et al., No. CV-2011-
928). The allegations in the Verified Complaint in the Hammer v. Ribi action were limited to 
the issues related to the IPPEA. The remaining claims in the Draft Complaint provided to the 
Controlled Notice Group were not filed as part of the Hammer v. Ribi case as Ms. Hammer's 
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tort claims in the Draft Complaint are subject to a waiting period under the provisions of the 
Idaho Tort Immunity Act ( (Idaho Statute 6-906 - 6-910). 
13) On or about November 28, 2011, I obtained a copy of the letter from R. Keith 
Roark attached as Exhibit D of the Complaint herein (the "First Roark Letter"). I certify that I 
did not receive a copy of the First Roark Letter either in the U.S. mail or via email. I certify 
that the first time I saw the First Roark Letter was on or about November 28, 2011 when I 
received a copy of an Affidavit ofNils Ribi prepared by R. Keith Roark in the Hammer v. 
Ribi case. 
14) On November 30, 2011, I sent the letter attached herein as Exhibit A to R. Keith 
Roark (the "First Response Letter''). 
15) On December 6, 2011, I received the email attached as Exhibit B herein from R. 
Keith Roark (the "Roark Email''). 
16) On approximately December 18, 2011, I received the letter dated November 16, 
2011 attached as Exhibit C herein from R. Keith Roark (the "Second Roark Letter''). 
17) On approximately December 18, 2011, I received a second letter dated November 
16, 2011 attached as Exhibit D :from R. Keith Roark (the "Third Roark Letter''). 
18) On December 22, 2011, I sentthe letter attached herein as Exhibit E to R. Keith 
Roark (the "Second Response Letter"). 
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Further Affiant sayeth not. 
Subscribed_Ip. And Sworn Before 
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I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BR1SCOE, 
Defendants. 
I. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF 
DEFENDANTSRIBIAND 
BRISCOE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
INTRODUCTION 
Ms. Hammer respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its finding that an employer's 
agent cannot be held personally liable under the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act 
("IPPEA"). The Court's November 26, 2013 finding omits language from the statute that 
addresses what would otherwise be an absolute defense to any violation of the IPPEA The 
. . ' I 
Court's finding that the IPPEA does. not provide for a separate cause of action against 
Defendants Ribi and Briscoe assumes that all liability arising out of the IPPEA is imputed to an 
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employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under Idaho law, respondeat superior only 
imputes liability to an employer where the employer's agent's conduct giving rise to liability is 
conduct within the course and scope of the agent's authority. The Court's ruling does not 
account for IPPEA violative conduct that falls outside the scope of respondeat superior liability. 
The intent of the IPPEA is to protect public employees from adverse action. Its purpose 
would not be served if all an employer needed to do to defeat an IPPEA liability is to claim that 
an agent's violative conduct falls ou~side the scope of respohdeat superior liability. The 
language omitted from the Court's qecision - specifically the remedy against a person -
addresses how the IPPEA's intent is preserved when an agent acting on behalf of an employer 
exceeds their authority and injures a public employee. The IPPEA expressly provides for 
remedies against agents of the employer in their individual capacity: 
6-2105. Remedies for employee bringing action -· Proof required. 
*** 
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may 
bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual 
damages, or both, within one hundred eighty (180) days after the 
occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. 
(3) An action begun under this section may be brought in the 
district court for ... the county where the person against whom 
the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of 
business. 
(I.C. § 6-2105(2) and (3); emphasis added.) Further, the remedies available under the Il>PEA 
can be applied to a person. '"Damages' means damages for iqjury or loss caused by each 
violation of this chapter, and includes court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." (I.C. § 6-
2105(1).) "Damages" are regularly applied to suits against "persons" in Idaho as are injunctions 
(I.C. § 6-2106(1)) and "compensation for lost wages, benefits, or other remuneration" (I.C. § 6-
2106(4)). 
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II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Omitted Statutory Words Must Be Included 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a Court mUst give effect to the 
statute as written. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685 688 (1999); citation 
omitted. ''Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court assumes that the legislature meant 
what is clearly stated in the statute." Id. A Court cannot write words out of the statute. "It is a 
cardinal rule of construction that effect, if possible, must be given to every letter, word, phrase 
and clause of a statute. Any construction which fails to give effect to the word and letter of the 
statute, or which would leave any clause as meaningless, or give it an absurd signification, is 
never admissible whenever any other interpretation is possible." Ingram v. State Wagon-Road 
Comm'n, 4 Idaho 139 (1894). See also, State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158 (2010) ("Indeed, to 
treat the provision merely as an example essentially reads the words "after a defendant has been 
placed on probation" out of the statute. Such an interpretation would violate the rule of statutory 
construction requiring every Word in a statute to be given its plain meaning."); Magnuson v. 
Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho ~17, 920, 556 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1976) ("[AJU sections of 
the applicable statutes.should be considered and construed together to determine the intent of the 
legislature; and thatit is incumbent upon a court to give the statute an interpretation that will not 
in effect nullify it.,,) (citations omitted). 
By omitting the ,express remedy against an individual person under the IPPEA, the Court 
has improperly read out a cause of actic;m provided for in the IPPEA. In doing so based on the 
assumption that respondent superior liability is the only liability under the IPPEA, the Court has 
also read-into the statute an ultimate defense·for employers - employers can say the actor was 
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not acting within the course and scope and, as a matter of law, the employer is not liable for that 
agent's conduct. See, e.g., Cantwe[l v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 
(2008) ("The actions of an agent are the actions of the corporation. An agent is only liable for 
actions which are outside its scope of duty to the corporation.") (emphasis added) citing 
Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 948 
(1993)); T. W. & L. 0. Naylor Co. v. Bowman. 39 Idaho 764, 230 P. 347 (1924) ("A principal 
cannot be bound by the acts of an agent done outside of the actual or apparent scope of his 
authority, unless such acts have been ratified and adopted by the principal/') 
The Court's narrow interpretation of the IPPEA seve,rely limits the iPPEA's intent, which 
is broad protection for public employees. This broad intent should be given broad effect: "The 
compiled laws establish the law of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed, with a view to 
effect their objects and to promote justice." LC.§ 73-102(1). "The Court will interpret [a] statute 
broadly to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Elec. Wholesale Supply Co. inc. v. Nielson, 
136 Idaho 814, 825, 41 P.3d 242, 253 (2001). 
B. The Non-Idaho Cases Relied Upon By The Court To Construe The IPPEA 
Narrowly Should Be Reconsidered 
In reaching its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the Court appears to have been persuaded 
by non.Idaho law regarding Title VII in its finding that there is no individual liability under. the 
IPPEA. The Court cited to Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2nd Cir. 1995), but missed the 
portion of Tomka finding individual liable under the New York Human Rights Law which uses 
the word "person" (in contrast to Title VII, which does not): 
the HRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice 
"for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of 
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any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.,, 
. . . Based on this language, several courts have . . . [held] that a 
defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a 
discrimination claim may be held personally liable under the HRL. 
In the present case, Tomka has alleged that each of the individual 
defendants assaulted her and thereby created a hostile working 
environment. This allegation is sufficient to satisfy § 296(6), and 
the district court thus 1incorrectly dismissed Tomka's sexual 
harassment claims against the individual defendants in their 
. personal capacities under the HRL. 
Tomka, 66 F .3d at 1317; citations omitted. 
14] 0006/0009 
The Court also relied on Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, 55 E.3d 377 (8th Cir. 
1995), but Lenhardt has been disfavored (see Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, 204 S.W.3d 238 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). In Lenhardt, . the Eighth Circuit discussed what it thought Missouri 
courts would determine about the Missouri Human Rights Act related to personal liability. As 
was noted in Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, "with all due respect to the Eighth Circuit, the 
Missouri Supreme Court does not blindly follow the 'predictions' of the federal courts." Cooper, 
204 S.W.3d at 243. Cooper determined that because the Missouri Human Rights Act refers to 
the word ''person" as to who suits·could be brought against (as is the case with the IPPEA), ''the 
MHRA imposes individual liability in ,the event of discriminatory conduct." Id. at 244. In 
Genaro v. Central Transport, 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1999), the ()~io 
Supreme Court also rejected a Title VII analysis of its Ohio anti-discrimination provision and 
determined that individual liability was imposed under the Ohio anti~discrimin:ation provision 
based on the use of the phrase "person" in the statute. In contrast to Tomka, Cooper, Blazek, and 
the IPPEA at issue in the present action, the statute at issue in Obst v. Microtron, 588 N.W.2d 
550 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), where individual liability was not found, does not use the word 
"person." 
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As discussed in the Title VII section of Tomka, a significant portion of the rationale of 
excluding individual liability under Title VII is Title VII's expressed inapplicability to employers 
with less than fifteen employees. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314. The small employer exemption was 
also used in E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995), Wathen v. General; Electric, 
115 F.3d 400 (61h Cir. 1997), and Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 18 Cal. 4th 640 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 
1998), all relied upon by this Court. Unlike the statutes being analyzed in theses case, the IPPEA 
does not have a small employer exemption. The 1PPEA applies to all public employers and all of 
their agents, regardless of the number of employees. The IPPEA also expressly provides for a 
remedy against an individual: 
6-2105. Remedies for employee bringing action -- Proof required. 
"'**· 
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter niay 
bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual 
damages, or both, within one hundred eighty ( 180) days after the 
occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. 
(3) An action begun un<ier this section may be brought in the 
district court for ... the county where the person against whom 
the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of 
business. 
(LC.§ 6-2105(2) and (3); emphasis added.) 
There was no need to look beyond Idaho Code section 6-2015, as its language is plain 
and unambiguous. The IPPEA's intent is, expressly, broad. Further, the Legislative History, 
however scant it may be, supports a reading of the IPPEA that does allow for a cause of action 
against a person. As the Plaintiff previously cited to the Court, Representative Berain (the 
sponsor of the IPPEA) testified befoz:e the Idaho House Human Rights Committee that the 
IPPEA also covered the "heads of those agencies" (i.e., Mayor and City Council members), 
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clearly indicating that the high ranking officials of the agencies at issue would also be subject to 
the provisions of the IPPEA. 
The IPPEA plain language, broad intent, and Legislative History all show why the logic 
related to the Lenhardt discussion on Title VII would not, and cannot, apply in this instance. The 
Lenhardt court stated: 
As a practical matter employees who unlawfully discriminate 
against their fellow employees, and who thereby expose their 
employer to liability, do not get anything like a "free-pass" to 
continue their wrongdoing with impunity . . . . Art employer who is 
subject to well-founded claims of employment discrimination as a 
result of an employee's intentional acts of discrimination is not 
likely to look favorably upon the offending employee. To the 
contrary, the employer, to protect its own interests and to avoid 
further liability,. almost certainly will impose some form of 
discipline upon the offending employee. That discipline may 
include a "free-pass'' to the unemployment line, a result that would 
seem particularly likely if the employee engages in repeated acts of 
intentional discrimination against fellow employees. 
Tomka, 66 F.3d at 381. 
This Title VII logic simply cannot apply to the situation that we have in this case. 
Defendants Briscoe and Ribi are the Mayor and City Council member, respectively. There is no 
one who can impose discipline oh them; nor are they going to impose any discipline themselves. 
This is just one more reason the IPPEA includes "person" and why Representative Berain 
assured the Idaho Legislature that the IPPEA would apply to the "heads of those agencies". 
ID. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Sharon Hamriler respectfully requests that this Co'uft 
reconsider having granted Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to Dismiss. 
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DATED this 10th day of December, 2013. 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of December, 2013, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
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950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702-6103 
The Honorable Jonathan P. Brody 
District Judge 
Minidoka County Courthouse 
8th & G Streets 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
( ] U.S. Mail 
[x'] Fax: 383-9516 
[ l Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
E,lJ Fax: (208) 436-5272 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
( ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: ,----
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RJBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATlON OF 
DEFENDANTSRJBIAND 
BRISCOE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer {"Ms. Hammet"), by and through her 
counsel of record, Jones & Swartz PLLC, and pursuant to Rules 7(b)(l) and 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the 
' Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure hereby moves this Court to reconsider having granted Defendants 
Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds and for the reasons that the Court's current 
finding omits statutory language, creates a defense to the Idaho Prote·ction of Public Employees 
Act ("lPPEA") that is inconsistent with the IPPEA language and intent, and that the cases relied 
upon by the Court in reaching its ruling are not supportive of the Court's ruling. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANTS RIBI AND BRISCOE'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
716 
12/10/2013 16:30 FAX 208 48 88 Jones Swartz 
~0003/0003 
This Motion is made and supported by the pleadings of record herein and is further 
supported by the Memorandwn filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2013. 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I 0th day of December 2013, a ttue and correct copy. of 
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
NAYLOR&HALES, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83 702-6103 
The Honorable Jonathan P. Brody 
District Judge 
Minidoka County Courthouse 
8th & G Streets 
P.O. Box368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[.,q Fax: 383-9516 
[ J Hand Delivery 
[ l Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
[ J U.S. Mail 
[ xJ Fax: (208) 436-5272 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ) Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: 
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Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396 
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702) 
P.O. Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 489;.8988 
Email: eric@ionesandswartzlaw.com 
joy@jortesandswartzlaw.com 
· Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Ham~er 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTYOF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff; 
VS; 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIB!; 
artd De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SUBPOENA AGAINST 
NON-PARTY PATRICIA BALL AND 
TO COM.PEL THE PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS WITHHELD FROM 
PRODUCTION IN DISCOVERY AND 
IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA 
A. There Is No Evidence of the Attorney-Client Relationships Necessary 
to Claim the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product at Issue 
Ms. Ball and the City of Sun Valley ("City") ate opposing Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
, · over 200 documents by asking this Court to infer .an attorney-client relationship in order to 
support the blanket assertion of the attorney~client privilege and attorney work product 
. protections. "As demonstrated by the communications provided in camera to this Court, ... there 
are multiple instances where Mr. Willich received communications that. clearly indicated that 
Mt; Naylor-and Mr. King·were participating in the aaministration of the investigation, and there 
·.REPLY TN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION to ENFORCE SUBPOENA AGAINST NON-PARTY 
PATRICIA BALL AND TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS WITHHELD FROM 
: .. PRODUCTION IN DISCOVERY AND IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA - I 
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is no evidence of any objection by Mr. Willich."1 
Obviously, Plaintiff cannot coilllftent of the substance of these emails since they have not 
been produced. According to the privilege log, however, there were only six (6) emails between 
Attorney Naylor and Former Mayot Willich. Five (5) of them were from Attorney Naylor, and 
there is no evidence that any of them were received or read by Former Mayor Willich. There is 
only one (1) email from Fonner Mayor Willich to Attorney Naylor, on December 13, 2011 - one 
day after Former Mayor Willich concluded the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation: 
. --· 
Date _,:. Log Ref. From To cc'd 




11/24/2011 BALL 1074-1075 Naylor Briscoe .. 
Ball, King, 
-11/25/2011 BALL 1064-1066 Naylor 
~-..; .. Willich Briscoe . . 
. Ball, Willi ch, 
.11/25/2011 BALL 1067-1069 ... Naylor .. ... King, Briscoe . . 
Willich, King, 
11/25/2011 .. BALL 1072-1073 Naylor Ball, Briscoe ... 
Ball, Willich, 
11/25/2011 -··· ·- --- BALL 1160-1163 .. Naylor King_ . 
.. ... . . ON NOVEMBER 28, 2011 THE HAMMER INVESTIGATION INTERVIEWS BEGIN 
. "·· - ON DECEMBER.12, 2Qll THE HAMMERINVESTIGATION IS CONCLUDED .. 
12/13/2011. BALL 1044·, . Willich Ball,_Naylor _King, Briscoe 
Even. if the December 13, 2011 email states, affirmatively, that Former Mayor Willich 
was hiring Attorney Naylor, the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation was over. There appear to 
be no emails before December 13, 2011, that· could support an affitinative engagement of 
1 Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena, p. 22. Plaintiff should be able to see 
these communications if, as the City and Ms. Ball assert, they describe and define the relationship 
between Attorney Naylor and the City. Such comfuunications are not covered by any attorney-client, 
work product or common interest privilege. Nguyen v. Excel. Corp., 197 F.3d 200 (5th. Cir. 1999) 
("Inquiry into the general nature of legal i services provided by counsel to a corporate client does not 
necessitate an assertion of attorney-client privilege"). Only communications that seek or provide legal 
advice are protected by the attorney-client privilege. State v. Allen, 123 Idaho 880, 853 P.2d 625 (Ct. 
A.pp. 1993). 
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Attorney Naylor by Fonner Mayor Willich. "As a general rule, no attorney-client relationship 
exists absent assent by both the putative client and attorney." Berry v. McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 
9, 278 P.3d 407, 411 (2012) (einphasi~' added): "[W]here the ,question as to the attorney's· 
authority is raised, his actual authority must be established .... " Muncey v. Children's Home 
Finding and Aid Society of Lewiston, 84 Idaho 147,153,369 P.2d 586, 589 (1962), Just because 
Attorney Naylor made the Hammer Investigation his business does not mean that Fonner Mayor 
' ' 
Willich's "lack of objection" was assent to convey actual authority to Attorney Naylor to be the 
City~s attorney for the purposes of the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. Again, there is no 
evjdence that these emails were received or read by Fonner Mayor Willich. The City's 
contention that there was an inferred attorney-client relationship via lack of objection also does 
not square with it and Ms. Ball's argument that unidentified "Sun Valley officials" decided that 
Attorney Naylor was going to be the legal contact for the purposes of the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation. 2 
Ms. Ball and th·e City's reliance on an inferred attorney-client relationship ,does n'Ot 
satisfy their burden of proving an actual attorney-client relationship and that each and every 
document being withheld thereunder falls within the scope of any such actual relationship: 
Nowhere in the hundreds of pages that. Ms. Ball and the City submitted to this Court is there 
proof that Mr. Naylor was hired by the City (Fornier Mayor Willich or by resolution of the entire 
j 
City Council) to participate in, guide; or offer legal adviceih regard to the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation. Mt. Naylor was insuran~e defense counsel after the November 21, 2011 IPPEA 
lawsuit was filed. If Ms. Ball is in possession of what he claims is attorney.:.client privileged and 
work product documents - as her privilege log shows ~ Mr. Naylor's decision to share his 
2 Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena, p. 5. 
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IPPEA-defense privileged communicatiop.s and work product with her waived any privilege that 
might have existed. 
The City never had an attorney-client relationship with Ms. Ball. Ms. Ball was not 
directed to provide legal advice; she does not even assert that she was. She was engaged to 
conduct a fact-finding investigation. Neither Ms. Ball nor the City's hundreds of pages of 
documents submitted to this Court show any actual engagement of Ms. Ball for the purposes of 
providing legal advice incident to the IPPEA lawsuit or the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. 
The documents available do show that her engagement was limited to fact-finding and limited to 
,.. allegations being made about Ms. Hammer's misconduct. There is no evidence of her 
engagement morphing into providing legal advice about the investigation or the IPPEA lawsuit. 
The evidence available also shows that Former Mayor Willich and the City do not informally 
enter into relationships. They use formal engagement letters. Th'ere is a complete absence of 
any such engagement letters to support the relationships that the City and Ms. Ball are asking 
this Court to infer exist. Without the formation of an attorney,a,client relationship, there cannot be 
any privilege or work-product protections to assert. 
B. Even if An Attorney-Client Relationship Existed, the City and Ms. Ball Do Not 
Provide the Privileges Asserted on a Document-By-Document Basis 
The City and Ms. Ball ask the Court to assume the existence of attorney-client 
relationships; assume that the withheld. documents fall within the scope of those relationships, 
assume that the communications ate, in fact-, because of litigation, and assume that the 
communications, in fact, include legal advice. Assumptions and inferences are not enough. Th~ 
burden of showing that information is privileged; and therefore exempt from discovery, is on the 
party asserting the privilege. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 14.1 Idaho 697, 704; 116 P.3d 27, 34 
(2005) (citation omitted). This burden is on a document-by-document basis: 
iIBPL YIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AGAINST NON-PARTY 
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Irt sum, a proper analysis as to the withheld documents must be 
conducted on a document by document basis. If the document 
would not have been generated 'but for' litigation, it is privileged. 
However, if it was generated for purposes other· than litigation, 
even though litigation may have been a 'real possibility'. it must be 
disclosed. 
United States v. Torf(In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 350 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). The 
. City and Ms. Ball suggest that the "but for" standard should be "because of," but they never 
undertake any ·effort to show that each of their over 200 withheld documents actually qualify for 
privilege protection. "As with the att6rney"'client privilege, the person asserting the work 
product privilege cannot make a blanket assertion of the privilege, but must state docume11t".'by-
doctiment wliat information the privilege applies." Buckner v. United States, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14107 {D. Idaho 1995) citing United States v. Born.stein, 977 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 
1992). 
The City and Ms. Ball's assertion of blanket privileges in this case is particularly 
problematic in this case. Even if a privilege could be asserted related to the Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation, that privilege cannot be extended to communications related to the 
Hammer Disciplinary Investigation after December 12, 2011. That is when Former Mayor 
Willich concluded the investigation to be over and further concluded that Ms. Hammer did not 
engage irt any misconduct.3 The City's current attempt to argue that the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation was not finished runs afoul of Idaho Code § 50-208, which provides that Fortner 
·. Mayor Willich controlled the "affairs" of Sun Valley, and Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley 
,Personnel Policies, which confirms that all decisions of. Former Mayor Willich related to 
employee disciplinary matters were "final and binding." Former Mayor Willich was the only 
City official who could have re-opened the investigation, and he has testified that he did not 
3 Willich Aff., 1 53. 
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i ,. 
Any communications with Investigator Ball after Fortner Mayor Willich terminated the 
investigation, until at least until January 3, 2012, when Former Mayor Willich's term as Mayor, 
of Sun Valley ended, cannot be within the scope of any attorney's work on the Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation. Berry v. McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 9, 278 P.3d 407, 411 (2012) ("If 
the attorney agrees to undertake a specific matter, the relationship terminates when that matter 
lias beeh resolved."). 
C. The Hammer Disciplinary Investigation Was to Address Allegations of 
Ms. Hammer's Alleged Misconduct - Not Because of Threatened Litigation 
The City and Ms. Ball's assertion that the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation Was 
because of threatened ligation is not supported oy the evidence of record. On November 14, 
2011, after Ms. Hammer refused to resign at Council Member Ribi, Council Member Youngman 
a:nd Current Mayor Briscoe's request, the Sun Valley City Council passed a resolution 
authorizing Fonner Mayor Willich to hire an attorney in regards to the Hanuner Disciplinary 
Investigation.4 The minutes of the November 14, 2011 Sun Valley City Council meeting do not 
state that the Sun Valley City Council was going into executive session 'related to threatened 
litigation. The minutes state that the Sun VaHey City Council was going into executive session 
"To consider the evaluation, dismissal or disciplining of, or to hear complaints or charges 
brought against, a public officer, employer, staff member or individual agent."5 The minutes 
were latet amended to include an "agenda item to discuss hiring an attorney to conduct an 
independent investigation. "5 Although the members of the Sun Valley City Council had already 
received Mr. Donoval's communication of November 12, 2011 by the November 14, 2011 
Sun Valley City Council meeting, the Sun Valley City Council gave no indication that 
4 Ex. Kto Supplemental Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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Mr. Donoval's threat of litigation was why the Council was going into executive session on 
November 14, 2011. Of more importance is that, when the Sun Valley City Council crune out of 
the November 14, 2011 executive session, no mention was made of threatened litigation, and 
instead the Sun Valley City Council passed a resolution to simply "authorize the Mayor to 
engage an attorney to conduct an independent investigation."7 If the purpose of the hiring of 
Investigator Ball was in regards to threatened litigation, as is .now asserted by the City and 
Ms; Ball, the Sun Valley City Council minutes would state as much.. Instead, the minutes and 
the subsequent Ball Retainer State that the investigation is to learn whether Ms. Hammer engaged 
in misconduct. Also, if Ms. Ball was being retained.because of litigation, her retainer agreement 
· would have stated as much. 
D. the City and Ms. Ball's Response to Waiver is Not Sufficient 
The release of any communications that have been asserted to be privileged acts as a 
waiver for the communication itself (Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417, 565 P.2d 1374 (1977)), as 
well as any matter associated with the topic of the communication (Weil v. Investment/ 
Indicators, -Research & Mgt., 647 F.2d 18 (91h Cir. 1981). The waiver also encompasses drafts of 
the documents or communications. Loftin v. Bande, 258 F.R.D. 31 (b.C. Cir. 2009) and United 
States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871 (4th. Cit. 1984). This Court raised the issue of waiver in 
Rlbi v. Donoval, Blaine County Case No. CV-2010~1040, at the time of Mr .. Donoval's Motion 
for Reconsideration.8 The Court never ruled on Mr. Donoval's periding Motion to Reconsider 
because the Coutt stayed discovery until after ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment related 
to Ms. Brolin-Ribi's emotional distress claims against Mr. Donoval, but did ask Attorney Naylor 
how any privilege was not waived after the Unauthorized Ball Report was released and published 
., 7 Id. 
8 Supplemental Affidavit of James DonovaL 
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in the Idaho Mountain Express newspapet.9 
Ms. Ball and the City do not cite any authority that supports their withholding of 
communications about the Ball reports after they made the Ball reports public and, apparently, 
provided them to the Prosecutor. 10 Instead, they argue that they have already produced the 
niaterials related to the reports. The City and Ms. Ball's argument begs the-questions - what is 
in the materials that are being withheld and does it fall within the scope of engagement, the scope 
of a true privilege, and does fairness require that the materials be produced in light of the 
publication of the Ball reports? The City and Ms. Ball ask the Court to :trust them without 
allowing the Court to verify their statements. 'rhe only way to know whether the materials still 
withheld were otherwise waived is for the Court to review the materials and detennine whether 
fairness requires the same to be produced. 
, E. Conclusion-
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in the Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and to Compel the 
Production of Documents Withheld from Production in Discovery and in Response to Subpoena, 
· Ms. Hammer respectfully requests that the Court grant her Motion, and: 
1. Conduct an in camera review of the materials being withheld on grounds of 
privileges established by the party claiming the same and which are not overcome by the 
,: _-4.. •• 
9 Mr. Donoval's Response· to Sun Valley's Motion to Quash the Subpoena for Investigator Ball's records 
in the Rib/ v. Donoval matter was filed on September 12, 2012, without the benefit of an Affidavit of 
Former Mayor Willich on the matter. The .Court granted Sun Valley's Motion to Quash on October 22, 
2012, about a month before the Unauthorized Ball Report was published in the' Idaho Mountain Express 
newspaper. Mr. Donoval filed his Motion to Reconsider on November 8, 2012, still prior to the 
publication of the Unauthorized Ball Report in the Idaho Mountain Express newspaper. At the January 
·1s, 2013 hearing on.the matter, the Court, on its·own, noted that in the intervening days since the filing of 
the Motion to Reconsider, the Unauthorized Ball Report had been published in the Idaho Mountain 
.Express newspaper and questioned Attorney Naylor as to how that did not amount to waiver. 
10 One government agency turning over ~ocuments to another government agency waives privileges. 
Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (U.S. D.C. 1981) . 
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arguments herein or at oral argument; 
a. Order their production if the Court finds no' applicable privilege ot a waiver 
thereof; 
b. Order their redacted, production to reveal facts, but preserve truly confidential 
information or attorneys' mental impressions; 
2. Compel the production of materials in their entirety that are being withheld on un-
established claims of privilege; 
3. Compel the production of materials for which any applicable privilege was, 
waived; and 
4. Award Ms. Hammer her attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of having to 
'bring this motion. 
DATED this 13th day of December, 2013. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of December, 2013, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702-6103 
The Honorable Jonathan P. Brody 
District Judge 
Minidoka County Courthouse 
8th &-G Streets 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
[ J U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax: 383-9516 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ J Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[XJ Fax: (208) 436-5272 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ J Email: 
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Eric B. Swartz, ISB.#6396 
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC . 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702] 
P.O. Box 7808 _ 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 489 ... 8988 
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
Attorneys fot Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer 
~-.ED ~ifJ!:3{C: 
I ; EC 1 3 2013 I 
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Jolynn Drag£;:, (.,'/er.1< Districl 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
.SHARON R HAMMER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
ENFORCE SUBPOENA AGAINST 
NON-PARTY PATRICIA BALL AND 
TO COMPEL TH'ii~ PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS WITHHELD FROM 
PRODUCTION.IN DISCOVERY AND , 
IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA 
STATE OF.IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
· County of Ada ) 
I; ERIC B. SWARTZ, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state: 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Jones & Swartz PLLC, and am authorized to· 
. practice law before this and all courts of thestate ofidaho. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of the November I l, 2011 
Speciai Council Meeting Minutes, prod~c·ed in discovety by Defendant City of Suh Valley. 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 13th day of December, 2013. 
Notary Public ?orictaho 
My Commission expires () 1.J.5·,,l,1)/$ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of December, 2013, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
NAYLOR& HALES, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, li:> 83702-6103 
The Honorable Jonathan P. Brody 
District Judge 
Minidoka County Courthouse 
8th & G Streets 
P.O.Box368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax: 383-9516 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X ] Fax: (208) 436-5272 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ J Hand Deli very 
[ ] Email: 
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SPECIAL COUNCIL MEETING MINUTES 
OF THE MAYOR AND ctrY COUNCIL 
ORIGINA·L 
IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBERS• 81.ELKHORN ROAD 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY, IDAHO 
NO~IER 11, 2011 2:00 P.M. 
The Mayor and the City Council 'of Sun Valley, Blaine County, State of Idaho, met In a Special Council 
Meeting In the Sun Vall$}' City Hall Council Chambers on November 11, 2011 2:00 p.m. 
CALL TO ORDER 
ROLL CALL 
PRESENT: Mayor Wayne WDllch, Council Prealdent Dewayne Briscoe, Council membet Bob 
Youngman and Council member NIis RJbl. 
ABSENT: Council member Joan Lamb. 
EXECUTIVI! SEBStON 
MOTION 
Col.Inell member NIis Rll:il moved to enter Into Exeartive Seasioli pul'8Uant to Idaho Codtf67-2345 1 
(b) ,To consider the eval~tlon, dlamlssal or dlsclpllnlng of, or to hear complaints or charge8 brought 
against, a. publlc officer,. employee, 8taff member or Individual agent, or publlc school student; 
seconded by Council member·Bob Youngman. · 
AYES:. Council Ptesldent Dewayne Briscoe, CouncH member Bob Youngman and 
Council member NIis Rlbl. 
NAYES: None 
Council member Joan Lamb wss absent for this vote. 
The Mayor declared the. motion carried. 
executfve s~ begarrat 2:10 p.m. 
E><ecuUve' Session ended at 4:415 p.m. 
AMENOAOENDA M0110N .. 
Counclf'.Prealdent Dewayne Briscoe moved to amend the agenda to add an Item authorizing the Mayor 
and Clly Attorney to have a dlacu88lon with a Clly Employee, sec:onded by Council member Bob 
Youngman. 
AYES: Council President Dewayne Briscoe, Counclf member Bob Youngman and 
Councll member Nila Rlbl. 
NAYES: None . 
CouncU member Joan I.limb was absent for Uifs vote. 
The Mayor declared the motion carrted. 
Council member Bob Youngman stated the good faith reason to amend the agenda was based on 
Information received by Council In Executive Session. 
'MOTION 
Council member NHa Rlbl moved to approve authorizing the Mayor and Ci'ty attorney to meet with an 
employee consistent with what was dlSCllned In Executive Session, seconded by Bob Youngman; 
AYES: Council Pre$ldent Dewayne Briscoe, Councll member Bob Youngman and 
Council membet Nils Rlbl. 
NAYES: None 
CouncH member Joan Lamb was absent for this vote. 
MOTION 
Council President Dewayne Bnac:oe moved to conUnue the Sj:leclal CouncU meeting date certain to 
Monday November 14th, 201.1 at 10:00 a.m, seoonded by Council member Bob Youngman. 
Council member Joan Lamb wes a.J>serit for this vote. 
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AYES: Council President Dewayne Briscoe, Cour\cft member Bob Youngman and 
CouncH me111ber Nl!s RltJI. · 
NAYES: None 
The Mayor declared the n1olloi'l carried. 
RECESS 
Mayor Wllllch recessed ~ meeting at 4:5() p.m. 
s·PECIAL COUNCIL MEErlNG MINUTES OF'JHE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL CONTINUED 
CITY OF SUN VALL.EV, IDAHO 
COUNCIL MEETING ()F "10\/El\ABER11, 2011, 
RECONVENED NOVEMBER 14~_2011 9100·~M 
ROLLCALL 
PRESENT: Mayor Wayne WUllch, Council Pretlldent.Dewayne Briscoe, Couhc!I member Bob 
Y9Ungman, cou-ncll member Nils Rlbhtn<! Ci)uncll m~mber Joah ~mb. 
ABSENT: None 
Council member Joan Lamb partlclpated via telephone. 
EXECU'rlVE SESSION 
MOTION . 
CouncllPresjdeilt 0$wayne Briscoe moved to enter Into.Executive Session pursuant to Idaho Code 
67-23451 (b) T<> consider \he evaluaUon,dlsmlssel or.disciplining of, or to hear complaints or charges 
brought agalnet, a public ciffk.er, employee, staff member or Individual agent, or public school student; 
seconded by Counc:ll member Bob Youngman. 
Executive Session began at 9:00.a.m. 
E~ectilive Session ended at 12:00 p.m. 
AMEND AGENDA 
MOTION 
Council mtt'mper Bob Youngman moved to add a'ti Item to the agenda to dlscuss'hlrlng an attorney to 
conduct an independent lnvesUgatlon, seconded by Council President Dewayne Briscoe. 
AVES: Councll President Dewayne BrlS4:oe, Councll member Bob Youngman:Councll 
member Nns.Rlbl and Councll member Joan Lamb. 
NAYES:Nolie 
The Mayor declared the- motion carried. 
CouMII membet Bob' Youngman stated tHe good faith reason was this ltefrffust arose during 
Executive Session. 
Councn member NIis Rlbl Indicated he was opposed to starting an Independent lnveeUgaUon until 
Mayor Wllllch plac:ea the City Administrator on a Leave of Absence. 
MOTION 
Council member Bob Voungmsh moved to autho'rlze the Mayor to engage an allorney to conduct an 
independent invest!gaUon, seconded by Council President Dewayne Briscoe. 
AYES:· Council PrMldent DewayntrBrlscoe, Council member Bob Youngman and 
NAYES: Council member Nils Rib!. 
Council memb<tr Joan Lamb we:r unable. to vote due to s cellular disconnection. 
the Mayor dedared the motlon carried 
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Council member Nila Rlbl moved to adjourn, seconded by Council member Bob Youngman. 
AYES: CouncHPresldent Dewayne Briscoe, Counol member Bob Youngman and 
Councfl member Nlla Rlbl. 
NAYES: None 
Council member Josn Lamb was absent far this vote. 
The Mayor declared the meeting ·adjourned at 12:08 p.m. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIB!; 
and DeWA YNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-2012~479 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF JAMES R. DONOVAL IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
I, JAMES R. DONOVAL, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state: 
1. That my name is James R~ D6noval, and that I am competent to testify as to the 
matters herein. I certify pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, that the facts 
alleged herein ate true and accurate and ate made With personal knowledge, and would further 
sweat to ·such under oath aha at trial if required. 
2. I am the Defendant/Counterclaimant in the matter of Ribi v. Donova/, Case No. 
·CV-2011-1040, Blaine County, Idaho, in: which I atn also acting as counsel prose. 
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3. On August 30, 2012, in "the Ribi v. Donoval matter, the New Administration of 
Sun Valley filed a Motion to Quash a Subpoena I had setved on Investigator Ball, seeking 
documents related to the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. 
4. On September 10, 2012, I tiled my Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Quash in the Ribi v. Donoval matter. At the time, I was unable to obtain any Affidavits of 
current or prior Sun Valley officials related to the matter. 
5. On October 22, 2012, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision Granting Non-
Party Sun Valley's Motion to Quash Suopoena in the Ribi v. Donoval matter. 
6. On November 8, 2012, I· filed a Motion to Reconsider the ruling by 'the Court 
quashing the Subpoena to Investigator Ball related to the Hammer Disciplinary Investigatiort.iir 
the Ribi v. Donoval matter. The Motion to Reconsider was supported by an Affidavit of Fonner 
Mayor Willich, which contradicted and disputed almost everything that llad been stated in 
pleadings by the New Administration of Sun Valley in regards to the original ruling oftlie Court 
related to the Subpoena issued to Investigator Ball. 
7. Prior to the Court makifi'g any rulings in regards to the Motion to Reconsider in 
the Ribt v. Donoval matter, the Unauthorized Ball Report that I had been seeking as part of the 
Subpoena to Investigator Ball was released by the New Administration of Sun Valley and 
published in the on-line section of the Idaho Mountain Express newspaper. 
8. At a January 15, 2013 hearing in the Ribi v. Donoval matter, the Court, on its 
own, raised the issue that, because the Unauthorized Ball Report had been publicly published, 
the New Administration of Sun Valley had effectively waived any-arguments regarding the 
documents I was seeking under the Subpoena issued to Investigator Ball related to the Hllrtlinet 
Disciplinary Investigation. 
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9. Instead of making any rulings related to the pending Motion to Reconsider, at the 
January 15, 2013 hearing the Court determined that it would stay any further discovery 
proceedings, and instead rule on the pending Motion for Summary Judgment against Ms. Brolin· 
Ribi's emotional distress claims against me. The Court entered an Order describing such on 
January 29, 2013. 
10. On April 23, 2013, the Court in the Rib/ v. Donova/ matter entered summary 
judgment against Ms. Brolin·Ribi's emotional distress claims against me. Because the Court had 
also previously entered summary judgme'nt against Council Member Ribi's defamation claims 
against me, all matters related to the claims of either Council Member Ribi or Ms. Brolin~Ribi 
were concluded. 
11. . As all claims ·by Council Member Ribi and Ms. Brolin-Ribi in Ribi v. Donoval 
were dismissed, any farther discovery related to their claims was thereafter unnecessary. 
12. The Court in Rlbi v. Donoval has never thereafter taken up the still pending 
Motion to Reconsider related to the Subpoena to Investigator Ball,as the matter is moot'because 
of the dismissal of all claims against me brought by Council Member Ribi and Ms. Brolin-Ribi. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYilTH NAUG'?1? C .. -" fl_ .. ~m~ .... 
; JAMES R. DONOVAL 
i 
I 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me thii 13th day of December, 2013. 
My Commission expires &/ /ff 4/! L/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1'3 th day of December, 2013, a true and correct copy 
. of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
NAYLOR& HALES, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83 702-6103 
The Honorable Jonathan P. Brody 
District Judge 
Minidoka County Courthouse 
8th & G Streets 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, Ib 83350 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax: 383-9516 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
[ ] U,S. Mail 
[X] Fax: (208) 43.6'-5272 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Sun Valley, 
Ribi, and Briscoe. 
FILE I JAN 14 20141 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coun , Maho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
De Wayne BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Defendants, by and through their counsel, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby submit,their 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons set forth below, and pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), the Motion should be denied and this Court's dismissal of Defendants Ribi 
and Briscoe should be upheld. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A court may reconsider any of its interlocutory orders pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). The decision is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. E.g., 
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,473, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (2006). As such, a decision denying 
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a motion for reconsideration will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. The analysis on 
appeal would be: ( 1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion: (2) whether 
the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. E.g., Blackmore 
v. Re/Max Tri-Cities, LLC, 149 Idaho 558, 563, 237 P.3d 655, 660 (2010). 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 26, 2013, this Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the individually 
named defendants Nils Ribi and Dewayne Briscoe. The reasoning for this dismissal was that Mr. 
Ribi and Mr. Briscoe are not employers under the definition of the Idaho Protection of Public 
Employees Act and, as such, are not liable in their individual capacities for a cause of action brought 
under the IPPEA. Plaintiff filed the pending motion for reconsideration alleging this Court's 
decision was improper because it "omits language from the statute" which allegedly establishes an 
"express remedy" for individual liability. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that this Court "does not 
account for IPPEA violative conduct that falls outside the scope of respondeat superior liability." 
However, it is clear from this Court's prior ruling and analysis that this Court addressed these 
considerations, and that Plaintiff's current attempt to discount the Court's prior analysis is fruitless. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged that Mr. Ribi or Mr. Briscoe Participated in 
Conduct Which Would Fall Outside the Scope of Respondeat Superior 
Liability. 
Regardless of Plaintiff's revised legal argument, even assuming for this argument only that 
there may be an individual cause of action under the IPPEA, Plaintiff has failed to allege how Mr. 
Ribi or Mr. Briscoe's conduct 1) violated the IPPEA, and 2) was outside the realm of respondeat 
superior liability. As argued previously, while she makes facial allegations that Mr. Ribi and Mr. 
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Briscoe acted outside the course and scope of their employment, her main cause of action is based 
on retaliatory discharge, which discharge would be impossible for Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe to 
execute outside their official capacities. Finally, pursuant to LC. § 6-903(5), Mr. Ribi and Mr. 
Briscoe are presumed to have acted within the course and scope of their employment, and Defendant 
City of Sun Valley has already admitted through discovery that it will assume any liability arising 
from proven violations within the course and scope of employment. (See Addendum 1) As Plaintiff 
seeks damages from violation of the IPPEA, and the City of Sun Valley has already admitted that 
Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe were acting in their official capacities and is liable for any proven damages 
from Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe's official conduct, the further pursuit of individual liability is 
frivolous. 
Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe need not be personally liable for Plaintiff to obtain her alleged 
damages under the IPPEA, and their absence as named individual defendants in no way undermines 
Plaintiff's ability to seek redress under the IPPEA from her former employer. However, the 
continuing crusade of Plaintiff to keep Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe as individual defendants seems to 
imply that the individual liability of Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe is somehow essential to her claims. 
For such an essential part of her claim, it is noteworthy then that she has failed to establish any 
IPPEA violative conduct by Mr. Ribi or Mr. Briscoe which would exclude them from respondeat 
superior liability. While she makes various policy arguments as to why individual liability might 
be beneficial to an IPPEA plaintiff in some vaguely undefined hypothetical, such a perfect storm has 
not occurred in her own claims. 
In fact, even in her "Demand of Judgment for Relief," Plaintiff has not even sought any 
remedy that would be appropriately apportioned to a non-employer defendant. The only possible 
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monetary damages she seeks which are authorized under the IPPEA are "lost wages, benefits, and 
other remuneration,"1 damages which are apportioned to Defendant City of Sun Valley. 
Additionally, Defendant City of Sun Valley has not argued that the actions of Mr. Ribi and 
Mr. Briscoe would somehow absolve it of any potential IPPEA liability as Plaintiff's former 
employer. Therefore, the procedural history of this case and Defendant City of Sun Valley's prior 
argument does not support Plaintiff's proposed doomsday scenario of an employer who somehow 
avoids all liability by disavowing an offending individual employee or official. Again, in her 
complaint, while she has facially alleged that Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe acted outside the course and 
scope of their employment, the adverse employment action that she cites to as violation of the IPPEA 
(her retaliatory discharge) is fully contained within the course and scope of the employment 
functions and powers of the City of Sun Valley, as enacted by its agents. 
B. Plaintiff's Renewed and Revised Reliance on I.C. § 6-2105(3) in Isolation 
is Unreasonable When Considered in the Entirety of the IPPEA. 
Plaintiff has brought no new arguments in her motion for reconsideration, but rather has 
simply repurposed a previously recognized ambiguity in the statutory language which was already 
fully argued by the parties and resolved by this Court. Plaintiff now proposes that I.C. § 6-2105(3), 
which she had previously identified as a venue statute implying individual liability, 2 should now be 
exclusively considered as an "express remedy" against individual defendants. This is inconsistent 
1Plaintiff states in her demand for relief that her request for "lost wages, benefits, and 
other numeration" is "not exclusive," however, the statutory remedies as found in I.C. § 6-2106 
do not provide for any other money damages. 
2Plaintiff specifically noted that the IPPEA "expressly anticipates the inclusion of 
individual defendants (e.g. enumerated proof requirements include placing venue within the 
'county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides.' I.C. § 6-2105(3) ... " 
(Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 2 (emphasis by 
Plaintiff)). · 
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with the plain language of the provision, this Court's interpretation of the same, and the IPPEA as 
a whole. Plaintiff again relies heavily on the solitary mention of the word "person" in this provision, 
pulling it out-of-context from a clause which clearly discusses venue, and combining it with the out-
of-context use of the word "remedies" in the heading of the section in order to manufacture an entire 
cause of action of the IPPEA against individuals. Plaintiff cites to no other provision in the IPPEA, 
nor in Idaho precedent, to support her statutory invention. 
However, in its decision granting dismissal, this Court already interpreted the use of the word 
"person" in LC.§ 6-2105(3) correctly in context of the IPPEA as a whole, citing to supporting Idaho 
case law and parallel federal statutes. It recognized that this section "created additional ambiguity," 
due to the use of the word "person." This Court also clearly acknowledged Plaintiff's prior argument 
that this provision in the IPPEA, "suggests that an action could be filed against an individual." The 
Court then discounted that suggestion by holding to the stated legislative intent found in J.C. § 6-
2101, the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, and the actual 
statutory remedies available to an IPPEA plaintiff found in LC. § 6-2104. Nothing Plaintiff argues 
here is new, and reconsideration is therefore unnecessary. 
Plaintiff also attempts to selectively reproduce the language of LC.§ 6-2105 in order to prop 
up her argument, and in doing so, avoids the most plain application of the statutory heading and title 
to the language of the statute itself. As argued in her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff 
emphasizes the word "Remedies" in the title, and then reproduces the text of only LC.§ 6-2105(2) 
and (3), arguing that LC. § 6-2105(3) specifically refers to the titular "Remedies." However, the use 
of "Remedies" is most plain and clear when taken in context of the full statute, including the 
conveniently omitted LC. § 6-2105(1): 
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6-2105. REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE BRINGING ACTION --
PROOF REQUIRED. 
(1) As used in this section, "damages" means damages for injury or 
loss caused by each violation of this chapter, and includes court costs 
and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a 
civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or 
both, within one hundred eighty ( 180) days after the occurrence of the 
alleged violation of this chapter. 
(3) An action begun under this section may be brought in the district 
court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county 
where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against 
whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of 
business. 
(4) To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this section, 
the employee shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the employee has suffered an adverse action because the employee, 
or a person acting on his behalf engaged or intended to engage in an 
activity protected under section 6-2104, Idaho Code. 
After looking at the statute as a whole, its organization and relationship to the heading breaks 
down quite clearly. Subsections (1) and (2) establish the remedies available to an employee who is 
alleging violation of the IPPEA, including a provision allowing for an aggrieved employee to bring 
a civil action. Subsection (3) specifically establishes the proper venue for bringing such an action. 
Subsection ( 4) establishes the burden of proof that a plaintiff must meet in alleging a violation of the 
IPPEA. Specifically, that burden of proof language cites to "activity protected under section 6-2104, 
Idaho Code," which, as this Court has previously noted, only refers to violations by an "employer," 
and never once mentions individuals or uses the word, "person." 
While focusing her entire argument on the word, "person," Plaintiff's legal argument 
interestingly fails to acknowledge how the IPPEA, as a whole, rarely addresses individuals in any 
capacity. Plaintiff's argument does not care to actually acknowledge that throughout the entirety of 
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the IPPEA, the word "person" is only used twice, once when defining the term, "employee," and the 
other in the aforementioned venue statute. See LC. § § 6-2103(3 ); 6-2105(3). Plaintiff does not care 
to acknowledge the absence of the word "person" or any indication of individuals in the substantive 
prohibitions of employer conduct found in LC. § 6-2104. Plaintiff does not care to acknowledge the 
substantive definition of "employer" in I.C. § 6-2103(4), which specifically details various public 
entities and their agents, but never once includes the word "person," or any other indication of 
individuals. 
The intent of the IPPEA is not to hold individual persons personally accountable for 
misconduct but to "protect the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule, or regulation." LC. § 6-2101 (emphasis added). Notable here is the absence 
of the word, "person," in addition to the use of "employer." Were this language to read, "from their 
employer or any other person acting in the interests of that employer," then Plaintiff's legal 
arguments would be within the realm of plausibility. Because this language is non-existent, so is the 
plausibility of Plaintiff's motion. 
Further, Plaintiff's insistence upon the conceded "scant" legislative history as supporting 
individual liability is just as weak as her interpretation of J.C. § 6-2105(3). Looking first to the plain 
language of the statute, if the legislature desired an IPPEA action against individuals, then it is 
assumed that they would have discussed as much throughout the entire statutory scheme, and not 
simply a mention of the word, "person," when discussing the potential venues for an employee's 
civil action. Instead, Plaintiff tries to again take another isolated mention of individuals in the 
legislative history - "the heads of those [state] agencies" - and thereby manufacture individual 
liability via this mention. However, the legislative history is in no way determinative of Plaintiff's 
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interpretation, as noted in the text itself. The language cited by Plaintiff was from a committee 
hearing in a discussion which resulted in a final vote to be held over to a future date when the 
Attorney General's office would be able to address the questions and concerns of the committee 
regarding these issues. There is no indication of a final determination of any of these issues in 
committee. Therefore, the comments made during that meeting should not be considered as a final 
or binding interpretation of the IPPEA. 
For sake of argument, an equally reasonable interpretation to this phrase in the legislative 
history would be that Representative Berain simply intended to confirm that the agency language as 
found in I.C. § 6-2104(3)(b) would also include department heads as agents liable under respondeat 
superior. However, without Plaintiff providing the final determination of the committee's later 
hearing on the matter, her own proposed interpretation is inconclusive. As Plaintiff has absolutely 
no other evidence or precedent in Idaho to indicate otherwise, this one mention of "the heads of those 
[state] agencies" in paraphrased, facially inconclusive legislative minutes should not serve to 
overturn this Court's prior ruling which is soundly based on precedent, the plain language of the 
statute, and which is not contrary to the legislative history. 
C. This Court's Reliance on Title VII Precedent for the Definition of 
''Employer" Was Accurate and Appropriate. 
Plaintiff's arguments to distinguish the Title VII case law upon which this Court relied for 
its decision further underscores her misapplication of the law. Plaintiff has simply found the word 
"person" in those decisions, taken it out of context, and matched it to her own out-of-context 
interpretation of the word "person" in the IPPEA to fashion an argument supporting her position. 
An analysis of the cases cited leads to a vastly different conclusion. For its prior decision, this Court 
relied on the determination that Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe were not "employers" as defined by the 
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IPPEA, and therefore the IPPEA does not support a specific action against them as individuals. In 
doing so, it relied upon multiple cases from Title VII case law interpreting the same question based 
on the similarity between the definition of "employer" as found in the IPPEA and Title VII:3 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) I.C. § 6-2103(4)(a) and (b) 
The term "employer" means a person engaged "Employer" means the state of Idaho, or any 
in an industry affecting commerce who has political subdivision or governmental entity 
fifteen or more employees for each working eligible to participate in the public employees 
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks retirement system, chapter 13, title 59, Idaho 
in the current or preceding calendar year, and Code; "Employer" includes an agent of an 
any agent of such a person ... employer. 
Based on the similarities between these two statutes, use of Title VII precedent in order to 
establish the lack of individual liability according to the definition of the term, "employer," is 
entirely appropriate. Plaintiff attempts to argue that alternative statutory schemes are more 
appropriate than Title VII for analysis, but these schemes are distinguishable from the IPPEA 
because they have a more expansive definition of the term, "employer," or because they specifically 
prohibit conduct by individual persons in their statutory language.4 In that the statutory basis for the 
3The Seventh Circuit noted that the definition of "employer" as used in the ADA, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the ADEA, were similar enough that "[ c ]ourts routinely 
apply arguments regarding individual liability to all three statutes interchangeably." U.S. 
E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995). The IPPEA would 
be similarly regarded. 
4In the cases alleged by Plaintiff to support her position, the statutes at issue include a 
more expansive definition of the term "employer," usually created through additional language 
indicating that persons other than employees or agents are acting directly or indirectly in the 
interests of the employer, which language is not found in the IPPEA. See Genaro v. Cent. 
Transp., Inc., 1999-0hio-353, 84 Ohio St. 3d 293, 298-99, 703 N.E.2d 782, 787 (1999) (statute 
at issue held to be "much broader in scope" than Title VII in that it defined "employer" as "any 
person employing four or more persons within the state, * * * and any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer.") (emphasis in original); Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, 
Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (statute at issue held to be "broader in scope than 
that found in Title VII," in that it defined "employer" as "any person employing six or more 
persons within the state, and any person directly acting in the interest of an employer.") 
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legal reasoning in Plaintiff's proposed cases are distinguishable, her legal analysis is unsound. These 
cases found personal liability when the statute broadly defines employer to include any other person 
working in the employer's interest. That language is broad enough to create individual liability, 
because these statutes are intended to include violative conduct of others who are those who are not 
necessarily employees or agents of the employer. Were the IPPEA written with such an expansive 
definition of "employer," then Plaintiff's argument might have been plausible. Instead, the language 
in Title VII mirrors that in the IPPEA, and thus Title VII precedent is the appropriate comparison 
to the IPPEA. 
D. Plaintiff's "Parade of Horribles" Policy Arguments Are Implausible 
Because IP PEA Defined Employers Are Statutorily Liable for Violative 
Conduct. 
Plaintiff's last-ditch policy argument is that not allowing individual liability will allow 
supervisors and others in higher employer positions to violate the IPPEA at will, unchecked and 
uncontrolled. Such an argument was summarily discounted by the Seventh Circuit in discussing the 
similarly structured ADA: 
Lacking the support of the structure arguments, the EEOC and 
Wessel bring forth a short parade of horribles. They say that 
individual liability is essential to dissuade supervisors and other 
individuals from violating the law. They argue that the paramount 
consideration is stamping out discrimination and that through the 
loophole of no individual liability will pour a flood ofunpunished and 
undeterrable discrimination. 
(emphasis in original). 
Additionally, Plaintiff's reliance on Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2nd Cir. 1995), 
and Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, 204 S.W.3d 238 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), is fully 
distinguishable to the IPPEA due to their respective statutes use of the word "person" in their 
substantive prohibitions against conduct, not simply in a venue statute. The vast substantive 
differences in statutory language found in these cases with the IPPEA makes Plaintiff's 
attempted comparisons invalid. 
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We reject that Chicken Little-esque argument. The employing entity 
is still liable, and that entity and its managers have the proper 
incentives to adequately discipline wayward employees, as well as to 
instruct and train employees to avoid actions that might impose 
liability. It is true that increasing the number of potentially liable 
defendants would increase deterrence, as businesses put more 
resources into avoiding liability and plaintiffs saw more potentially 
liable parties and had a greater incentive to sue in marginal cases. But 
Congress has struck a balance between deterrence and societal cost, 
and we will not upset that balance. We do not doubt that the 
employment discrimination statutes have broad remedial purposes 
and should be interpreted liberally, but that cannot trump the narrow, 
focused conclusion we draw from the structure and logic of the 
statutes. A liberal construction does not mean one that flies in the face 
of the structure of the statute. See Hudson, 873 F.Supp. at 136 ("[W]e 
cannot reverse course in the face of some vague, aspirational broad 
intent. Congress had lofty goals but provided limited means for 
reaching those goals. Individual liability was not one of them."). We 
hold that individuals who do not otherwise meet the statutory 
definition of "employer" cannot be liable under the ADA. 
U.S. E.E.O.C., 55 F.3d at 1282. Again, Plaintiff has failed to show how the adverse conduct that she 
faced would allow this type of abuse of the IPPEA, other than the mere proposition that such an 
abuse is imaginable. 
In a correlated fear, Plaintiff seems to be under the impression that employers will be able 
to somehow allege that the conduct of their employees was outside the course and scope of 
employment, therefore leaving plaintiffs without an individual cause of action against those 
employees would deny them any possible recourse against violations of the IPPEA. Defendants 
cannot imagine a plausible hypothetical where this issue of law would arise, as the IPPEA 
specifically creates employer liability for adverse actions taken against an employee's employment 
conditions. As noted by this Court, any conduct outside the course and scope of an individual's 
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e~ployment would presumably open that individual to other legal remedies, but not to the IPPEA.5 
Again, in any event, such an implausible scenario is not at issue here, where Plaintiff has only 
facially alleged that Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe' s conduct was outside the course and scope of their 
employment and Defendant City of Sun Valley remains in this action as the IPPEA defined 
employer. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's desperate attempt to keep Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe as individual defendants 
through such sparse legal analysis is perplexing. Defendant City of Sun Valley remains in this 
litigation, and there has been no attempt to artificially manipulate this Court's prior decision to create 
a full dismissal of Plaintiff's entire action. Should Plaintiff prevail, all damages that she currently 
seeks are fully available from Defendant City of Sun Valley, and are only available from the City of 
Sun Valley. However, instead of saving the parties and this Court's time and resources in continuing 
on with the alleged merits of her claim and actually obtain the remedies she seeks, Plaintiff is still 
trying to piece together an individual claim against only Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe based solely on 
a strained connection between the terms "remedies," "person," and "the heads of those [state] 
agencies," all taken out-of-context. Plaintiff's proposed interpretation is contrary to the plain 
language of the whole of the IPPEA, all Idaho case law interpreting the IPPEA, and valid 
interpretation of a multitude of case law similarly interpreting the parallel Title VII definition of 
"employer." 
5Plaintiff has brought such claims against Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe in their individual 
capacities in federal court. See Hammer v. City of Sun Valley, et. al., Federal District ofldaho 
Case No. l:13-CV-00211-EJL. 
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In light of Plaintiff's lack of legal or factual basis for her motion for reconsideration, 
Defendant requests that this Court deny her motion. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
~! 
By~--''-+---,f#-iF--~~~~~~~~~~ 
Kirtla ylor, Of the Firm 
Attorn ys or Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of January, 2014, I caused to be served, 
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Joy M. Vega 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
PO Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Sun Valley 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; 
NILS RIBI, in his individual and official capacity; 
De WAYNE BRISCOE, in his individual and official 
capacity; ADAM KING, in his official capacity; 
ROBERT YOUNGMAN, in his official capacity; 
KELLY EK, in her official capacity; 
MICHELLE FROSTENSON, in her official capacity; 
FRANZ SUHADOLNIK, in his official capacity; 
MICHELLE GRIFFITH, in her official capacity; 
JOAN LAMB, in her official capacity; and 
WAYNE WILLICH, in his official capacity, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2011-928 
DEFENDANT CITY OF SUN 
VALLEY'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND 
AMENDED REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS TO CITY OF SUN 
VALLEY 
COMES NOW Defendant City of Sun Valley, by and through its attorneys ofrecord, 
the law firn1 of Naylor & Hales, P.C., pursuant to Rules 26 and 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
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\ 
Procedure, and hereby responds to Plaintiff's Second Amended First Set of Requests for Admissi~n 
to City of Sun Valley as follows: 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. l: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Nils Ribi in his official capacity alleged in Plaintiffs IP PEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, Nils Ribi was acting in the course and scope of his employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code§ 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out Nils Ribi 's conduct 
while acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to De Wayne Briscoe in his official capacity alleged in Plaintiffs IPPEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, De Wayne Briscoe was acting in the course and scope of his employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code § 6-2103(3 ). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that pursuantto Idaho 
Code §§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of DeWayne 
Briscoe 's conduct while acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Adam King in his official capacity alleged in Plaintiffs IPPEA Complaint against 
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Sun Valley, Adam King was acting in the course and scope of his employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code§ 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Adam King's 
conduct while acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Robert Youngman in his official capacity alleged in Plaintiff's IPPEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, Robert Youngman was acting in the course and scope of his employment/official 
position consistent with Idaho Code § 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Robert 
Youngman 's conduct while acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Kelzv Ek in her official capacity alleged in Plaintiff's IPPEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, Kel(v Ek was acting in the course and scope of her employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code § 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
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AMENDEDREQUESTFORADMISSION N0.10: Admitthatpursuanttoldaho 
Code §§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Kelly Ek 's 
conduct while acting within the course or scope of her employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Michelle Frostenson in her official capacity alleged in Plaintiffs IPPEA Complaint 
against Sun Valley, Michelle Frostenson was acting in the course and scope of her 
employment/official position consistent with Idaho Code§ 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Michelle 
Frostenson 's conduct while acting within the course or scope of her employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMJSSJON NO. 13: Adtnit that as to any facts 
relating to Franz Suhadolnik in his official capacity alleged in Plaintiffs IP PEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, Franz Suhado/nikwas acting in the course and scope of his employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code § 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N 0.14: Admit that pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Franz 
Suhadolnik ·s conduct while acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
DEFENDANT CITY OF SUN VALLEY'S ANSWERS - 4. 
ADDENDUM 1 755 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Michelle Griffith in her official capacity al1eged in Plaintiff's IPPEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, Michelle Grif.fith was acting in the course and scope of her employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code§ 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.16: Admitthatpursuantto Idaho 
Code §§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Michelle 
Grif.fith 's conduct while acting within the course or scope of her employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Joan Lamb in her official capacity alleged in Plaintiff's lPPEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, Joan Lamb was acting in the course and scope of her employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code § 6-2103(3). 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDEDREQUESTFORADMISSION N0.18: Admitthatpursuanttoldaho 
Code§§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Joan Lamb's 
conduct while acting within the course or scope of her employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits . 
. AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19: Admit that as to any facts 
relating to Wayne Willich in his official capacity alleged in Plaintiff's IPPEA Complaint against 
Sun Valley, Wayne Wi!Hch was acting in the course and scope of his employment/official position 
consistent with Idaho Code § 6-2103(3). 
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RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit that pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 6-2101, et seq., Sun Valley is liable for any proven damages arising out of Wayne Willich's 
conduct while acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
RESPONSE: The City of Sun Valley admits. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2012. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P .C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of December, 2012, I caused to be served, 
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Eric B. Swartz 
JoyM. Vega 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
PO Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Fax Transmission: 489-8988 
X Email: eric@ionesandswartzlaw.com, 
joy@j onesandswartzlaw .com, 
beth@ionesandswartzlaw.com 
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Boise, ID 83707-7808 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and DeWAYNB BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
I. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF DEFENDANTS RIBI AND 
BRISCOE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
INTRODUCTION 
If the Idaho Legislature intended to limit Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act 
C'IPPEA") claims against employers, it would have stated as much. Instead, the Legislature 
enacted the IPPEA with a provision that unambiguously provides for a cause of action against a 
"person." A public employer is not a person. A person is someone who works for a public 
employer. The Court must read and apply the Wlambiguous language of the IPPEA. 
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On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must also take Ms. Hammer's factual allegations as 
true. Ms. Hammer's Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants Briscoe and Ribi worked for 
the City of Sun Valley when they engaged in conduct that adversely affected Ms. Hammer, and 
that some or all of Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's conduct fell outside the sco~.iheir.--.-·-···--·--
··- -··-·. ---··----·----·-- -
employment for which they are personally liable, as "persons" under the IPPEA. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should not have been granted on the ground that 
Ms. Hammer did not state a cause of action against them because the IPPEA does not provide for 
a cause of action against a person. The IPPEA provides for a cause of action against the 
Defendants. And, Ms. Hammer properly alleged that claim. 
None of the Defendants' arguments change the Court's need to reverse its ruling 
dismissing the Defendants. Contrary to Defendants' argument, Ms. Hammer's Amended 
Complaint does state that Defendants Ribi and Briscoe acted outside the scope of their 
employment. 1 Contrary to the Defendants' argument, a cause of action against a person is not 
only expressly provided for in the IPPEA but such cause of action is consistent with the IPPEA 
intent of providing broad protection to public employees. Contrary to Defendants' argument, 
Title VII and case law interpreting it is inapplicable; the divergence from a lack of individual 
liability under Title VII is uniformly found where state statutes provide for individual liability. 
Finally, the Defendants' argument that there is no situation where a public employer cannot be 
liable for an agent's conduct ignores the law of respondeat superior - a law that this Court must 
assume the Idaho Legislature knew when enacting the IPPEA with an express remedy against a 
person. 
1 Amended Complaint. ,r,r 3 and 4. 
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A. Defendants Are Asking the Court to Rewrite the IPPEA 
Defendants' opposition to Ms. Hammer's Motion for Reconsideration does not address _____________ _ 
•- ••-•• -~. -·•··-n-•--·------
this Court's obligation to read the plain and unambiguous language of the IPPEA. They, instead, 
encourage the Court to amend the IPPEA by omitting plain and unambiguous language in the 
IPPEA. There has been no argument or finding that reading the IPPEA as written is palpably 
absurd. Nor has there been an argument or finding that the actual language providing for a cause 
of action against a person is ambiguous. Without such findings, the Court is obligated to give 
effect to every word in the IPPEA. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685 688 (1999) 
("Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court assumes that the legislature meant what is 
clearly stated in the statute."); Ingram v. State Wagon-Road Comm'n, 4 Idaho 139 (1894) ("Any 
construction which fails to give effect to the word and letter of the statute, or which would leave 
any clause as meaningless, or give it an absurd signification, is never admissible whenever any 
other interpretation is possible.,,); State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 
(2010) ("read[ing] the words ... out of the statute ... would violate the rule of statutory 
construction requiring every word in a statute to be given its plain meaning."). 
Including and giving effect to the IPPEA remedy against a "person" in no way creates an 
ambiguity or palpable absurdity. Its effect is consistent with the IPPEA's intent to protect public 
employees against any and all adverse action - not just action that could be carried out by an 
employer, such as termination of employment, as argued by the Defendants. Any and all such 
adverse action expressly includes conduct that cannot be within the course and scope of 
employment ~ith a public employer: "threaten[ing] or otherwise discriminat[ing] against an 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
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employee in any manner that affects the employee's employment .... " (LC. § 6-2103.) The 
Idaho Legislature's broad definition of adverse action to include conduct that falls outside of the 
scope of employment, and its inclusion of a remedy against a "person," is consistent with the 
assumption that this Court is obligated to make-the }daho Legislature knew Idaho's resP-Qndeat ·------·----· 
.. ···-----·--·------
superior law and wanted to ensure that the IPPEA intent or remedies thereunder were not 
nullified. "[T]his Court assumes that the legislature knows about existing judicial decisions 
when it enacts a statute." State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 340, 924 P.2d 599, 602 (1996). The 
IPPEA was enacted in 1994. Idaho's respondeat superior law has been settled by judicial 
decisions since at least 19242 and has remained undisturbed since then.3 
B. The Title VII Cases Cited by Defendants and Relied Upon by the Court Actually 
Support This Court's Denial of the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Defendants are asking this Court to read Title VII and cases interpreting Title VII without 
regard to the differences between Title VII and the IPPEA and without regard to the rationale 
behind the conclusion that there is no individual liability under Title VII. Specifically, the lack 
of individual liability under Title VII hinges on Title VII' s application to an employer with a 
minimum number of employees and does not, anywhere, mention a cause of action against a 
"person." In contrast, the IPPEA expressly provides for a cause of action against a person. The 
IPPEA certainly does not contain the Title VII small employer provision that the Courts have 
cited in finding no individual liability under Title VII: "If Congress decided to protect small 
entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow 
2 T. W. & L. 0. Naylor Co. v. Bowman, 39 Idaho 764, 230 P. 347 (1924) ("A principal cannot be bound 
by the acts of an agent done outside of the actual or apparent scope of his authority, unless such acts have 
been ratified and adopted by the principal.") 
3 See, e.g., Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (2008) ("The actions of an 
agent are the actions of the corporation. An agent is only liable for actions which are outside its scope of 
duty to the corporation.") Citing Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 123 Idaho 650,654, 
851 P.2d 946,948 (1993). 
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civil liability to run against individual employees." E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security, 55 F.3d 1276, 
1281 (7th Cir. 1995). Defendants' side-by-side comparison of Title VII and the IPPEA 
demonstrates the Idaho Legislature's lack of desire to limit the scope of the IPPEA. 
Upholding a cause of action against a person under the IPPEA is not onlx consistent with 
--- ··-------· ---------
the plain language of the IPPEA, but is also consistent with the Tomka case that this Court relied 
upon when denying Ms. Hammer the right to sue Defendants Ribi and Briscoe in their individual 
capacity. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding individual liability 
under the New York Human Rights Law which uses the word "person"). The Court's reversal of 
its decision on the Motion to Dismiss is also supported by: Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, 204 
S.W.3d 238, 244 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (Disfavoring Lenhardt and finding individual liability 
under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA") because the Act refers to the word "person" -
"the MHRA imposes individual liability in the event of discriminatory conduct."); Genaro v. 
Central Transport, 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1999) (rejecting a 
Title VII analysis of the Ohio anti-discrimination provision and determining that individual 
liability was imposed under the Ohio law based on the use of the phrase "person" in the statute.); 
Blazek v. U.S. Cellular, 937 F.Supp.2d 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (finding that Title VII personal 
liability rationale exemption does not apply to the Iowa Human Rights Act). And, in a slew of 
cases from New Jersey, the U.S. District Court for New Jersey and various New Jersey courts 
have determined that there is personal liability under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee 
Protection Act that applied to "any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly on 
behalf of or in the interest of an employer with the employer's consent." See Palladino v. VNA 
of Southern New Jersey, 68 F.Supp.2d 455 (U.S. Dist. Ct. N.J. 1999); Espinosa v. Continental 
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Airlines, 80 F.Supp.2d 297 (U.S. Dist. Ct. N.J. 2000); Maw v. Adv. Clinical Communications, 
Inc., 359 N.J. Super. 420,820 A.2d 105 (Ct. App. 2003). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
---- ----·- --···- -·--- -··-· -------·-·--------
~ -··--· --- .... ···-·--··-----· 
-------···----·- ------ -----·-- --· . 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Sharon Hammer respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider having granted Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2014. 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of January, 2014, a true and correct copy of 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
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[ ] Email: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIB!; 
and DeWAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA 
AGAINST NON-PARTY PA TRICIA BALL 
AND TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS WITHHELD FROM 
PRODUCTION IN DISCOVERY AND IN 
RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"). by and through her 
counsel of record, Jones & Swartz PLLC, and pursuant to Rules 7(b)(l) and 11 (a)(2)(B) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure hereby moves this Court to reconsider having denied PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AGAINST NON-PARTY PATRICIA BALL AND TO COMPEL THE 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS WITHHELD FROM PRODUCTION IN DISCOVERY AND JN REsPONSE TO 
SUBPOENA. The Court's current finding provides for a blanket work-product privilege covering 
in excess of two hundred (200) emails and attachments and other correspondence without 
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requiring the City of Sun Valley and Patricia Ball to prove that each withheld document actually 
qualifies for protection. It may be that the~e withheld materials should be redacted in part rather 
than completely withheld. It may be that these materials should not be redacted or withheld. 
The City and Ms. Ball's privilege log does not identify why these materials qualify for work-
product protection and they did not submit evidence to support such protection. The Court 
assumes that the materials (which it generally described without review of the same) were in 
anticipation of litigation, when there is no testimony to that effect and where Former Mayor 
Willich's ~estimony states otherwise. The Court's current ruling was also made without the 
benefit of Former Mayor Willich's testimony about and regarding certain conclusions and 
assumptions that the Court made in its ruling. 
This Motion is made and supported by the pleadings of record herein and is further 
supj)o1ted by the Supplemental Affidavit of Wayne Willich filed contemporaneously herewith 
and incorporated herein, and will be further supported by a Memorandum that will be filed 
within fourteen days of this motion. 
By this Motion, Plaintiff Sharon Hammet· respectfully requests that the Cou1t: 
1. Order the production of materials, in whole or redacted as necessary, withheld 
where the City of Sun Valley and/or Patricia Ball fail to prove with evidence that such materials 
(in whole or in part) qualify for protection; 
2. Conduct an in camera review of the materials being withheld on grounds of 
privileges established by the pat1y claiming the same, and: 
a. Order the production of such documents if the Court finds no applicable 
privilege or a waiver thereof; 
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b. Order redacted production to reveal facts, but preserve truly confidential 
information or attorneys' mental impressions; 
3. Order the production of materials in their entirety that are being withheld on un-
established claims of privilege; 
4. Order the production of materials for which any applicable privilege was waived; 
and 
5. Award Ms. Hammer her attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of having to 
bring this motion. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2014. 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; 
NILS RIB!, iri his individual and official capacity; 
De WAYNE BRISCOE, in his individual and official 
capacity; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
SUPPLEMENTAL-Af?F'IJMYII OF WAYNE WILLICH 
EQRMER MAYOR Of TIIE CITY OF SYN VALLEY 
INSUPPQBT OF MOTION.TO RE~Qti51D£RDENJAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
I, WAYNE Wli.LICH, first duly sworn on oath, depose and state as follows: 
1) My name is Wayne Willich, and from the first week of January of 2008 to January 3, '" 
2012, I was the duly elected Mayor of the City Of Sun Valley, Idaho ("Sun Valley"), and that I 
am competent to testify as to the matters herein. I certify pursuant to Rule J 1 of the Idaho Code 
Of Civil Procedure, that the facts alleged herein are true and accurate and are made with personal 
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knowledge, and would further sweat to such under oath and at trial if required. 
2) I have previously filed an Affidavit in the matter herein and stand on the veracity and 
truthfulness of the statements made under oath in tbilt Affidavit. 
3) I have reviewed the pleadings·and affidavits associated with the Motion To Compel 
herein, and have reviewed the Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Enforce 
Subpoena And Compel ("Memorandum Decision"). 
4) I find many factual statements ofthe·Court in the Memorandum Decision, and in 
particular statements related to my actions and decisions, to be incorrect. I believe that many of 
the incorrect statements in the Memorandum Decision are due to the fact that I was not allowed 
to review any of the communications submitted by Sun Valley in opposition to the Motion to 
Compel in camera to the Court or confinn that they were ever sent or received by myself, or as 
to the veracity of the statements in the commurucations. 
5) I find it to be disturbing that correspondences and communications purportedly from 
me to other persons, or to me .from other persons, including purportedly to or from Attorney 
Naylor, Investigator BaJl, City Attorney King or Mayor Elect Briscoe, have been considered by 
the Court to have been legitimate withou.t my acknowledgement of ever having sent them, or 
received them, or as to their veracity. 
6) I did not retain my email correspondences as Mayor of Sun Valley, nor have I had 
access to such emails since my last day in office as Mayor of Sun Valley on January 3, 2012. 
7) In particular, I have no particular recollection of ever sending the following emails 
which have been disclosed by Sun Valley as having purportedly been sent by ~yselfpursuant to 
a Privilege Log provided to Ms. Hammer during discovery in the matter: 
11/22/2011 BALL 522 WilUch to Ball, copy to King 
11/22/2011 BALL 518 Willich to Ball, copy to Briscoe and King 
11/25/2011 BALL 519 Willich to Ball, copy to Briscoe and King 
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iWillich to King, copy to Ball 
Willichto&ll 
Willlch to Ball 
Willlch to Ball 
,wUJioh to Ball and Naylor, copy to King and Briscoe 
Willich to Ball and King 
Willioh to Ball and King 
8) In addition, ifl did send the emails described in paragraph 6 above, the topics of the 
emails were in regards to what duties Investigator Uall was to perform; the scheduling of the 
interviews in the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation, when Investigator Ball would compiete her 
. written report, and other administrative matters. I deny that in any of the correspondences did I 
seek any legal advice or discuss any matters related to the Hammer Law Suit with either 
Investigator Ball, Attorney Naylor, City Attorney King or Mayor Elect Briscoe. 
9) In addition, the Privilege Log includes multiple emails that were supposedly sent to 
me, many of which I may never have opened, may have been blocked by my spam program, I 
never read; or which I read but refused to respond to. I also find it disturbing that the Court 
would consider these correspondences in making its decisions without any knowledge related to 
my actual receipt of the correspondences or my reactions or responses to 1he comrirunications. t 
also have no recollection 1hat in any of the correspondences that I may have read, was there any 
legal advice provided or any discussions related to the Hammer Law Suit with either Investigator 
Ball, Attorney Naylor, City Attorney King or Mayor Elect Briscoe. 
10) Until such time as I am able to review the emails and communications provided to the 
Court by Sun V ailey related to the Motion To Compel, or which I wn supposedly a sender or 
receiver, I cannot vouch for their accuracy ot that they were even sent by me or received by me. 
11) As I have stated in my previous Affidavit, other than to provide me with names of 
attorneys that would possibly become the independent investigator related to the Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation, and that he contact them and detennine whether they woUld be 
available to do so, I deny that I ever provided City Attorney King any authority to be involved in 
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had already been sued by Ms. Hammer as part of the Hammer Law Suit and because he was to 
be interviewed as part of the Hammer Disolplinary Investigation himself. If City Attorney King 
gave Investigator Bal) any indication that she was being retained in regards to litigation matters 
or the Hammer Law Suit, and not simply to perform an independent, fact finding, disciplinary 
investigation unrelated to the Hammer Law Suit, City Attorney King did so outside the scope of 
his duties and the directions that I had given him to simply help me find an investigator. 
Therefore. if City Attorney King "contacted Ms. Ball about the possibility of retaining her 
services for a fact-finding investigation regarding various allegations that could be subject of 
litigation", as is stated In the Memorandum Decision, that is an incorrect conclusion regarding 
the limited scope ofwhatCity Attorney King was supposed to discuss with; or disclose to, 
lnvestigator Ball. 
12) As I have stated in my previous Affidavit, I deny that I ever discussed with 
Investigator Ball that sbe was being retained in regards to any pending or threatened litigation, 
that we ever discussed the pending Hammer Law Suitt or that her work would be used in regards 
to any pending litigation including the Hammer Law Suit, in any of our discussions prior to the 
signing of her retainer agreement on November 2.3, 2011 or thereafter. If Investigator Ball was 
made aware of the Hammer Law Suit or of any of the correspondences threatening litigation that 
had been sent to Sun Valley by Ms. Hammer's attorney, it was not by me, and it was done 
without my knowledge or approval, possibly by City Attorney King or Attorney Naylor. 
13) I specifically deny the finding of the Court that "Mr. Naylor was appointed as Ms. 
Ball's primary legal contact on November 28, 2011". As the Mayor of Sun Valley, and the 
responsible patty for the Harn.mer Disciplinary Investigation, I had the sole authority to make 
determinations as to the proceedings in the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. Neither City 
Attorney King, Mayor Elect Briscoe or Attorney Naylor had any right to instruct Investigator 
Ball that Attorney Naylor was to have any involvement in the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation, or act as Investigator Ball's legal contact in regards to the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation, without my knowledge or approval, which was never given. The Privilege Log · 
does not show any written communications between myself and Attorney Naylor, Investigator 
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given any of them the indication that I had provided Attorney Naylor with any authority in 
regards to the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation on that date as the Court has somehow 
concluded. In fact, as I have otherwise made clear in my prior Affidavit, after ICRMP refused 
my request to provide a different attorney than Attorney Naylor to defend the Ham.mer Law Suit, 
I specifically instrue1ed Attorney Naylor that he was to have no part in the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation, othet than to be able to receive the report produced by Investigator Ball at the end 
of the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. I also reaffmn that I never provided Investigator Ball 
with any authority to even contact Attorney Naylor or discuss the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation with Attorney Naylor. 
14) I specifically deny the Court's conclusion that "Ms. Ball's report was prepared in 
large part for Sun Valley in anticipation of, or in conjunction with pending and anticipated 
litigation." Although Attorney Naylor, City Attorney King, Investigator Ball and Mayor Elect 
Briscoe may have retroactively asserted that Investigator Ball was retained in regards to 
litigation or the Hammer Law Suit, there is no question that when I retained Investigator Ball it 
was solely to assist me in making my decision related .to whether to discipline Ms. Hammer or 
not. The Court's finding also ignores the fact that I mandated that the written report showed to 
me at City Attorney King's office on December 12, 2011 be kept at City Attorney King's office, 
in large part, so that it could not be used by Attorney Naylor in the defense of the Hammer Law 
Suit because of its multiple flaws, errors and orroneous and unauthorized conclusions. 
15) I am very concerned and disturbed with the Court's findings that "In fact, email 
communications provided in camera contradict Mr. Willich's assertions that he gave Ms. Ball no 
authority or direction to modify the upjnaJ Ball Report,, in any manner after December 12, 
2011''. The only emails disclosed in the Privilege Log from which the Court could conclude that 
I gave this purpor:ted direction, is the December 12, 2011 email described as ''BALL 764, 
Willich to Ball" and the December 13, 2011 email described as "BALL 1044j Willich to Ball, 
copy to King and Briscoe". I have no recollection of sending these emails. Until such time as I 
can review and confinn that I sent these emails, and that the contents are accurate, I find it 
unacceptable and inaccurate for the Court to conclude that these purported email 
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in the Court's possession, was ever actually sent by me; or gave Investigator Ball any direction 
related to continuing the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation after December 12, 2011, without 
my ability to confirm the sending of the email or other communication and the intent of the email 
or communication. 
16) Although I do not remember.sending the December 12; 2011 email or the December 
13,2011 email, at the time, I do remember that I was angry at Investigator Ball for failing to 
follow my explicit instructions to interview Sun Valley City CoWlcil member Joan Lamb in 
regards to Ms. Hammer's allegations of harassment and misconduct against CoWlcil Member 
Ribi, whom I believe would have verified Councfl Member Ribi's anger and hostility towards, 
and harassment of, Ms. Hammer. I believed that Investigator Ball refused to interview Council 
Member Lamb at the direction of Attorney Naylor, in contradiction to my explicit directions, and 
told her so. Investigator Ball's refusal to interview Council Member Lamb was a large part of my 
decision to end Investigator Ball's work for Sun Valley at that juncture. Any assertion that I 
directed Investigator Ball to continue preparing a report in regards to the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation on or about December 13, 2011, is simply contrary to what was occurring at that 
point of time. 
17) I do remember making comments to Investigator Ball, Attorney Naylor, Mayor Elect 
Briscoe and City Attorney King at the meeting of December 12, 2011, that there may be the need 
to continue investigating the allegations of misconduct and harassment against CoW1cil Member 
Ribi, to investigate misconduct that related to Fonner Treasurer Frostenson's handling of Sun 
Valley finances that was discovered as part of the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation, and to 
look into some of the Sun Valley Fire Department issues raised in the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation, unrelated to any allegations of misconduct against Ms. Hammet, but that the next 
administration of Mayor Elect Briscoe would lfave to take on that responsibility. However, I 
infonned all involved that as far as I was ooncetned; the Hammet Disciplinary Investigation, and 
any other investigations during my tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley, were completed. If I sent 
emails on December 12, 2011 or December 13, 2011, it may have been in regards to additional 
investigations of those matters after my tertn as Mayor of SWl Valley was over, rather than jn 
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directing Investigator Ball to continue working on those matters, nor did J ever intend that she do 
so. 
18) In addition, the Court's conclusion that I sought to continue the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation after December 12, 2011, totally ignores the meeting and conversations I had with 
Attorney Naylor on December 16, 20 I 1, and which are sworn to in my previous Affidavit, in 
which I specifically told Attorney Naylor that the Hammet Disciplinary Investigation was over, 
which is at least four days before Investigator Ball prepared the unauthorized report dated 
December 20, 2011, which I never saw until about a year later when it was published in the 
Idaho Mountain Express newspaper on-line edition. 
19) Contrary to the Court's finding regarding my conversation with Ms. Hammer at the 
Sun Valley Golf Clubhouse on December 19, 2011, I never indicated to Ms. Hammet that 
Investigator Ball's report was still being.finished. What I indicated to Ms. Hammer at that 
meeting was that there were still some unresolved issues related to Council Member Ribi, 
Fonner Treasurer Frostenson and the Sun Valley Fire Department, unrelated to Ms. Hammer, 
that may need further investigation after Mayor Elect Briscoe was sworn into office as the new 
mayor of Sun Valley on January 3, 2012. ~t the time I did not tell Ms. Hammer that I had ended 
Investigator Ball's relationship with Sun Valley. Ms. Ham.mer may have assumed that 
Investigator Ball was handling the other matters related to Council Member Ribi, Fonner 
Treasurer Frostenson and the Sun Valley Fire Department, when such was not the case. 
20) The Court should also note that subsequent to the end of my tenn as the Mayor of 
Sun Valley, I have discovered that unknown Sun Valley employees or officials have forged my 
initials and/or signature ofi financial documents. I have filed an Affidavit, under oath, describing 
such in the matter of Donoyaj v, Sun Valle')!, CV--2012-600, Blaine County. I also discovered that 
several payroll documents that I was shown during the forensic. aQdit and investigation by the 
Idaho Attorney General's office also indicated signatW'es and initials that purported to be mine, 
but that I did not recogniz.e, on docwne~ts that I did not recognize either. Based on my personal 
history with him, I also simply do not t11;1st Attorney Naylor to be providing truthful infonnation 
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21) Until such time as I am allowed to review the communications and documents that 
have been provided to the Court related to the Motion To Compel and upon which the Court 
based its Memorandum Decision, that purport to be to me, from me, or have my signature or 
initials on them, and am able to verify their veracity, l must deny the legitimacy and veracity of 
any and alJ of the emails, communications ot documents which the Court has used in making the 
Memorandum Decision. 
. 22) I request that the Court allow me to obtain each and every email or other 
communications submitted by Sun Valley in objection to the Motion to Compel which I am 
asserted to have been a sender or receiver of, that I be allowed to thereafter review each and 
every email or other commurtication with an attorney of my choice, and that I be allowed to file 
an additional Affidavit with the Court,. In camera if required, detailing whether I sent, or received 
the emails or other com.inunications, and that I am allowed to explain the circumstances 
associated with, or the meaning of, each and every email or communication. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
Subscri~ TJJ And Swl, Before 
Me This ~Day Of 1\1,lU .~ vt 
20lf.' 1 ~ ~ J 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA 
AGAINST NON-PARTY PATRICIA BALL 
AND TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS WITHHELD FROM 
PRODUCTION IN DISCOVERY AND IN 
RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Court's current finding provides for a blanket work product privilege covering in 
excess of two hundred (200) emails and attachments and other correspondence without requiring 
the City of Sun Valley and Patricia Ball to prove that each withheld document actually qualifies 
for protection. Just because a party claims that something is privileged does not mean that it is. 
There is a burden of proof that such a party bears. It begins with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
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When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under 
these rules by claiming it is privileged or subject to protection as 
trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly 
and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or 
things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable 
other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or 
protection. 
(1.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A)). 
The City of Sun Valley and Ms. Ball's privilege log does not meet this most minimum of 
burdens. The privilege log leaves Ms. Hammer and this Court without the information necessary 
to ascertain whether the materials withheld actually qualify for a privilege. Just because 
correspondence is exchanged between counsel or counsel and an agent of a party does not 
automatically mean that a privilege applies. Even if a privilege does apply, it may not apply to 
an entire document. The Court's denial of the Motion to Compel does not address this. The City 
and Ms. Ball's counsel, Mr. Naylor, stated that the materials involved counsel and were 
privileged, and the Court accepted Mr. Naylor's statement as meeting the City and Ms. Ball's 
burden of proof. Neither the City, Ms. Ball, Mr. Naylor, nor the privilege log identify the nature 
of the documents being withheld. The privilege log only identifies the documents withheld as 
emails. The subject matters or the nature of those emails are not addressed. At best, the 
documents withheld are categorized on the privilege log as falling within one of three categories: 
"factual request," "investigation administration," or "subpoena regarding investigation." 
Notably absent is any reference to litigation, legal advice, legal strategy, or anything of the sort. 
"Factual request," "investigation administration," or "subpoena regarding investigation" are not 
the type of descriptions that qualify for attorney-client communications or the work product 
privilege. This is particularly true where facts are not privileged and neither is evidence of what 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AND COMPEL PRODUCTION - 2 
779 
a person or persons did to carry out an investigation.1 Such matters are not communications in 
furtherance of the provision of legal advice or strategy communications containing mental 
impressions in anticipation of, or as part of, litigation. 
The Court's decision also assumes that the undescribed materials withheld were done in 
anticipation of litigation, even though Former Mayor Willich - the only authorized 
representative to speak on such matters at the time for the client, the City - submitted testimony 
that states otherwise. Usually, it is the client demanding protections exist. Here, the one person 
who could claim the protections at that time on behalf of the City is actually arguing that no 
privileges existed. Yet, the Court has - without evidence to support the finding - found 
otherwise by drawing inferences and making assumptions. The party claiming a privilege is not 
entitled to inferences and assumptions. The party claiming the privileges is required to present 
direct evidence that each element of the claimed privilege exists. 
After drawing inferences and making assumptions in order to find that the materials 
withheld are privileged, the Court appears to have engaged in a "hardship to Ms. Hammer" test. 
As part of that analysis, the Court concludes that Ms. Hammer is not entitled to Ms. Ball's 
investigatory notes of interviews with witnesses and that Ms. Hammer can go interview all of the 
witnesses that Ms. Ball interviewed. There is no evidence of record that the materials withheld 
are notes of interviews with witnesses. It is not clear how the Court arrived at that conclusion. 
Respectfully, it cannot be determined whether Ms. Hammer would face a hardship or not until 
and unless the City describes what it is withholding, as Rule 26 requires. Even then, without 
reviewing the materials first-hand, the Court cannot know whether Ms. Hammer could obtain 
that information from another source. 
1 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396, 101 S. Ct. 677, 688 (1981); Diversified Industries, Inc. v. 
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,603 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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Ms. Hammer appreciates that this case may not be popular with the Court. She also 
appreciates that reviewing over 200 documents to ascertain whether they qualify for a privilege 
in whole or in part may be burdensome, but she respectfully requests that the Court do so or that 
it appoint a special master to do so on the Court's behalf. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. A Blanket Work Product Privilege Does Not Satisfy The City and Ms. Ball's 
Burden of Proof 
The materials at issue in this motion to compel were withheld on claims of attorney-client 
privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.2 This Court denied Ms. Hammer's Motion to 
Compel, finding that everything withheld by the City and Ms. Ball was subject to the attorney 
work product doctrine: "Because this Court finds that the materials sought in the subpoena are 
protected by the work product doctrine, the Plaintiffs Motion is denied. "3 
The party asserting the work product privilege bears the burden of establishing all of its 
elements on a document-by-document basis: 
In sum, a proper analysis as to the withheld documents must be 
conducted on a document by document basis. If the document 
would not have been generated 'but for' litigation, it is privileged. 
However, if it was generated for purposes other than litigation, 
even though litigation may have been a 'real possibility', it must be 
disclosed. 
United States v. Torf (/n re Grand Jury Subpoena), 350 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). "As 
with the attorney-client privilege, the person asserting the work product privilege cannot make a 
blanket assertion of the privilege, but must state document-by-document what information the 
privilege applies." Buckner v. United States, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14107 (D. Idaho 1995) 
2 See Ex. D to Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena and Motion to Compel 
("Aff. of Counsel"), Defendants' Privilege Log. 
3 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena and Compel ("Mem. Decision"), p. 2. 
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citing United States v. Bornstein, 977 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1992). The proponent work of the 
product doctrine privilege must prove that the documents or correspondences at issue were 
prepared or made in anticipation of, or in regard to, litigation. In Jordan v. United States Dept. 
of Justice, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated: "The work-product rule 
does not extend to every written document generated by an attorney; it does not shield from 
disclosure everything that a lawyer does. Its purpose is more narrow, its reach more modest." 
Jordan v. United States Dept. of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
It is clear from this statement that the purpose of the privilege is to 
encourage effective legal representation Within [sic] the 
framework of the adversary system by removing counsel's fears 
that his thoughts and information will be invaded by his adversary. 
In other words, the privilege focuses on the integrity of the 
adversary trial process itself and seeks to ensure that such 
proceedings do not degenerate into mere "battles of wits." This 
focus on the integrity of the trial process is reflected in the specific 
limitation of the privilege to materials "prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial." 
Id. (citations omitted.) 
Appreciating that this Court has cited to threats of litigation that ran contemporaneously 
with Ms. Ball being hired, the Court cannot overlook the fact that Ms. Ball was hired to 
determine whether employment disciplinary action should be taken against Ms. Hammer. 
Ms. Ball's retainer agreement ("fact-finding investigation") and Former Mayor Willich's 
affidavit both state as much: 
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16) At no time during either the November 11,2011 or the November 14, 2011 
executive sessions oftbe Sun Valley City Council was there any discus$ion of'u.sing 1he Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation in regards to any potential or threatened litigation. At no time during 
eidter the November 11, 2011 or November 14. 20 t 1 executive sessions of the Sun Valley City 
Council was there any discussions of the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation being commenced 
to work with the Blaine County Prosecutor's office to pmtjclpate in a criminal investigation. The 
direction that I received from the Sun Valley City Council at the November 14.2011 executive 
session was solely to perfonn a dulciplinary investigation related to Former Administrator 
Hammet, solely fot internal Sun Valley purposes.. 
(Sept. 19, 2013 Affidavit of Wayne Willich, 'ii 16.) Former Mayor Willich's testimony is that of 
the client - the City. Idaho Code § 50-602, related to the powers and authorities of a mayor in 
Idaho, states in relevant part: 
The mayor ... shall be the chief administrative official of the city, 
... have the superintending control of all the officers and affairs 
of the city, .... (Emphasis added.) 
Former Mayor Willich, as the client, is telling this Court that the assertion of the work product 
doctrine is a sham because the subject materials were not because of or in relation to litigation. 
At least until January 3, 2012, when Former Mayor Willich's tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley 
ended, Investigator Ball, City Attorney King and Attorney Naylor all reported solely to Former 
Mayor Willich, and Former Mayor Willich had sole authority over the purpose and direction of 
the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. And, he is stating that it was not litigation related. 
The Court should also recognize the specific language of the Sun Valley City Council 
resolution of November 14, 2011 (the "Authorizing Resolution"), which authorized the Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation, which simply states: 
Council member Bob Youngman moved to authorize the Mayor to 
engage an attorney to conduct an independent investigation.
4 
4 Affidavit of Wayne Willich, fl 13-24. 
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No other Sun Valley City Council action was thereafter taken in regard to the Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation, or which limited Fonner Mayor Willich's right to conduct the 
Hammer Disciplinary Investigation as he saw fit. The Authorizing Resolution clearly indicated 
that, in conformance with Idaho Code § 50-602, the Sun Valley City Council recognized that it 
was Fonner Mayor Willich's sole responsibility to conduct the Hammer disciplinary 
Investigation, and to hire Investigator Ball, without any conditions attached to such activities. 
While the Court concludes that Ms. Ball was subsequently advised by unidentified City 
officials that her new legal contact was Mr. Naylor, there is no evidence or testimony that what 
Ms. Ball was doing would not have been done but for litigation. Not even the City and 
Ms. Ball's privilege log supports such a conclusion. The privilege log in no way supports the 
conclusion that her communications with anyone contained mental impressions or legal 
strategies because of or in anticipation of litigation. Indeed, the privilege log states, only, that 
the withheld materials fall within three categories that are anything but. The privilege log states 
the withheld documents are: "factual request," "investigation administration," or "subpoena 
regarding investigation." Notably absent is any reference to litigation, legal advice, legal 
strategy, or anything of the sort. Moreover, there has been no showing that Ms. Ball's withheld 
materials were for any purpose other than the preparation of her reports. 
Communications about the process (i.e., "factual request," "investigation administration," 
or "subpoena regarding investigation") in which Ms. Ball was engaged to prepare those reports is 
not work product. In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595,603 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("terms 
and conditions of an attorney's employment, the purpose for which an attorney has been 
engaged, [and] the steps which an attorney took or intended to take in discharging his obligation" 
not protected); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489,494, cert. denied sub nom. Walsh v. United States, 449 
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U.S. 994 (1980) (recognizing general rule that matters involving receipt of fees from clients are 
not protected); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The 
memorandum contained no confidential information. It did little more than reveal the 
relationship between the parties, the purpose for which Law Firm had been engaged, and the 
steps which the Firm intended to take in discharging its obligations to Diversified. Such a 
document is not privileged."); Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 206 (5th Cir. 1999) 
· (although "inquiry into the substance of the client's and attorney's discussions does implicate the 
privilege," "inquiry into the general nature of the legal services provided by counsel does not 
necessitate an assertion of the privilege because the general nature of services is not protected by 
the privilege."); Valenti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.Supp.2d 200, 218 (U.S. M.D. Pa. 2003) 
("Actual circumstances of the attorney-client relationship remain discoverable, even when the 
underlying communications itself may be privileged. ... The facts of legal consultation or 
employment, client identities, attorney's fees and the scope and nature of employment are not 
deemed privileged."); Oasis International Waters, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 87, 100 
(U.S. Ct. Cl. 2013) ("Courts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' 
representations are not privileged. Inquiry into the general nature of the legal services provided 
by counsel does not necessitate an assertion of the privilege because the general nature of 
services is not protected. . . . The fact of legal consultation is not privileged because it does not 
directly reveal the substance of a client's request for legal advice.") 
Although Ms. Hammer was not privy to the emails and other communications submitted 
to the Court in camera, there is no question that the Court relied on these communications to 
make its finding as to the relationship between Ms. Ball, Mr. Naylor, City Attorney King and 
Sun Valley, the scope of work to be performed, the directions as to who was to perform work 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AND COMPEL PRODUCTION - 8 
785 
~ I 
and when, none of which is covered by any privilege. For example, the Court states "email 
communications provided in camera contradict Mr. Willich's assertion that he gave Ms. Ball no 
authority or direction to modify the "Final Ball Report" in any manner after December 12, 
2011." As the in camera communication the Court relied on for this finding clearly related to the 
description of the work that was to be performed by Ms. Ball (and/or others), and presumably did 
not include legal advice, legal strategy, or attorney mental impressions, this communication itself 
should have been disclosed to Ms. Hammer, rather than provided secretly in camera to the Court 
without Ms. Hammer being able to address what it may have stated. 
It is also problematic that the Court allowed both City Attorney King and Ms. Ball to 
submit Affidavits which describe their duties, as well as Mr. Naylor's duties, in regard to the 
Hammer Disciplinary Investigation, and yet allow other documents discussing those same roles 
and duties to, somehow, be privileged. Once City Attorney King and Ms. Ball openly discussed 
their roles and duties, and the role and duties of Attorney Naylor, in their own Affidavits, any 
and all correspondences related to the roles and duties of either Ms. Ball, City Attorney King or 
Mr. Naylor should have been subject to disclosure. 
Although Former Mayor Willich has not reviewed the emails or communications at issue, 
his recollection of communications with Ms. Ball had to do with the duties Ms. Ball was to 
perform, the scheduling of the interviews in the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation, when 
Investigator Ball would complete her written report, and other administrative matters. (See 
Supplemental Affidavit of Wayne Willich ("Willich Supp. Aff."), 18.) And, Former Mayor 
Willich denies that any of the correspondences he sent sought legal advice or discussed any 
matters related to the Hammer lawsuit with Ms. Ball. (Willich Supp. Aff., 18.) Former Mayor 
Willich also denies that any of the communications he received from either Ms. Ball, City 
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Attorney King, or Mr. Naylor provided any legal advice or related to the Hammer lawsuit. 
(Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 8.) Former Mayor Willich notes that, as is described in his prior Affidavit 
in the matter, after ICRMP refused his request to provide an attorney other than Attorney Naylor 
to defend the Hammer lawsuit, Former Mayor Willich specifically instructed Attorney Naylor 
that he was to have no part in the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation, other than to be able to 
receive the report produced by Investigator Ball at the end of the Hammer Disciplinary 
Investigation. (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 13.) Former Mayor Willich also confirms that he never 
provided Investigator Ball with any authority to even contact Attorney Naylor or discuss the 
Hammer Disciplinary Investigation with Attorney Naylor. (Willich Supp. Af£, ,r 13.) 
Former Mayor Willich goes on to specifically deny the Court's conclusion that 
"Ms. Ball's report was prepared in large part for Sun Valley in anticipation of, or in conjunction 
with pending and anticipated litigation." (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 14.) Although Mr. Naylor, City 
Attorney King, Ms. Ball, and Mayor Elect Briscoe may have retroactively asserted that Ms. Ball 
was retained in regard to litigation or the Hammer lawsuit, there is no question that when Former 
Mayor Willich retained Ms. Ball, it was solely to assist Former Mayor Willich in making his 
decision whether or not to discipline Ms. Hammer. (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 14.) Former Mayor 
Willich also testifies that he mandated that the written report shown to Former Mayor Willich at 
City Attorney King's office on December 12, 2011, be kept at City Attorney King's office, in 
large part so that it could not be used by Attorney Naylor in the defense of the Hammer lawsuit 
because of its multiple flaws, errors and erroneous and unauthorized conclusions. (Willich Supp. 
Aff., ,r 14.) 
Given Former Mayor Willich's testimony and this Court's own finding upon review of 
the in camera documents, Ms. Hammer asks the Court to reconsider a blanket privilege waiver. 
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At a minimum, the documents reviewed by the Court appear to be subject to at least redacted 
production so as to preserve any actual work product contained therein. It would also be prudent 
for the Court to review the rest of the approximately 200 documents being withheld which the 
City and Ms. Ball describe as "factual request," "investigation administration," or "subpoena 
regarding investigation." If the documents do not contain legal advice, legal strategy, or mental 
impressions, they should be produced. If they contain such information in part, then the 
documents should be produced in redacted form to protect only the qualifying portions. 
B. Former Mayor Willich Should Be Permitted to Comment on the Documents Relied 
Upon by This Court and the Documents Being Withheld 
In his Supplemental Affidavit, Former Mayor Willich calls into question the authenticity 
of the documents reviewed by the Court. Former Mayor Willich should be permitted to review 
the documents that the Court reviewed in camera in order to respond to the same. Former Mayor 
Willich should also be permitted to review any and all emails and attached materials that were 
sent to him or sent by him. Allowing Former Mayor Willich to review the documents will not 
waive any privilege as he was the person who could speak for the client at the time the purported 
privilege arose. 
It is noteworthy that Former Mayor Willich is trying to prevent this Court from being 
misled. He is not trying to assert the privilege in an attempt to cover up facts or to mislead the 
Court. He wants the truth to be known. He has personal knowledge that someone within the 
City forged his initials and/or signature on financial documents. (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 20.) In 
addition, based on Former Mayor Willich's personal history with Mr. Naylor, Former Mayor 
Willich does not trust Mr. Naylor to provide truthful information to the Court. (Willich Supp. 
Aff., ,r 20.) The Court cannot take lightly Former Mayor Willich's concerns about the credibility 
of the communications that were purportedly sent by, or to, Former Mayor Willich. The Court 
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also cannot take lightly that Former Mayor Willich asserts that if he did send or receive any of 
the emails at issue, the emails were in regard to what duties Ms. Ball was to perform, the 
scheduling of the interviews in the Hammer Disciplinary Ihvestigation, when Investigator Ball 
would complete her written report, and other administrative matters. (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 8.) 
Former Mayor Willich denies that any of the correspondences he may have sent to or received 
from either Ms. Ball, City Attorney King or Mr. Naylor included legal advice, legal strategies, or 
any matters related to the Hammer lawsuit. (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r,r 8, 9.) Former Mayor Willich 
notes that, as is described in his prior Affidavit in the matter, after ICRMP refused his request to 
provide a different attorney than Attorney Naylor to defend the Hammer lawsuit, Former Mayor 
Willich specifically instructed Attorney Naylor that he was to have no part in the Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation, other than to be able to receive the report produced by Investigator 
Ball at the end of the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. (Willich Supp. Aff, ,r 13.) Former 
Mayor Willich also confirms that he never provided Investigator Ball with any authority to even 
contact Attorney Naylor or discuss the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation with Attorney Naylor. 
(Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 13.) 
Former Mayor Willich goes on to specifically deny the Court's conclusion that 
"Ms. Ball's report was prepared in large part for Sun Valley in anticipation of, or in conjunction 
with pending and anticipated litigation." (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 14.) Although Attorney Naylor, 
City Attorney King, Investigator Ball and Mayor Elect Briscoe may have retroactively asserted 
that Investigator Ball was retained in regard to litigation or the Hammer lawsuit, there is no 
question that when Former Mayor Willich retained Investigator Ball, it was solely to assist 
Former Mayor Willich in making his decision related to whether to discipline Ms. Hammer or 
not. (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 14.) Former Mayor Willich notes that the Court's finding also 
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ignores the fact that Former Mayor Willich mandated that the written report shown to Former 
Mayor Willich at City Attorney King's office on December 12, 2011, be kept at City Attorney 
King's office, in large part so that it could not be used by Attorney Naylor in the defense of the 
Hammer lawsuit because of its multiple flaws, errors and erroneous and unauthorized 
conclusions. (Willich Supp. Aff., ,r 14.) 
Ms. Hammer respectfully requests that this Court allow Former Mayor Willich to review 
the withheld and in camera materials so that he, and counsel of his choosing, can ascertain 
whether documents are being improperly shielded, or are actually subject to protection. Such a 
review would be prudent in addition to an in camera review by the Court (or Special Master). 
C. The Waiver Was Broader Than the Court Recognized 
The Court's conclusion on a lack of waiver focuses, only, on the release of the 
Unauthorized Ball Report to the Blaine County Prosecutor. The Court does not address that the 
Unauthorized Ball Report was published for a year in the on-line section of the Idaho Mountain 
Express newspaper, and that several articles were written about the Unauthorized Ball Report 
and the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation in the Idaho Mountain Express and the Boise Weekly 
newspapers. Ms. Hammer could understand the Court's ruling if the Court found that the only 
person who the Unauthorized Ball Report was released to was the Blaine County Prosecutor, 
who thereafter kept it confidential. However, for the Court to assert that no waiver resulted in all 
matters associated with the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation due to the publishing of the 
Unauthorized Ball Report, literally globally, to millions of persons, cannot be accurate. 
As the Court noted: 
Under the federal rule, work product protection is only waived 
when fairness requires, and is limited to the subject matter of the 
related disclosure, and does not create a blanket waiver of the work 
product privilege in the entire case. Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 
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F.3d 1095, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2010). "[V]oluntary disclosure of the 
content of a privileged attorney communication constitutes waiver 
of the privilege as to all other such communications on the same 
subject." 
(Mem. Opinion, pp. 8-9, citing Weil v. Investment Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F. 2d 
12, 23 (9th Cir. 1981). It is not conceivable that the entire contents of Ms. Ball's report could be 
publically released and yet that does not constitute a waiver of any privilege as to all other such 
communications on the same subject. Again, according to the City and Ms. Ball's privilege log, 
the materials being withheld relate directly to the report and, on their face, relate to the process 
that she engaged in in producing the report. The City and Ms. Ball describe the materials as 
falling into one of three categories: "factual request," "investigation administration," or 
"subpoena regarding investigation." 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Hammer respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its 
denial of her Motion to Enforce Subpoena and Motion to Compel. Ms. Hammer requests the 
relief identified herein and in her Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2014. 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
By~~~ 
JoYM. VEGA 
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BACKGROUND 
The dispute at issue involves the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer, and the 
Defendants, the City of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi, and De Wayne Briscoe. The dispute is 
centered on the Plaintiff's treatment while an employee for the City of Sun Valley. The 
Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendants for retaliatory discharge in violation of the 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("IPPEA"). 
The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider, seeking reconsideration on the 
previously decided Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion to Reconsider was 
argued before this Court on January 21, 2014. For the reasons stated on the record, this 
Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider is hereby 
DENIED. 
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CV-20~-479 
BACKGROUND 
The dispute at issue involves the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer, and the 
Defendants, the City of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi, and De Wayne Briscoe. The dispute is 
centered on the Plaintiff's treatment while an employee for the City of Sun Valley. The 
Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendants for retaliatory discharge in violation of the 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("IPPEA''). 
The Defendants brought a Motion to Amend, seeking to amend the caption of the 
case. The Motion to Amend was argued before this Court on January 21, 2014. For the 
reasons stated on the record, this Court denied the Defendants Motion to Amend. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants Motion to Amend is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
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DECISION DENYING MOTION TO AMEND to each of the persons as listed below: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Jones & Swartz PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
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_f_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
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Deputy Clerk 
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JoLC ynn Ora~. Clerk District 
ourt Blaine fou , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
\ 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs.· 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
DeWayne BRISCOE, , 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION TO DENY 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
Defendant, the City of Sun Valley, by and through its counsel, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby submit this Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration to Deny Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel. Plaintiff's dogged attempts at seeking Ms. Ball's work product material is an 
apt illustration of the proverb, "If at first you don't succeed\ try2, try3, try4 again." In her latest 
1See Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Quash, October 17, 2012, Ribi v. Donoval 
(Blaine County Case No. CV-20 l 1-1040) 
2See Plaintiffs Motion for Recoi1sideration (Motion to Quash Patricia Ball Subpoena), 
November 5, 2012, Ribi v. Donoval (Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-1 040), and all 
accompanying briefing and affidavits. 
3See Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and to 
Compel the Production of Documents Withheld From Production in Discovery and In Response 
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bid, Plaintiff repeats erroneous legal argument supported by bad case law, brings issues before 
the Court that have never been raised through any meet and confer, questions the integrity and 
motives of the Court, and ultimately relies again upon another one of Mr. Willich's affidavits. 
Interestingly, all of these issues could have been raised in Plaintiffs reply or at the oral argument 
held in the prior motion to compel, but were ignored by Plaintiff until the Court denied her 
motioi1. Plaintiff's current legal arguments are simply repeated from her prior motions 
notwithstanding the Court's prior rulings on the same arguments. Reconsideration is improper 
ahd Defendant requests attorney fees and costs for having to defend against this frivolous motion. 
The Court correctly determined in its prior ruling that "there is ample support in the 
record that Ms. Ball was retained by Sun Valley in anticipation oflitigation, and that her 
investigation was substantially focused on issues that appeared ripe for impending litigation," 
and subsequently "the materials produced as part of that investigation are protected under 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3)." (January 17, 2014 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Enforce Subpoena and Compel, p. 6-7) This includes any communications made by Ms. Ball in 
performing her investigation. (Id at 7) Additionally, any \.Vaiver of the work product protection 
is not a blanket waiver of all documents or communications in relation to that waived document. 
(Id. at 9) Nothing Plaintiff has raised in her current motion for reconsideration affects the 
Court's prior ruling. However, Defendant v.1i.ll still address Plaintiffs arguments for 
reconsideration to, hopefully, dissuade Plaintiff from any further motions brought about from 
misunderstanding the applicable doctrines. 
to Subpoena, November 4, 2013, current action, and resulting Memorandum Decision Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena and Compel, January 23, 2014. 
4Plaintifrs cun·ently pending Motion for Reconsideration. 
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Defendants do not have the burden of establishing all elements of work product 
protection by a document-by-document basis as Plaintiff alleges. Idaho has never established 
that it has adopted the «but-for" standard. Frustratingly, Plain ti ff still cites to the overmled 
United States v. T01f (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 350 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir, 2003), as 
basis for her "but for" standard of the work product protection. As pointed out previously in 
Defendants briefing, this case has been directlv ove1tumed on the exact point oflaw for which 
Plaintiff cites it, and the Ninth Circuit has adopted the more permissive "because of' standard. 
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf!To,f Envtl. Mgmt.), 351 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Tori). 
The "because of' standard does not consider whether litigation was 
a primary or secondary motive behind the creation of a document. 
Rather, it considers the totality of the circumstances and affords 
protection when it can fairly be said that the "document was 
created because of anticipated litigation, and would not have been 
created in substantially similar form but for the prospect of that 
litigation[.]" 
* * * 
The question of entitlement to work product protection cannot be 
decided simplv by looking at.one motive that contributed to a 
document's preparation. The circumstances surrounding the 
document's preparationmustalso be considered. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court has already determined, multiple times, that 
Ms. Ball's investigation was performed in anticipation oflitigation. There is no credible new 
fact or legal argument that Plaintiff has submitted that contradicts the Court's previous ruling. 
For Plaintiff to continually rely on bad case law to support her asse1tion of the "but for" litigation 
standard is the definition of frivolity and should be a reason for awarding costs and fees to 
Defendant in having to defend against this motion. 
Plaintiff also still ignores the distinction between the attorney-client privilege and the 
work product doctrine. Plaintiff continues to inappropriately mix the standard for each, thus 
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suggestion the standards are interchangeable. (See Plaint~ff's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Reconsideratioii, p. 7-8) This argument is not supported by case law. Plaintiff uses the legal 
analysis for attorney client privilege to argue that Ms. Ball's conununications were not protected 
as work product. These are not interchangeable doctrines. 
Plaintiff also repeats her argument that publication of portions of the findings from two of 
Ms. Ball's three reports in the online Idaho Mountain Express, is a "global" waiver of any and all 
documents and communications from her investigation. Even with a publication waiver, though, 
and as argued extensively by Defendants in prior briefing, \.Vaiver of the v.,ork product protectioh 
is not the same as voluntarv disclosure of privileged attorney communication, and waiver of any 
work product documents only waives those documents themselves. What Plaintiff continually 
fails to acknowledge is that online publication of the Ball Report was limited to these limited 
findings sections of the reports, found in pages Ball 1.-29, and Ball 343-348.5 The remainder of 
the findings from each report and their accompanying exhibits, or pages Ball 30-342, and Ball 
348-354, have never been publically published or available. Plaintiff has never produced 
conclusive evidence that the reports, in their_entirety with exhibits were ever "globally'' 
published or disclosed. 
Plaintiff now, for the first time, objects to Defendant's privilege log produced on June 24, 
2013, in order to support her argument for reconsideration. Plaintiff has never raised this 
objection through any meet-and-confer attempt during the past eight months. (See Affidavit of 
5 These publications are still available online. Pages Ball 1-29, or the findings of one of 
the reports, are publically available at "http://mtexpress.com/pdf/pattyball.pdf' and pages Ball 
343-348, the findings of a different report, are publically available at 
"http://mtexpress.com/pdf/pattyball2.pdf'. Additionally, as evident in those pages on.line, even 
those portions were redacted and so there has never been any full publication of any of the 
reports. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA - 4 
802 
4/7/201" 1:23 PM FROM: Fa:-: TO: J2DS788S!,27 PAGE: 00>:, '· 011 
Eric Swartz in Support of Motion to Enforce Subpoena, Ex. 6-11) Thus, the Court should 
disregard Plaintiffs objection. Regardless of this procedural shortcoming, the merits of 
Plaintiff's objection to the privilege log are unconvincing. Plaintiff argues the attorney-client 
privilege applies to only specific and individual statements of communications that "include legal 
advice, legal strategy, or attorney mental impressions," and that Defendant's privilege log does 
not indicate these specific determinations. This is an unsound interpretation of the attorney-
client privilege when viewed in the plain language of I.R.E. 502(b) and I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). The 
Court previously, and correctly, cited to I.RE. 502(b) which establishes that the attorney-client 
privilege stands to protect communications, "made for the purpose for facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client. .. " (emphasis added) The privilege log accurately 
details emails that are either a) communicati_ons made by Ms. Ball that are described briefly, but 
clearly, as pertaining to her investigation and therefore protected as work product, or they are b) 
communications 1nade between Ms. Ball and various attorneys representing Defendant in the 
facilitation of the rendition of professional legal services that, as .tvls. Ball was an agent of the 
city, would then be doubly protected as work product and as attorney-client communications. 
Plaintiff additionally argues that attorneys who state facts regarding the general 
representation of their clients and the general scope of that representation somehow waive all 
documents and communications which further specify that representation and scope: "Once City 
Attorney King and Ms. Ball openly discussed their roles and duties, and the role and duties of 
Attorney Naylor, in their own affidavits, any and all c01Tespondences related to the roles and 
duties of either Ms. Ball, City Attorney King, or Mr. Naylor should have been subject to 
disclosure." Oddly, the case law that Plaintiff cites in her own memorandum does not even 
support this incorrect legal conclusion. See Oasis International Waters, Inc. v. United States, 
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110 Fed. Cl. 87, 100 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 2013). Additionally, this is a disingenuous v,raiver argument 
by Plaintiff, as the only reason why the general representation of Attorneys King and Naylor is 
being discussed at all is because Plail'1tiff has openly questioned this representation supported by 
Mr. Willich's questionable affidavits. 
Defendant understands that Mr. Willich keeps repeating that he believes the clearly 
threatened litigation had no influence on Ms. Ball's investigation. However, Mr. Willich's sole 
opinion, although incessant, is subject to determinations of credibility and plausi bi!ity by the 
Court. The Court has previously held that the evidence before it supports that Ms. Ball's 
investigation was conducted in contemplatio11 of potential litigation, and that Mr. Naylor and Mr. 
King were authorized to participate in this investigation. (January 14, 2014 Order, p. 9) Further, 
while Mr. Willi ch has offered yet another affidavit in support of Plaintiffs motion, neither this 
latest affidavit nor any of Plaintiffs argument has addressed the myriad of factual inconsistencies 
highlighted in Defendant's previous briefing, which ultimately undermine Mr. Willich's 
credibility as to any of his statements sworn under oath.6 (See Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena, p. 5-11. 21-25) Iv1r. Willich' s nev.1est 
contradictory affidavit does not trump his older affidavits or S\VOrn testimony which is now 
inconvenient to Plaii1tiffs latest legal theories. Plaintiff repeatedly argues that "[t]he Court 
cannot take lightly" Mr. Willich's various assertions of conspiracy and malfeasance. However, 
the Court may do just that in the light of more credible evidence before the Court, especially as 
Mr. Willich's credibility is suspect from his breadth of contradictory sworn statements and 
6Mr. Willich, in his latest sworn affidavit, asserts that "I have previously filed an 
Affidavit in the matter herein, and stand on the veracity and truthfulness of the statements made 
under oath in that Affidavit." (~ 2) Conspicuously absent is any review or assertion of veracity 
or truthfulness of any of Mr. Willich's other sworn statements or testimony cited by Defendant as 
contradictory, and is a tacit concession of those contradictions. 
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testimony. 
Neither does one line from the Special City Council Meeting Minutes of November 14, 
2011 (which Plaintiff characterizes as the "Authorizing Resolution") serve as irtunutable proof of 
the intent of the entire Sun Valley City Council in its motives for authorizing its investigation. 
The intent to have an investigation was clearly in part due to Mr. Donoval's tlu·eatened litigation, 
which intent was established by the previously submitted affidavits of Nils Ribi (119-10), Adam 
King c,, 7-8), and Ms. Ball (ir, 3, 6). Plaintiff has produced no credible evidence to the contrary. 
It is hard to understand why Plaintiff specifically requested the relief of an "in-camera" 
review of communications throughout her briefing only to subsequently belittle the Court's 
actual in-camera review of those communications, both through Mr. Willich's latest affidavit and 
through argument to the Court. Plaintiff, through her briefing, questions the Court's ability or 
desire to take the "burdensome" task ofreviewing these commW1ications and further questions 
the Court's impru1iality in avoiding a case which "may not be popular with the Court." (See 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support oflvfotionfor Reconsideration, p. 4) Plaintiffs briefing also 
states that the Court has "draw[n] inferences and mad[e] assumptions" "v.ithout evidence to 
support" its findings. (Id. at 3) Mr. Willich apparently finds the Court's actions as, 
"disturbing," (January 29, 2014 Affidavit of Wayne Willich, 1~ 5, 9, 15), "concern[ing]" (Id. at, 
15), "unacceptable and inaccurate," (Id.) and alleges that the Court "ignored" specific facts. (/d. 
at ,r,r 14, 18) However, for having such strong feelings about the evidence now, it is interesting 
that neither Plaintiff nor Mr. Willich failed to contest tbese same issues raised by Defendant's 
evidence and argument during the motion t? compel. Instead, Plaintiff felt it only important now 
in this subsequent motion for reconsidel'ation, after seeing the Court's ruling. This is a waste of 
the Court and Defendant's time and resources. 
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Mr. Willich's "concern" with the Court's ruling is based on his alternative factual 
recollections of the emails sent in 201 I drawn from an analysis of the privilege log produced to 
Plaintiff by Defendant on June 24, 2013. However, Plaintiff had all of this evidence at least five 
months before she brought her motion to compel in November 2013. Mr. Willich never 
mentioned that the emails recorded in this log were questionable or "illegitimate" in his affidavit 
of September 19, 2013. It was not raised in any manner even after Defendant relied on these 
emails in its opposition briefing. Only after the Comt relied, in part, on those emails submitted 
in camera for its decision did Plaintiff bring this motion for reconsideration with a new objection 
to a long produced privilege log and the latest affidavit of Mr. Willich suddenly calling into 
question all emails that might be detrimental to Plaintiffs legal position. 
As irrefutable proof that any emails sent by Mr. Willich are not under privilege, Mr. 
Willich swears to alternative versions of the "tn1th" in order to remedy any adverse effects of the 
Court's prior ruling: Altemative A: Mr. Willich simply has no recollection of ever sending the 
emails. (January 29, 2014 Affidavit of Wayne Willich, ~ 7) Alternative B: If those emails were in 
fact sent by Mr. Willich, then the topics were definitely and conclusively related to matters that 
Plaintiff has concurrently argued would be outside her interpretation of the attorney-client 
privilege. (Id. at~ 8) Regardless of the fact that "Fonner Mayor Willi ch has not reviewed the 
emails or communications at issue," (see Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, 
p. 9);,he now clearly recalls the content ofall the etnails sent more than two years ago between 
himself and Ms. Ball, Mr. King, and Mr. Naylor. However, there is another option, unmentioned 
by Plaintiff or Mr. Willich, Alternative C: that Mr. Willich actually sent the emails as Wlitten. In 
failing to acknowledge Alternative C, Plaintiff and Jvir. Willich's seemingly assert that every 
single email purporting to be sent froin lvfr. Willich to Ms. Ball is suspect in some way. Mr. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA - 8 
806 
• 
4/7/2014 1:23 PM FROM: fa:, TO: 12087385527 PAGE: 01 OF 011 
Willich makes a similar statement regarding communications to Mr. King and Mr. Naylor, 
stating that he never sought legal advice from either of them in any correspondences. (January 
29, 2014 Affidavit of Wayne Willich, ~ 8) Mr. Willich's new affidavit is not supported by the 
evidence before the Court, nor by common sense. 
In addressing emails allegedly sent to Mr. Wi!lich from other parties, emails which again, 
he admittedly has never actually reviewed or seen, he also swears to multiple versions of the 
"truth": either he never opened them, they may have been blocked by a spam program, he never 
read them, or he read them "but refused to respond." (January 29, 2014 Affidavit of Wayne 
Willich, 19) (emphasis added). Again, the most obvious version-that Mr. Willich received, read, 
and responded to emails certified by other parties-is not a suggested possibility to any of the 
emails in question. Mr. King and Mr. Naylor also allegedly never sent any legal advice to Mr. 
Willich, or he just never read any such communications. And again, these assertions defy not 
only the evidence before the Court, but common sense. 
Plaintiff apparently hopes that having Mr. Willich raise new and assorted allegations-
unsupported by anything than his current testimony and contradicted by his past testimony-that 
Mr. Willich will be allowed to participate in the in camera review of any communications, and 
allow Mr. Willich an opportunity to "explain" himself further. 7 What Mr. Willi ch is actually 
requesting is the equivalent of a ''take-home exam," where he and "an attorney of [his] choice," 
7Upon order of the Court, DefendaJ'.1t would be willing to provide any and all 
communications for further in camera review. However, Defendant objects to Plaintiff or Mr. 
Willich's informal demands to participate in any review of documents submitted to the Court for 
tn camera review. Contrary to Plaintiffs asse1iions, allowing Mr. Willich to view the in camera 
documents would in fact waive any privilege to them, as Plaintiff has provided no legal basis as 
to Mr. Willich's current authority because he is no longer is an elected official. Additionally, he 
has demonstrated through his cooperation v.:ith Plaintiff that he is an adverse paiiy to the City of 
Sun Valley. 
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will be able to do exactly what they have done with the Court's other rulings: manipulate or 
attempt to discredit the documented trnth in a targeted way in order to have a preferable outcome 
for Plaintiff. 
Defendant has had to repeatedly respond to erroneous legal arguments and an ever 
changing (and contradictory) factual narrative presented by Plaintiff Defendant requests not 
only that the Co1.1rt dehy Plaintiffs frivolous motion for reconsideration, but that it impose costs 
and fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) to Defendants in light of having to respond, yet again, to 
the same legal arguments and another of the continuing and contradictory affidavits of Mr. 
Willich .. 
DATED this 71h day of April, 2014. 
NAYLOR& HALES, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 71" day of April, 2014, I caused to be served, by the 
rnethod(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Eric B. Swartz U.S. Mail 
Joy M. Vega Hand Delivered 
Jones & S·wartz, PLLC .J-(.. Fax Transmission: 489-8988 
PO Box 7808 Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 joy@jonesandswattzlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaint([! 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AND COMPEL 
BACKGROUND 
The dispute at issue involves the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer, and the 
Defendants, the City of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi, and DeWayne Briscoe. The dispute is 
centered on the Plaintiff's treatme1;1t while an employee for the City of Sun Valley. The 
Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendants for retaliatory discharge in violation of the 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("IP PEA"). 
The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider, seeking reconsideration on the 
previously decided Motion to Enforce Subpoena and Compel. The Motion to Reconsider 
was argued before this Court on April 15, 2014. Sharon Hammer ("Plaintiff'') brought a 
Motion to Enforce Subpoena against non-party Patricia Ball and to compel production of 
documents withheld from production in discovery and in response to subpoena Ms. BaU 
and the Defendants, City of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley") opposed the Motion claiming that 
attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protections apply. Oral argument was 
heard on that matter on December 17, 2013. This Court found that the materials sought in 
the subpoena were protected by the work product doctrine, and the Plaintiff's Motion was 
denied. The Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Reconsider the Motion Enforce Subpoena and 
Compel, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) and 1 l(a)(2)B), which was heard before this Court 
on April 15, 2014. For the following reasons the Motion to Reconsider is denied: 
LEGAL STANDARD 
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I.RC.P. 26(b)(l) permits broad discovery of any matter that is not privileged, 
even if it is inadmissible, so long as it is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence." I.RC.P. 26(b)(l). The burden of showing information is 
privileged, and therefore exempt from discovery, is on the party asserting the privilege. 
Kirkv. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 703-04, 116 P.3d 27, 33-34 (2005) citing Ex 
parte Niday, 15 Idaho 559, 98 P. 845 (1908). I.RE. 502(b) states: "A client has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client which were made (1) between the client or the 
client's representative and the client's lawyer or the lawyer's representative, (2) between 
the client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) among clients, their 
representatives, their lawyers, or their lawyer's representatives, in any combination, 
concerning a matter of common interest, but not including communications solely among 
clients or their representatives when no lawyer is a party to the communication. (4) 
between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the 
client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client". 
I.R.E. 502(b ). A communication is confidential where it is not intended to be disclosed to 
third parties, other than those third parties who are furthering the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client or who are necessary to transmit the confidential 
communication. I.R.E. 502(a)(5). 
Furthermore, work product is generally immune from discovery. See I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(3). Work product is considered "documents and tangible things otherwise 
discoverable ... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or 
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by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) ... " Id Work product can only become discoverable 
"upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in 
the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Id Additionally, "[i]n 
ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court 
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation, 
including communications between the attorney and client, whether written or oral" Id 
DISCUSSION 
In the Motion to Compel and Enforce Subpoena Sun Valley argued that the 
Motion to enforce the Plaintiff's subpoena should be denied because the subpoena seeks 
protected work product and material protected by the attorney-client privilege. The 
Plaintiff argued that the material sought was not protected by the attorney-client privilege 
and should not be considered work product. 
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in 
anticipation of litigation "by or for another party or by or for that other party's 
representative ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial 
need of the materials ... and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." I.RC.P. 26(b)(3). If discovery of 
such material is ordered, "the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative 
of a party concerning the litigation." Id 
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The Court found in the Motion to Compel and Enforce Subpoena, and further 
finds here, there is evidence in the record that Ms. Ball was retained by Sun Valley in 
anticipation of litigation, and that her investigation was substantially focused on issues 
that appeared ripe for impending litigation. A.ff. Ball, 15; Aff. King, ,r 14. Ms. Ball was 
consulted after Mr. Donoval had threatened litigation, was retained on the same day Mr. 
Donoval initiated litigation, and conducted an investigation squarely related to that and 
other potential litigation. Aff. King, Ex. A, p. 5, AfI. King, 115, A.ff. Ball, 15,7. 
Therefore, Ms. Ball's report was prepared in large part for Sun Valley in anticipation of, 
or in conjunction with pending and anticipated litigation. 
This Court's previous finding is that the investigation was completed on 
December 20th, 2011. There have been new affidavits produced that create 
inconsistencies as to when the investigation was completed. However, there is not enough 
evidence that shows that this Court's previous finding that the investigation was 
completed on December 20th, 2011, was incorrect. As noted in this Court's previous 
ruling, e-mail communications provided in camera contradict Mr. Willich's assertion that 
he gave Ms. Ball no authority or direction to modify the "Final Ball Report" in any 
manner after December 12, 2011. K. Naylor Aff., Ex. B, SV IN CAMERA 57; Ex. L, ,r 
14. Furthermore, Plaintiff's previous affidavit states that Mr. Willich stated to her on 
December 16, 2011, ''that the report of Special Investigator Ball was close to being 
completed and that disciplinary charges against me, if any, would be determined in a few 
days." Aff. K. Naylor, Ex. G, ,r 5. This further shows that Mr. Willich did not see the 
investigation as complete on December 12, 2011. This Court continues to find that for the 
purposes of this motion, Ms. Ball's investigation was complete on December 20, 2011. 
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Moreover, if Sun Valley retained Ms. Ball in substantial part to conduct her 
investigation in anticipation of litigation, as this Court finds it did, the materials produced 
as part of that investigation are protected under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). It is irrelevant whether 
Mr. Naylor was her primary contact, or whether Ms. Ball was retained as an attorney or 
merely an investigator. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3) protects material produced in anticipation of 
litigation either for a party or for that party's representative. 
As this Court previously noted, the work product doctrine protects disclosure of 
communications. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383,395 (1981). ''Communications" are 
precisely what the Plaintiff seeks, essentially all documents generated in connection with 
Ms. Ball's disciplinary investigation. The Plaintiff is free to depose any of the individuals 
interviewed by Ms. Ball in the course of her investigation in order to discover underlying 
facts which may be related to this case. However, the Plaintiff is not entitled to copies, 
however recorded, of Ms. Ball's interviews with witnesses or communications with Sun 
Valley representatives engaged in pursuant to Ms. Ball's duty as an investigator. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the e-mails produced in accordance with the 
investigation. The Plaintiff can obtain the underlying facts obtained by Ms. Ball in these 
interviews through other discovery methods. Notably, at least portions of the report itself 
became publically available and Plaintiff has it. 
It is possible under certain circumstances to waive the work product doctrine. If 
work product is disclosed, and that disclosure is to an adversary, the protection is lost. 
Trustees ofElec. Workers No. 26 Pension Trust Fundv. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 
F.R.D. 1, 14-15 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In this case, part of Ms. Ball's report 
was disclosed to the Blaine County Prosecutor. Blaine County and Sun Valley are not 
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adversaries; rather they share a common interest. Disclosure to the Blaine County 
Prosecutor is consistent with maintaining secrecy from Sun Valley's adversaries. See U.S. 
v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MCI's disclosure of work product to the 
government, for the purpose of aiding in the investigation of MCI's opponent did not 
waive work product immunity). "While the mere showing of a voluntary disclosure to a 
third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the attorney-client privilege, it 
should not suffice in itself [to waive protection of work product]." Id. at 1299. Since there 
has been no showing that Sun Valley disclosed its work product to an adversary, it has 
not waived protection of its work product. 
As stated in this Court's decision on the Motion to Compel and Enforce 
Subpoena, the Plaintiff has not shown that Sun Valley has waived work product 
protection. The Plaintiff argues that Sun Valley has waived its attorney-client and work 
product privilege. While there is no direct Idaho case law on the issue, the Plaintiff cites 
to federal case law which analyzes a similar work product rule. Under the federal rule, 
work product protection is only waived when fairness requires, and is limited to the 
subject matter of the related disclosure, and does not create a blank.et waiver of the work 
product privilege in the entire case. Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100-01 (9th 
Cir. 2010). "Moluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney communication 
constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such communications on the same 
subject." Weil v. Investment.Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F. 2d 12, 23 (9th 
Cir. 1981 ). The Plaintiff attempts to argue that the voluntary waiver of a single document 
waives all communications presented in a case. However, this is not the case. Even a case 
cited by the Plaintiff states "[ w]e conclude, then, that while the mere showing of a 
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voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, it should not suffice in itself for waiver of the work product 
privilege." Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981) citing 
United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.CirJ 980). Because Ms. Ball's findings 
were disclosed to the Blaine County Prosecutor does not mean that waiver should be 
applied to all of Ms. Ball's other communications. Furthermore, there has been no 
evidence produced by the Plaintiff that the Defendant has voluntarily disclosed any 
attorney-client communications between Mr. King and Mr. Naylor nor any of the work 
product currently not being disclosed. Therefore, the privileges remain. Lastly, Plaintifrs 
argument that Mr. Naylor and Mr. King were 1n1authorized to participate in Ms. Ball's 
investigation is not supported by the evidence in the record. 
In the Motion to Reconsider, the Plaintiff has not shown that she cannot obtain the 
underlying facts through depositions. interrogatories. requests for production, or other 
discovery methods, nor has the Plaintiff shown either a substantial need for Ms. Ball's 
materials, nor an undue hardship in attaining the substantial equivalent of these materials 
by other means, and again, the Plaintiff has the report itself. Because the Plaintiff has not 
met the burden under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3), and this Court finds that Ms. Ball was retained in 
anticipation of litigation, and the materials she prepared were prepared in anticipation of 
litigation, those materials are protected. Because of this, there is no need to analyze 
whether those materials are protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. 
Defendant sought fees and costs pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), which were previously 
denied without prejudice as stated in the prior ruling. No further argument was provided 
at the last hearing. Fees and costs for the original Motion to Enforce Subpoena and 
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Compel are denied. The Motion to Reconsider was not frivolous, concerned an important 
issue, and did provide the Motion a new affidavit. Thus, fees and expenses are denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider is hereby 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated: ¢/ 1'{ 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Crystal Rigby, ~Jerk for the County ofB!aine, do hereby certify that on 
the /:/ day of , 2014, I filed the original and caused to be 
senred a true and correct copyfthe above and foregoing document: MEMORANDUM 
DECISION DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER to each of the persons as listed 
below: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Jones & Swartz PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 
Boise. Idaho 83 707 
Fax:208-489-8988 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax:208-383-9516 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
~ Via Facsimile 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
____t. Via Facsimile 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [!SB No. 35691 
Jacob H. Naylor (!SB No. 8474] 
Tyler D. Williams [ISB No. 8512] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw(a1naylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Sun Valley, 
Ribi, and Briscoe. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
DeWayne BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
DECLARATION OF SUSAN 
ROBERTSON 
_, 
c:t z -C!) -er 
0 
CJ 
I, SUSAN ROBERTSON, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and 
correct: 
I. I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and competent to testify to the matters herein. I 
make this declaration based upon personal knowledge. 
2. I am the Sun Valley City Administrator and in that capacity I am a custodian of 
City Records, including the following. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy 
of Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer's "City Administrator Employment Agreement." (SV 61-66.) A 
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tt'ue and correct copy of Plaintiff's "City Administrator Employment Agreetnent Extension" is 
attached hereto aa Exhibit B (SV 67-68). A true and co1Tect copy of Plaintiff's '1Supplemental 
Release Pursuant to City Administrator Employment Agreement" is attached hereto as Exhibit C 
(SV 387). 
PURSUANT to Idaho Code§ 9-1406 and Rule 7(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, I declare under penalty of peijury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
EXECUTED on this l::l!!!ttay of ::1JatLOOllfJK , 2014 
~~ 
SUSAN ROBERTSON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theL_.fl'(day of November, 2014, I caused to be served, 
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Joy M. Vega 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
PO Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
J,.,U16 . .'4 Oecll,rauon ol Su-'>a11 Rl•ben~on MSJ ~-pd 
_ _J,l.S. Mail 
~ Hand Delivered 
Fax Transmission: 489-8988 
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com 







nns CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGRBE'MENT hereinafter 
"Agreement''. effective the 1st day of June 2008, by and between the CITY OF SUN 
V ALLBY, State of Idaho, a municipal corporation, hereinafter called "Employer"', and 
SHARON R HAMMER hereinafter called "Employee" is made in contemplation of the 
following: 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Employer desires to employ the services of said Employee as 
City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley (11City"); and 
WHEREAS, Employee desires to accept employment as City Administrator of 
City p1.llSUant to the tenns and conditions bereot: 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises 
herein containe.d, and the above Recitals which are incorporate.cl herein, the parties agree as 
follows: 
SECTION!. DUTIES 
Employer hereby agrees to employ BmployeB as City Administrator of the City 
of Sun Valley to perform the duties customarily performed by City Administrators and which 
Employer, through the Mayor. s.ball from time to time assign. Employee shall perform such 
duties thoroughly, competently and with the highest level of professionalism as would be 
expected of a city administrator with Employee•s background. qualifications and experience. 
SECII0N1. EMPLOYMENT 
A. Employee's Employment shall commence June l, 2008. Employee 
shall report to work no later than June 23. 2008. 
B. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or otherwise interfere 
with the right of the Employer to terminate the services of Employee under -the applicable 
provisions of Section 3 below. 
C. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or otherwise interfere · 
with the right of the Employee to resign at any ti me from her position with Employer, subject 
only to the notice provision set forth in Section 3, Subsection C, of this Agreement 
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SECTION 3. TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY 
A Employer, acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's 
employment, without 01use, for any reason or no reason. Alty such decision to terminate 
shall occur only after the Mayor consul ta with each member of the City Council Upon such 
termination, Employar shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum cash payment equal 
to six (6) months, base salary described in Section 5, Subsection A 
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive 
remedy for any and all olaims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without 
caue and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by 
both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of 
any kind· for damages a.gainst Employer arising from a termination without cause. 
Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all 
claims against. the City of Sun Valley. A tetmination without cause shllU not entitle 
Employee to an informal review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel 
manual ('"Personnel Manas.1"). 
B. In the event Employee is terminated. for "cause", then Employer shall 
not be obligated to ~ any severance payment to Employee. "Cause" is defined as (i) a 
material breach of this Agreement; (ii) repeated neglect of Employee's duties as City 
Administrator. or (iii) misconduct such as theft, dishonesty. fraud, misrepresentation, 
embezzlement or other acts of willful misconduct, moral turpitude or criminal conduct 
C. Unless the parties otherwise agree, if Employee voluntarily resigns her 
position with Employer, then Employee shall give Employer three (3) months notice in 
advance; provided Bmploy~r may waive such three month advance notice in its discretion. In 
the event of a voluntary resignation. Employee shall not be entitled to any severance payment 
unless the Mayor shall decide otherwise in his sole discretion. 
If Employee applies for employment elsewhere, and during the term of her 
employment hereunder is included in a list of ten or fewer candidates still under consideration 
for such employment. then. upon learning of her inclusion in such a list, Employee shall 
promptly inform the Mayor and each member of the City Council, which shall be confidential 
insofar as is pennitted by applicable law. 
D. In the event Employee is terminated by Employer, acting through the 
Mayor, for any reason, then Employer shall pay Employee, at the rate of compensation then 
being earned by Employee, all accrued and unused vacation entitlement in accordance -with 
the then current policy for City Department Heads. 
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SECTION 4. DISABILITY 
Unless otherwise required by law, if employee is permanently disabled or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties because of sickness, accident, iajury, mental 
incapacity or health for a period of fom (4) successive weeks beyond any accrued sick leave, 
Employer shall have the option to terminate this Agreement, subject to the severance pay 
requirements of Section 3, Subsection A However, Employee shall be compeosated for any 
sick leave, vacation. holidays, compensatory time and other benefits accrued at the time 
Employee became disabled in accordance with PersoMel Manual provisions which are 
applicable to management employees, AND reduced by the Disability payments received for 
the preceding twelve (12) months. ff Employee suffers any permanent disability or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties then sick leave, vacation, holidays, compensatory 
time, and other benefits shall cease to accrue at that time. 
SECTIONS. COMPENSATION 
A. Employer agrees to pay Employee for her services a salary (hereinafter 
"Base Salary") at the rate of One Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($110,000.00), per year, 
payable in equal installments at the same time as other employees of the Employer are paid. 
B. Employer shall match. not to exceed to five percent (5%) of 
Employee's base salary of Section A, contributions made by Employee to a 4S7 Plan. 
C. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, Employee 
shall receive the general employment benefits, incluwng medical plan coverage, in the same 
amount and to the same extent as Employer grants to Department Heads. 
D. During the course of Employee's term of employment, Employer will 
pay into the Public Employees' Retirement System of Idaho ("PERSr'), for the account of 
Employee, in accordance with the policy established by Employer for all employees of 
Employer generally. 
E. Employer shall provide Employee a housing allowance of $1 ,000.00 
per month. 
SECTION 6. SICK LEA VE AND VACATION 
A. Upon commencement of employment. Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty ( 40) hours of sick leave and thereafter shall accrue sick leave at the 
same rate as City Department Heads employed by the City. 
B. Tbe leave entitlement granted to Employee pursuant to Subsection A of 
this Section 6 shall be used by Employee for time attributable to recovery from an illness or 
injury only and not as additional vacation time. If such sick leave is not used, it shall continue 
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to accrue, except that such entitlemont shall not accrue beyond the maximum actrual limits 
established for City Department Heads in respect to the same entitlement Upon termination 
of this Agreement Employee shall not be entitled to be paid for any a.ccrued but unused leave 
time. 
C. Upon commencement of employment, Employee shaU have credited to 
her personal account forty {40} hours paid vacation leave and thereafter: shall accrue vacation 
leave at the m.te of one hundred-sixty (160) hours per year. Vacation accrual and use shall 
follow the procedures set forth in the Personnel Manual. 
SECTION 7. PERFORMANCEEVALUA110N 
A. The Mayor shall review and evaluate the performance of the Employee 
at least once annually for consideration ofa compensation increase. Further. the Mayor shall 
provide the Employee with a summary written statement of the evaluation. 
B. · Annually, the Ma.yor and Etttployee shall doftne such goals and 
performance objectives which they determine neceswy for the proper operation of the City 
and in the attainment of the Employer's policy objectives and shall further establish a 1ela.tive 
priori~ among those various goals and objectives. Said goals and objectives shat l be in 
writing, and shall generally be attainable within the time limitations as specified and the 
annual operating and capital budgets. 
SECTIONS. GENERAL EXPENSES AND MEMBERSBIPS 
A. Employer recognizes that certain expenses of a non-personal and 
generally job-affiliated nature may be incurred by Employee from time to time. and hereby 
agrees to reimburse or to pay actual expenses in accordance with the travel and other policies 
of the Employer. 
B. Employer shall pay the membership fees to the International City 
Management Association on behalf of Employee. · 
C. Employer shall reimburse Employee's direct expenses for relocating to 
the Wood ruver Valley, as substantiated by receipts, up to $15,000.00. 
SECTION 9. INDEMNIFICATION 
Consistent with Idaho Code § 6-903, City agrees to indemnify and hold 
hannless Employee from claims, liabilities. or causes of action brought against Employee 
which are related to the course and scope of Employee's employment or which arise out of 
any act or omission within the course and scope of Employee's employment, provided, the 
City may 1efuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment for Employee if it is 
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determined that such act or omission of the Employee was not with.in the course and scope of 
her employment or included malice or criminal intent 
SECTION IO. OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
A. The Mayor. in consultation with 1he Employee, .sbaU fix such other 
terms and conditions of employment, as he ma.y determine from time to time to be 
appropriate, relating to the performance of Employee, provided such terms and conditions are 
not inconsistettt with or in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement · 
B. Except as herein specifically provided, all provisions of the Personnel 
Manual and regulations and rules of the Employer relating to vacation and sick leave, 
retirement contributions, holidays and other benefits which now exist or hereafter may be 
amended, also shall apply to Employee as they would to other employees of Employer. 
SECTION 11. NOTICES 
Notices pursuant to th.is Agreement shall be given by deposit in the custody of 
the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, addressed as follows or to such other 





City of Sun Valley 
P.O.Box-416 
Sun Valley, ID 833S3 
360 W. Illinois St. 
tl3P 
Chicago, IL 60610 
Alternatively, notices required pursuant to this Agreement may be personally 
served by band delivery. Notice shall be deemed given as of the date of personal service or as 
of the date of deposit of such written notice in the course of transmission in the United States 
Postal Service. · 
SECTION 12. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A. The text herein shall constitute the entire agreement between the 
parties. 
B. If any provision, or any portion thereof, in this Agreement is held 
unconstitutional, invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement, or portion 
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CITY ADMINISTRATOR 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT EXTENSION 
I 
ri This Employment Agreement Extension ("Extension") is made and entered into as of this 
____ -r+,.., ____ day of September 2009, by and between the City of Sun Valley, State of Idaho, 
a municipal corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Employer" and Sharon R. Hammer 
hereinafter referred to •employee." collectively known as the "Parties.· is made in contemplation 
of the following: 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Employer and Employee are parties to the City Administrator Employment 
Agreement; and 
WHEREAS, Employer and Employee wish to extend the original Employment 
Agreement effective June 1, 2008; and 
WHEREAS, the Parties wish to amend the Employment Agreement as sel forth in this 
Extension. 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
SECTION 1. TERM 
The term of the Employment Agreement Extension is one year commencing on June 1, 
2009 and fully Incorporates all terms of the Employment Agreement, originally executed by the 
Parties and effective on June 1, 2008, and this Employment Agreement Extension. 
SECTION 2. EMPLOYMENT 
The Employment Agreement shall automatically renew on its anniversary date {June 1·~ 
for a period of one (1) year hereinafter unless notice that the Agreement shall terminate Is given 
at least sixty (60) days before the expiration date. In the event the Agreement is not renewed, 
all compensation, benefits and requirements of the Employment Agreement shall remain in 
effect until the expiration of the term of the Employment Agreement unless Employee voluntarily 
resigns. 
SECTION 3. COMPENSATION 
A. Employer agrees to pay Employee for her services a salary (hereinafter "Base 
Salary"} at the rate of One Hundred Sixteen Thousand One Hundred and Thirty Two Dollars 
($116,132.00), per year, beginning October 1, 2009 payable in equal installments at the same 
time as other employees of the Employer are paid. 
B. Employer shall match, not to exceed five percent (5%) of Employee's base salary 
of Section A above, contributions made by Employee to a 457 Plan or other qualified retirement 
program. 
1 
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C. Consideration shall be given on an annual basis to increased compensation. 
Increased compensation can be in the form of a salary increase andior bonus and/or increase in 
housing allowance. 
D. Employer shall provide Employee a housing allowance of One Thousand One 
Hundred and Twenty Five Dollars {$1,125.00) per month beginning October 1, 2009. 
SECTION 4. NOTICE 
Employee: Sharon Hammer 
P.O. Box 1499 
Sun Valley,· 10 83353 
SECTION 5. GENERAL 
All other provisions of the City Administrator Employment Agreement effective June 1, 
2008 sha!I remain in full force and affect. 
EMPLOYER 
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r 
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the City Administrator 
Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley for any claims defined in 
dministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City 
nt Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008. 
__ 1~~'::-
tJI/T, ; 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
Tyler D. Williams [ISB No. 8512] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Sun Valley, 
Ribi, and Briscoe. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 







0 CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
DeWayne BRISCOE, a 
Defendants. 
Defendant, the City of Sun Valley, by and through its counsel, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby 
submits this Memorandum in Support of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment. As shown 
below, summary judgment is appropriate in this case and Plaintiffs complaint should therefore be 
dismissed, with final judgment entered in favor of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi and De Wayne Briscoe. 




Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer sued Sun Valley under the Idaho Public Employee Protection 
Act, Idaho Code§ 6-2101 et seq (the "Whistleblower Act") on June 29, 2012. (See Complaint for 
Damages and Demand for Jury Trial). She claims that she was twice placed on paid administrative 
leave pending an investigation in December 2011 and January 2012, then terminated on January 19, 
2012, in retaliation for having allegedly reported that then-Councilman Nils Ribi 1 harassed her. 
Hammer, however, waived this claim when she executed her City Administrator Employment 
Agreement ("Employment Agreement") on June 1, 2008. She then later released this claim at the 
time she was terminated in January 2012 when she executed a "Supplemental Release Pursuant to 
City Administrator Employment Agreement" (the "Release") in exchange for a six-month severance 
payment. Indeed, the Honorable Edward J. Lodge, United States District Court for the District of 
Idaho, has already ruled that Hammer's waiver and release was valid and binding with respect to 
similar state and federal claims based on retaliatory discharge. 
Additionally, Hammer's Whistleblower Act claim is meritless. First, a portion of it is time 
barred because she did not timely file suit within 180 days after the alleged violation. More so, with 
respect to the non-time barred portions, summary judgment is appropriate because, in short, there 
is insufficient evidence upon which Hammer can make out a prima facie case of retaliation in 
violation of the statute. And even if she could, Sun Valley had a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason to discharge her and she cannot show that such reason was a pretext. Trial is therefore 
unwarranted here. 
1Nils Ribi served two, four-year terms as a Sun Valley Councilman, ending in January 
2014. 
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Last, Hammer's claims for damages exceed the scope of allowable damages under the 
Whistleblower Act. In the unlikely event that any portion of Hammer's claim makes it past summary 
judgment, and in the even more unlikely event she prevails at trial, Hammer cannot as a matter of 
law obtain the full relief she seeks. The Court should therefore grant partial summary judgment with 
respect to damages. 
II. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Hammer's Employment Aereement and Release 
Hammer was hired as the City Administrator for Sun Valley on June 1, 2008, under the terms 
of a written Employment Agreement. (Complaint, 11 1, 16.) Section 3 of the Employment 
Agreement contains two termination provisions such that Hammer's employment could be 
terminated by Sun Valley either with or without cause. Specifically, Section 3.A (the "without cause" 
provision) provides in plain and unambiguous language: 
Employer, acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's employment, 
without cause, for any reason or no reason. Any such decision to terminate shall 
occur only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon 
such termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum cash 
payment equal to six (6) months, base salary described in Section 5, Subsection A. 
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive remedy 
for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without 
cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and 
equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Consequently, receipt of the severance 
payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun 
Valley. A termination without cause shall not entitle Employee to an informal 
review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel manual ("Personnel 
Manual"). 
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(Declaration of Susan Robertson, Ex. A (Employment Agreement, § 3.A)) (emphasis original). 
Section 3.B provides that in the event of a termination "with cause" Hammer would not be entitled 
to any severance payment. (Id., § 3 .B.) 
The next year Hammer executed an Employment Agreement Extension that provided for 
automatic, annual one-year extensions of the Employment Agreement. (Id., Ex. B (Employment 
Agreement Extension, § 2.)) It is thus undisputed that the Employment Agreement was in full force 
and effect at the time of Hammer's termination. 
On January 19, 2012, Hammer was terminated from her position at Sun Valley under the 
"without cause" provision ofher Employment Agreement. In compliance with Section 3 .A, Hammer 
drafted, through her attorney/husband James R. Donoval, and executed the Release stating in full: 
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3 .A. of the City 
Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City of Sun 
Valley for any claims defined in Section 3.A. of the City Administrator Employment 
Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator Employment Agreement 
was entered into on June 1, 2008. 
(Id., Ex. C) Hammer received her six-month severance payment as stated therein and she and Sun 
Valley parted ways. 
A mere six months after accepting that money and agreeing not to sue Sun Valley, however, 
Hammer turned around and sued Sun Valley and two officials2 for alleged violations of the 
Whistleblower Act.3 Hammer alleges that during the time of her employment at Sun Valley from 
2The Court dismissed defendants Mayor De Wayne Briscoe and Councilman Nils Ribi on 
November 26, 2013, because there is no individual liability under the Whistleblower Act. 
3Hammer had previously sued and then voluntarily dismissed Sun Valley and various 
officials based upon similar allegations, in Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-928 (J. Elgee). She 
had also filed a claim against Sun Valley, Ribi and Briscoe with the Idaho Human Rights 
Commission, also based on similar allegations. It is undisputed that Hammer knew of the 
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June 1, 2008, until her discharge on January 19, 2012, she was harassed by Councilman Nils Ribi, 
which she asserts she reported to various Sun Valley officials and in retaliation she was placed on 
administrative leave, investigated, then terminated. (Complaint, 11 31-38.) Her Complaint 
conveniently ignores the waiver language in her Employment Agreement and the fact that she 
received a six-month severance in exchange for releasing this very claim. 
B. Hammer's Termination 
Mayor Briscoe was sworn into office as the new Sun Valley mayor on January 3, 2012. 
(Complaint at 29, ,r 143.) As is common with new administrations, he made the determination that 
he could not work with the prior mayor's chosen city administrator. Instead, as was his prerogative 
as mayor, Mayor Briscoe decided he would rather vet and hire his own person for that important 
position, with whom he would necessarily have a close working relationship.4 (Declaration ofK.irtlan 
G. Naylor, Ex. A (Briscoe Depo Tr. at 129:4 - 130:8); Ex. B (Griffith Depo Tr. at 13:14-24, 15:21-
23, 17:1-5, 29:13-21, 33:16-24); Ex. C (Youngman Depo Tr. at 27:24-29:6, 82:11 - 83:1); Ex. D 
(SuhadolnikDepo Tr. at 14:16-24); Ex. E (Ribi Depo Tr. at 171 :20- 172:15)). Thus, on January 19, 
Hammer's position with Sun Valley was terminated under the "without cause" provision of her 
Employment Agreement, under which she executed a Release of all claims against Sun Valley and 
received a six month severance payment, as set forth above. 
allegations that form the basis of the present lawsuit at the time she was terminated and signed 
the Release. 
4Under Idaho Code § 50-206, appointed officers (such as Hammer) may be removed by 
the mayor for any reason "deemed sufficient" with the affirmative vote of half the full city 
council plus one. Alternatively, a city council may upon its own initiative remove an appointed 
official by unanimous vote. 
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C. Related Federal Case 
Hammer also brought a related federal action against Sun Valley, Briscoe and Ribi, wherein 
she alleged fourteen claims for gender discrimination and harassment, retaliation, due process 
violations (both procedural and liberty interest), conspiracy, assault, wrongful termination, breach 
of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Hammer v. Sun Valley, Case No. 1: 13-
cv-21-EJL. That case is still pending, but substantially overlaps with the present Whistleblower case, 
especially with respect to the Employment Agreement and Release. The Honorable Edward J. Lodge, 
United States District Judge, significantly narrowed the federal case by dismissing all but two claims 
based on the plain and unambiguous language of the very same Employment Agreement and Release 
at issue here. (Naylor Deel. Ex. I ("Lodge Decision")) 
In Judge Lodge's words: "the laneuaee of the contract could not be clearer. The 
waiver/release was to 'any and all claims' without any limitations." (Lodge Decision at 17) 
( emphasis added). Thus, Judge Lodge dismissed nearly all of Hammer's claims existing against Sun 
Valley at the time of her termination. Notably, Judge Lodge's dismissal included claims for 
retaliation closely mirroring Hammer's Whistleblower claim here. Only Hammer's claims for assault 
(which does not involve Sun Valley) and liberty interest violation (which accrued after the release) 
remain in the federal lawsuit. 5 
D. Other On~oine Sun Valley Matters 
While Hammer's termination was because Mayor Briscoe determined he could not work with 
her and would rather vet and hire his own City Administrator, there were other ongoing Sun Valley 
5Hammer moved for reconsideration but no decision has been entered yet on that motion. 
Additionally, defendants moved for summary judgement on the remaining two claims, which is 
also pending. 
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matters under investigation, which did in part relate to her being placed on paid administrative leave. 
These matters were not, however, the cause of Hammer's termination. 
To put these events in context, the starting point is the fall of 2011. On October 5, 2011, then-
Sun Valley Treasurer Michelle Frostenson met with then-Mayor Wayne Willich and expressed 
concerns she had about possible City mismanagement. (Naylor Deel., Ex. F (Frostenson Depo Tr, 
at 15:22 - 16:14, 25:11 - 37:19); Ex. B. (Willich Depo Tr. at 11 :14 - 14:3)) Frostenson again raised 
the same issues to Councilman Ribi on or about November 10 because she did not believe Mayor 
Willich had adequately addressed her concerns. (Frostenson Depo Tr. at 15:22- 16:6; 53:14-22; Ex. 
C (Ribi Depo Tr. at 26:14 - 32:9)) Ribi contacted Councilman Bob Youngman and 
Councilman/Mayor-Elect DeWayne Briscoe6 regarding these same matters and a City Council 
special executive session was called for November 11, 2011. (Complaint at 26, 1 129.) 
During the November 11 executive session, Frostenson presented her allegations to the 
Mayor and City Council. (Complaint at 26, 1 130; Briscoe Deel., Ex. A. 7) Afterwards, Mayor Willi ch 
and Adam King, the City Attorney, met with Hammer, presented the allegations that had been made 
against her and proposed that she resign in exchange for a severance payment. (Complaint at 26, 1 
131.) Hammer turned down the offer. (Complaint at 27, 1133.) 
On November 13, Hammer's husband/attorney, James R. Donoval, delivered to the Sun 
Valley City Council and Mayor Willi ch a letter, dated November 12, threatening litigation regarding 
6Briscoe defeated Willich in the Mayoral race on November 8, 2011. Additionally, Franz 
Suhadolnik and Michelle Griffith were elected as new City Council members, replacing Mayor 
Briscoe (due to his vacancy) and Joan Lamb. 
7Mayor Briscoe's declaration is attached as Exhibit J to the declaration of Kirtlan Naylor. 
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Ribi's alleged harassment, and in the event of any disciplinary action against Hammer. (Complaint 
at 27, ,r 136; Briscoe Deel., Ex. B.) 
On November 14, the City Council conducted a follow-up executive session. (Complaint at 
27, ,r 137.) The City Council voted to engage an attorney to conduct an independent investigation 
into the allegations being made. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. A at SV 2070.) 
Donoval sent Sun Valley a second letter, dated November 15, again threatening a lawsuit in 
connection with Hammer's allegations of harassment by Ribi and the City's intent to conduct an 
investigation. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. C.) Donoval followed up with a third letter, dated November 16, 
which actually applauded the decision to conduct an internal investigation, yet still threatened a 
lawsuit unless Sun Valley agreed to Hammer's absurd settlement terms, which included Ribi's 
resignation, a six-figure payment to Hammer, and a promise that Ribi would never contact Hammer 
again, otherwise he would be subjected to a hundred thousand dollar punitive damage assessment. 
(Briscoe Deel., Ex. D.) 
On November 18, Mayor Willich placed Hammer on non-disciplinruy paid administrative 
leave, pending the outcome of the investigation. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. E.) Hammer responded by filing 
a Whistleblower Claim ( the first Whistleblower action) in Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-928, 
which was later voluntarily dismissed. She also filed a complaint with the Idaho Human Rights 
Commission. (Complaint at 28, ,r 139.) 
Sun Valley hired Patricia Ball8 on or about November 21 to conduct the investigation. The 
"Ball Investigation" occurred over the next several weeks and, with authorization from Mayor 
8While Ms. Ball is an attorney, her investigation was not done in the capacity of a legal 
representative. 
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Willi ch, expanded into a broader inquiry of Sun Valley financial issues, Fire Department issues, and 
Hammer's allegations of harassment by Ribi. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. F.) (Filed Under Seal) 
On December 16, Mayor Willich provided authorization for the Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney to be notified about "information and facts discovered in an employment investigation that 
may be the subject of criminal conduct." (Briscoe Deel. Ex. I.) He also issued to Hammer a 
"NOTICE OF CONTINUED PAID ADMINISTRATIVE LEA VE PENDING INVESTIGATION", 
along with a Garrity Notice. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. G and H) (emphasis original). 
The Ball Investigation then culminated in a December 20, 2011 report known as the "Ball 
Report"9 (id.). With respect to Hammer, the Ball Report concluded that " [ s ]ufficient evidence exists 
to support multiple violations of City policy by Hammer[]" and that "[t]hese matters should be 
immediately referred to an outside agency for further audit and investigation of possible civil and/or 
criminal violations." (Id. at BALL 3.) After receiving the Ball Report, but before Ball actually 
presented it to the Mayor and City Council, Mayor Willich decided that he disagreed with the report 
and recommendations Ball made and therefore unilaterally brought Hammer back from paid 
administrative leave on December 27. (Complaint at 28, ,, 141-142.) 
Briscoe took office as Sun Valley'snewMayoronJanuary3,2012. (Complaint at 29,, 143.) 
The next day he provided authorization for the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney to be notified 
about "information and facts discovered in an employment investigation that may be the subject of 
criminal misconduct." (Briscoe Deel., Ex. J.) He also issued Hammer a "NOTICE OF PAID 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEA VE PENDING INVESTIGATION", essentially tracking the language of 
9The Ball Report actually consists of three separate reports covering allegations involving 
the Fire Department, Ribi and Hammer. (Briscoe Deel.,, 8.) For purposes here, the Ball Report 
will refer only to the report covering the investigation into Hammer. 
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former-Mayor Willich's notice. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. K.) Mayor Briscoe also issued Hammer a Garrity 
Notice. (Briscoe Deel., Exl. L.) Similar notices were issued to other Sun Valley employees in 
connection with the Ball Investigation findings about the Fire Department. (Briscoe Deel., 1 14.) 
As noted above, Hammer was terminated on January 19, 2012, because Mayor Briscoe 
determined he could not work with her and would rather vet and hire his own city administrator. 
Afterwards, Sun Valley issued a press release in the Idaho Mountain Express informing the public 
that Hammer had been terminated as the City Administrator. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. 0.) 
In February 2012, shortly after Hammer was terminated, Sun Valley hired the law firm of 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd., who engaged an independent accounting firm, Hagen, 
Streiff, Newton & Oshiro, P.C., to conduct a thorough audit of Sun Valley's financial matters from 
2009 through 2011. (Briscoe Deel., 118.) The resulting Forensic Audit was completed in August 
2012. The audit found significant problems, including: (a) non-compliance with control and approval 
of expenditure processes; (b) lack of control over work schedules by salaried exempt employees; ( c) 
exempt employees being paid twice for work performed during normal working hours; (d) exempt 
employees being paid salaries inconsistent with the personnel manual; ( e) problems with the 
compensation of hourly on-call firefighters; (f) non-compliance with the accrued vacation hour 
policies; (g) improper use of city property; (h) improper use of city credit cards; (i) inappropriate use 
of a fuel card; and (j) problems with travel expenses reimbursement. (Briscoe Deel., Ex. P.) 
Similarly, on November 21, 2012, the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney issued a letter to 
Sun Valley about the criminal investigation initiated months before, which had been performed by 
Scott Birch, the Attorney General Office's Criminal Investigative Unit Chief. Based upon the 
criminal investigation, which included a review of Sun Valley documents as well as the Ball Report 
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and the Forensic Audit, the PA found misconduct by Hammer, but he chose not to pursue criminal 
charges in light of the heightened burden of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Notably, the PA 
concluded: 
Although no criminal charges will be forthcoming, the investigations revealed serious 
failures at multiple levels of management and supervision within the City of Sun 
Valley, including (1) a failure to document; (2) a failure to follow stated policies and 
procedures; (3) lax management and oversight; ( 4) poor time accounting; (5) 
apparent conflicts of interest; and (6) a lack of checks and balances throught the 
claims process. 
(Briscoe Deel., Ex. Q.) 
Meanwhile, in June 2012 while both the Forensic Audit and criminal investigations were 
underway, two tort claim notices against Sun Valley and various Sun Valley officials, including 
Hammer, were settled. These claims were brought by Frostenson and Kelly Ek, a former Sun Valley 
Clerk. Both claimed that Sun Valley officials, including Hammer, retaliated against them after 
making allegations of misconduct and financial problems. (Briscoe Deel., 1 20.) Sun Valley 
published press releases about the fact of the settlements in June 2012, which included brief 
synopses of the allegations. (Briscoe Deel., Exs. Rand S.) Both matters were later resolved. 
Hammer then filed the present suit on June 29, 2012, and has attempted to confuse these 
events and conflate them in such a way as to show that Ribi somehow orchestrated a scheme to have 
her fired in retaliation for reporting his alleged harassment. As shown below, however, Hammer 
cannot proceed to trial because she waived and then released this claim and, in any event, there is 
insufficient evidence to support her claim. 
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III. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Shapleyv. Centurion Life 
Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875 (2013). A defending party may move for summary judgment as to all or any 
part of the claims against it. I.R.C.P. 56(b). 
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with 
the moving party. Harris v. State, 147 Idaho 401, 404-405 (2009). In determining whether this 
burden has been met, "a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits or depositions 
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Petricevich v. 
Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869 (1982). Any disputed material facts is liberally construed 
in favor of the non-moving party, and the court makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. McCoy v. Lyons .. 120 Idaho 765, 769 (1991). 
Upon this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party and in order to 
defeat summary judgment must submit "evidence ... which contradicts the evidence submitted by 
the moving party, and which establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact." State 
Dept. of Agric. v. Curry Bean Co., 139 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). Even disputed facts will not defeat 
summary judgment when the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential 
element of the case, Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (1988), or when a plaintiff fails to establish 
a prima facie case on which he or she bears the burden of proof. State v. Shama Res. Ltd P's hip, 127 
Idaho 267, 270 (1955). Further, the non-moving party "must not rest on mere speculation because 
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a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact." Harris v. State Dept. 
of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298 (1992). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Hammer Plainly and Unambi1:uously Waived and Later Released Her 
Whistleblower Claim A~ainst Sun Valley 
Hammer's Employment Agreement is a plain and unambiguous complete recital of the terms 
and conditions ofher employment with Sun Valley. It specifically states that "[t]he text herein shall 
constitute the entire agreement between the parties." (Employment Agreement § 12.) Relevant here, 
the Employment Agreement provides that Hammer could be terminated, "without cause, for any 
reason or no reason." (Id., § 3.) (emphasis added) It further provides that, at the time Hammer 
executed the agreement, she waived all claims of any kind arising from a termination without cause. 
(Id.) In a separate clause Hammer also agreed that upon receipt of the agreed upon severance 
payment she would release all claims against Sun Valley. (Id.) 
Thus, Hammer's present Whistleblower Claim fails for two distinct reasons: first, she waived 
any claim arising from a termination without cause when she entered into her Employment 
Agreement with Sun Valley; second, she later released all claims against Sun Valley when she 
received her six-month severance payment. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate, consistent 
with the Lodge Decision on the same issues. 
1. Hammer's Waiver and Release are Enforceable 
It is well settled that " [ f]reedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of 
contracts." Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499 (1970). It is, therefore, "a 
general rule of this state and the majority of American jurisdictions that a party may contract to 
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absolve [herself] from certain duties and liabilities under a contract subject to certain limitations." 
Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178 (1979). 
A legally enforceable contract must manifest mutual assent of the parties to its terms, which 
must be stated plainly and explicitly, and there must be consideration. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 
415 (2009) ( citing 17 A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 19 (2d ed. 2009)). When the terms of a contract are 
clear and unambiguous their interpretation and legal effect are questions oflaw. Opportunity, LLC. 
v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605 (2002) ( citing Idaho v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886 (2000)). "The 
meaning of an unambiguous contract must be determined from the plain meaning of the words." Id 
The intent of the parties is thus ascertained from the contract language. Id at 607. 
Thus, " [ w ]here preliminary negotiations are consummated by written agreement, the writing 
supercedes all previous understandings and the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the 
writing." Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498 (1991) ( emphasis added). "If the written 
agreement is complete upon its face and unambiguous, no fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic 
evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, 
vary, alter, add to or detract from the terms of the written contract." Id. 
All contracts must also be supported by valid consideration. Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners 
Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 526 (2012). Consideration exists where there is something given in 
exchange for a promise. While consideration is invalid if it is something to which the other party 
already has an absolute right, "forbearance to prosecute a disputed claim is good consideration." 
Salmeron v. US., 724 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 1 Corbin on Contracts§ 140 at 595 
(1963)). Further, where a contract is in writing the presumption is that it is supported by valid 
consideration. Weisel, 152 Idaho at 526. 
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2. Hammer Waived Any Claim Arising from· a Termination 
Without Cause Under the Plain and Unambiguous Terms of the 
Employment Agreement 
When Hammer was hired by Sun Valley in June 2008 she executed the Employment 
Agreement in which she contractually waived any claim that could arise from a future termination 
without cause. (Employment Agreement§ 3.A.) Specifically, the clear and unambiguous language 
of her Employment Agreement states: 
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive remedy 
for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without 
cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and 
equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right 
to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a termination 
without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to 
execution of a release against the City of Sun Valley. 
(Id.) (bold in original, underline added) Accordingly, Hammer cannot maintain her present 
Whistleblower Action against Sun Valley because she indisputably waived this claim when she 
executed the Employment Agreement. 
3. Hammer Later Released Sun Valley of All Existing Claims Under 
the Plain and Unambiguous Terms of the Release 
The "without cause" provision in Section 3.A of Hammer's Employment Agreement also 
includes a requirement stating that "receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a 
release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley." (Employment Agreement, § 3 .A.) This release 
clause is separated from the previously discussed waiver provision, as it allowed Hammer the choice 
(upon a termination "without cause") to: (1) accept the contractually provided severance payment 
and consequently release all claims against Sun Valley, regardless of whether they arose from a 
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termination without cause; .ru: (2) to reject the severance payment and retain the right to pursue all 
non-waived claims against Defendant City of Sun Valley. (Id) 
The plain language of Plaintiff Hammer's Employment Agreement clearly states that receipt 
of the severance payment is subject to a release of all claims against Defendant. (Id.) This release 
is a conditional term and was only required if Plaintiff Hammer voluntarily took receipt of the 
severance payment. This is a clear and distinct event from the initial waiver for all claims arising 
from a termination "without cause". In other words, when Hammer made her choice to accept the 
severance payment and executed the Release, she released all claims against Sun Valley. 
If Hammer wanted to sue Sun Valley, her option at that time was to forego the severance 
payment and pursue any non-waived legal action she believed she might have. This was a basic 
risk/reward analysis. In signing the Release and accepting the severance payment, Hammer was 
guaranteed her six-month severance payment. In exchange for that certainty, she agreed to release 
any claim for damages available at that time. Alternatively, she could have rejected the severance 
payment and taken the risk of pursuing a lawsuit against Sun Valley for any un-waived claims. 
It is undisputed that on January 23, 2013, Hammer chose the first option and accepted the 
severance payment in exchange for a release of "all claims against the City of Sun Valley." She is 
now attempting to seek double-recovery as she has retained her six-month severance payment and 
also seeks money damages under the Whistleblower Act (as well as her federal court claims). This 
is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of her Employment Agreement and Release. 
Because Hammer has released all claims against Sun Valley - as Judge Lodie has already found-
Hammer cannot maintain the present action. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate. The 
analysis and decision by Judge Lodge is correct, persuasive and can be relied upon by this Court. 
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B. Hammer's Whistleblower Claim Is Meritless 
1. Idaho's Whistleblower Act 
For the sake of argument, even if the Court were to analyze Hammer's claim on its merits, 
it cannot survive summary judgment. The Whistleblower Act is designed to benefit the citizens and 
protect the integrity of government "by providing a legal cause of action for public employees who 
experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of law, 
rule or regulation." LC. § 6-2101. Specifically, the Whistleblower Act prohibits the governmental 
employer from taking: 
... adverse action against an employee because the employee ... communicates in 
good faith10 the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a 
violation or suspected violation of law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of 
this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such 
communication shall be made at a time and in a manner which gives the employer 
reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation. 
LC.§ 6-2104(1)(a). 
The Whistleblower Act contains an implicit, common-sense requirement that the employer 
engage in some sort of "predicate act" that triggers the application of the statute in the first place. 
Black v. Idaho State Police, 155 Idaho 570, 574 (2013). Thus, the statute cannot be used as a tool 
to resolve or take action as a result of political, internal, or organizational issues. It only protects 
activities directed at reporting or "blowing the whistle" on the predicate act of wrongdoing related 
to waste or the violation of a law, rule or regulation. See id.; I.C. § 6-2101. 
1011For purposes of subsection l(a) of this section, an employee communicates in good 
faith if there is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is lacking where the 
employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or 
frivolous." LC.§ 6-2104(1)(b). 
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If a plaintiff can establish the existence of a predicate act triggering the application of the 
Whistleblower Act, the issue becomes whether the plaintiff can set forth sufficient facts to 
demonstrate a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge. This requires an adequate showing that: (1) 
the plaintiff was an employee that engaged in or intended to engage in a protected activity; (2) the 
defendant is an employer that took adverse action against the employee; and (3) there is a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty 
Fire & Rescue, 138 Idaho 391, 464 (2008). 
Under McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to show that its adverse employment action was for a legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reason. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-804 (1973). If the employer meets 
this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason the employer proffered is a pretext. Id.; see Hatheway v. Bd of Regents of Univ. of Idaho, 15 5 
Idaho 255, 263-264 (2013) and Frogley v. Meridian Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558, 564 (2013) 
(both implicitly overruling Curlee 's summary judgment framework and applying McDonnell 
Douglas burden shifting framework to employment retaliation claims). "A plaintiff may establish 
pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence." Frogley, 155 Idaho at 564. 
2. A Portion of Hammer's Claim is Time-Barred 
All actions under the Whistleblower Act must be brought "within one hundred eighty (180) 
days after the occurrence of the alleged violation .... " LC. 6-2105(2). Hammer's Complaint was 
filed June 29, 2012. She therefore cannot proceed on any alleged violation that occurred prior to 
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January 1, 2012, which is 180 days before the date of her Complaint. See id. This necessarily 
excludes her theories that she was retaliated against by being placed on paid leave and investigated 
in November and December 2011. 
3. Sun Valley Did Not Engage in a Predicate Act Merely Because an 
Elected Official Allegedly Violated City Policy 
Hammer alleges that Councilman Ribi harassed her in violation of Sun Valley's Personnel 
Policies & Procedures Manual. (Complaint, , 18, Ex. 1 ("Employee Manual")) The Employee 
Manual includes a "Standard of Conduct" section that, among other things, prohibits work place 
harassment "in any form, including verbal, physical and visual harassment." (Id., § 27; Employee 
Manual, § 7.5.) The Complaint rambles on at some length about the alleged violations of the 
Employee Manual Ribi supposedly engaged in, but they essentially boil down to mere allegations 
that Hammer and Ribi had several disagreements about a number of work-related issues and at times 
Ribi would become angry, bang his fists on a table and "verbally chastise her for not doing exactly 
what he wanted her to do." (See id.,,, 43-126.) 
Hammer's deposition testimony echoes the same type of alleged misconduct: 
Q. And what was the nature of the harassment? 
A. Those allegations are in the complaint. 
Q. What was the nature of the harassment that you claim Nils Ribi did? 
A. The bigger incidents are in the complaint. The nature of his harassment was to try 
to intimidate me into doing what he wanted me to do. He had a pattern of coming by 
City Hall during the lunch hour when he knew that the mayor and most of the other 
City employees were not in City Hall. He would stand in my doorway and try to 
intimidate me into doing things that he -I had not been directed to do by the mayor. 
When I would suggest that he talk to the mayor, because it was very- made clear to 
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me that my direction came from the mayor, he got very agitated. He would raise his 
hands and lean through the doorway and shake his hands and say, "No. No. You don't 
understand." He yelled at me that the mayor did not know what his job was. 
(Naylor Deel., Ex. H, Hammer Depo Tr. at 187:7 - 188:6.) 
In other words, Hammer's allegations comes down to her belief that Ribi would at times 
become angry over work-related disputes. Even assuming this conduct violated the Employee 
Manual, it certainly does not trigger application of the Whistleblower Act. Indeed, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has rejected taking an expansive view of what constitutes a violation of a law, rule 
or statute necessary to implicate the Whistleblower Act. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 620 
(2004). Under the plain language of the statute, the Mallonee court ruled that there must be a 
violation oflaws, rules or regulations that had been properly promulgated by an administrative body 
giving them the force and effect oflaw. Id Where no such promulgation has occurred, a violation 
of a city policy simply does not amount to a predicate act. Id. at 620-621. Thus, merely violating an 
internal city policy does not trigger application of the Whistleblower Act. See id. 
Consequently, while reporting an alleged assault or status-based harassment may be a 
predicate act for purposes of the Whistleblower Act, Hammer cannot proceed to trial under any 
theory that Ribi merely violated the Employee Manual. 
4. Hammer Cannot Demonstrate a Prima Facie Case 
Even to the extent Hammer could show a Sun Valley official engaged in a sufficient predicate 
act to implicate the Whistleblower Act, she still cannot adequately demonstrate a prima facie case 
to warrant trial. 
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a. Placing an Employee on Paid Administrative Leave 
Pending an Investigation Is Not Adverse Action 
The Whistleblower Act plainly states what constitutes an adverse action: "to discharge, 
threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee in any manner that affects the employee's 
employment, including compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights, immunities, promotions 
or privileges." LC.§ 2103(1). 
Sun Valley does not dispute that termination is an adverse action. However, placing an 
employee on paid administrative leave pending an investigation is not. As the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court very recently explained in finding that similar action as here did not violate that state's nearly 
identical whistleblower statute, 11 11 [t ]he use of paid administrative leave provides a reasonable means 
of immediately neutralizing a potentially contentious situation while minimally affecting the 
[employee]." Russo v. State, Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 87 A.3d 399,407 
(R.I. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
The Russo court further discussed how its decision was bolstered by the fact that under 
federal case law, to be actionable, an adverse employment action must be "materially adverse in 
order to 'prevent lawsuits based upon trivial workplace dissatisfactions' or 'bruised 'ego[s]."' Id 
(quoting White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795, 797 (6th Cir. 
2004) (en bane) ajj'd by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) 
(requiring that an adverse employment action must be material). Thus, consistent with the wording 
of the Idaho Whistleblower Act, actionable adverse actions include (other than the obvious 
11Rhode Island's Whistleblower Act states "[a]n employer shall not discharge, threaten, or 
otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, 
conditions, location, or privileges of employment ... [because the employee engaged in 
protected activity.]" R.I. Gen Laws§ 28-50-3. 
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discharge) such things as change in salary, benefits, responsibilities, refusals to hire or promote, 
reprimands, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities and otherwise inflicting direct 
economic harm. Id. Indeed, "several federal appellate courts have specifically held that 
administrative leave with pay is not an adverse employment action." Id. ( citing Singletary v. 
Missouri Dept. of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 891-892 (8th Cir. 2005); Kenney v. Merit Syst. Protection 
Bd, 356 Fed. Appx. 394,396 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 2004); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 
869 (4th Cir. 2001); Breaux v. City o/Garland, 205 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
Idaho's case law is consistent with the these other jurisdictions. In fact, the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Hatheway, mandated that to be actionable an adverse employment action must include 
significant changes in employment. Hatheway, 155 Idaho at 265 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Kcosis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 
1996). Being placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation does not constitute an 
adverse action, as in such instances there is no material or significant changes to the "compensation, 
terms, conditions, location, rights, immunities, promotions or privileges" of one's employment. See 
LC. § 6-2103(1 ). 
In this case, Hammer was placed on paid administrative leave twice pending the Ball 
Investigation into the allegations that had been made against her during the November 11, 2011 
executive session, as well as a possible criminal investigation pursuant to the authority given by 
former-Mayor Willich on December 16 and reiterated by Mayor Briscoe on January 3, 2012. As 
numerous jurisdictions have made clear, such paid administrative leave does not constitute an 
adverse action. Rather, it was Sun Valleys' means to neutralize contentious situation with minimal 
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effect on Hammer's employment. As such, while Sun Valley does not dispute that termination is an 
adverse act, Hammer cannot base her Whistleblower Act claim on merely being investigated while 
on paid leave. 
b. Not All of Hammer's Reporting Qualifies as a Protected 
Activity 
As discussed above, merely violating a city policy does not constitute a predicate act and thus 
does not trigger application of the Whistleblower Act. See Section 3.b, supra. It follows that 
reporting conduct that does not constitute a predicate act is likewise insufficient to create liability. 
See LC.§ 6-2104(l)(a) (requiring reporting in good faith the existence of waste, or violation or 
suspected violation oflaw, rule or regulation). Hammer therefore cannot support this element of her 
cause of action merely by showing that she reported Ribi's conduct that was allegedly in violation 
of the Personnel Manual. 
c. Hammer Cannot Demonstrate That Her Termination Was 
Causally Connected to Complaining About Ribi's 
Conduct 
Hammer claims that she was terminated because from 2008 through 2011 she reported 
harassment by Ribi to Mayor Willich, Adam King and Cam Daggett. Even viewing the evidence in 
a light most favorable to Hammer, however, her contentions are belied by the actual evidence in the 
record. To reiterate, Mayor Briscoe was sworn into office as the new Sun Valley mayor on January 
3, 2012. As is common with new administrations, he made the determination that he could not work 
with the prior mayor's chosen city administrator. Instead, as was his prerogative as mayor, he decided 
he would rather vet and hire his own person for that important position, with whom he would 
necessarily have a close working relationship. Thus, on January 19, Hammer's position with Sun 
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a. There is Insufficient Direct Evidence of Pretext 
Direct evidence may exist in retaliatory discharge cases where the "evidence, if believed, 
proves the fact without inference or presumption." Id. at 565 (internal quotations omitted). In other 
words, the evidence must require the conclusion that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against the 
plaintiff. Id. This typically requires some overt statement. See id. For example, in one age 
discrimination suit an employer issued a memorandum to management saying to "Fire Early- he is 
too old." Id. (discussing Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997). This direct 
statement thus requires no inferences as it directly showed that the employer's proffered reason for 
firing that employee was a pretext. This type of evidence is rare in retaliatory discharge cases. Id. 
at 567. 
There is simply no similar direct evidence in this case that would show Sun Valley's reason 
for discharging Hammer was a pretext. Absent such evidence, Hammer cannot create a triable issue 
rebutting Sun Valley's proffered reason for her discharge. 
b. There is Insufficient Indirect Evidence of Pretext 
Where there is no direct evidence of pretext, a plaintiff "may come forward with 
circumstantial evidence that tends to show that the employer's proffered motives were not their actual 
motives because they are inconsistent or otherwise not believable." Frogley, 155 Idaho at 567 
(internal quotations omitted). However, "such evidence must be substantial and specific." Id. 
(emphasis added). "[l]ndirect evidence is not substantial and specific where no evidence beyond 
what is produced to satisfy the plaintiffs prima facie case is produced. Id. And"[ c ]ourts only require 
an employer [to] honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or 
even baseless." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is therefore appropriate where 
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the plaintiff fails to show that the defendant did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its 
actions. Id 
There is simply no such evidence in this case. Rather, the evidence merely shows that the 
only thing that happened at all related to Hammer reporting alleged harassmentt by Ribi is that Sun 
Valley broadened the Ball Investigation to include looking into those allegations. Hammer's theory 
that Ribi had some grand plan to get her fired, for which he recruited various other city officials and 
employees to execute, is pure speculation. Hammer cannot meet her burden to show pretext by 
relying on her baseless accusations. 
C. Hammer's Remedies are Limited By the Whistleblower Act 
If the Court allows Hammer to proceed to trial on any portion of her Whistleblower claim, 
it should nevertheless grant partial summary judgment to Sun Valley with respect to the scope of 
Hammer's potential recoverable damages. Specifically, Hammer claims that she has suffered "severe 
economic damages" and is entitled to her "loss of past and future wages, retirement benefits, medical 
benefits, other fringe benefits, and other losses to be proven at trial[,]" and also seeks recovery for 
her "emotional damages, including but not limited to public ridicule, contempt, and hatred; 
embarrassment, emotional pain and suffering; and loss of enjoyment of life." (Complaint at 32, ,r 
169.) Thus, Hammer indicates that she is entitled to recovery any type and category of damages she 
can prove as a result of her termination if a jury finds her termination was in violation of the 
Whistleblower Act. Such broad recovery, however, is not authorized under the statute. 
Instead, the Whistleblower Act explicitly limits the scope ofrecoverable damages to a finite 
enumerated list of special damages, and does not allow for general damages at all. Initially, the 
statute defines "damages" to include "injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter, and 
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includes court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." LC. § 6-2105(1). It then states that "[a]n 
employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive 
relief or actual damages, or both .... " LC. § 6-2105(2). The statute goes on to list the specific 
remedies that are available, stating: 
A court, in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may order any or all of 
the following: 
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of this act; 
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the 
adverse action, or to an equivalent position; 
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights; 
(4) The compensation for lost wages. benefits and other remuneration; 
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees; 
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars 
($500), which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the 
general fund. 
LC. § 6-2106 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the statute only allows the court to order "any or all" of these express and specific 
remedies; it does not provide for any other type of relief. Although the initial providing for damages 
or equitable relief seems general, see LC. § 6-21 OS, it must be read in conjunction with the more 
specific provisions of LC.§ 6-2106, which plainly and explicitly sets forth the remedies that a court 
may order for an employee. See Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 14 7 Idaho 257, 263-
264 (2009) (stating that the court "must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of 
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature."). Reading the provisions 
together, Section 2105 authorizes damages and/or specific relief, and Section 2106 lists the types 
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relief the court may order. To read the Whistleblower Act so broadly as to provide the broad and 
unenumerated relief sought by Hammer would require the Court to effectively nullify Section 2106. 
In this case, Hammer does not seek the equitable relief authorized under subsections (1) 
through (3) (nor would it be appropriate here) and therefore in the unlikely event Hammer were to 
prevail she would only be allowed to recover her reasonable costs and attorney fees and 
"compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration." LC.§ 6-2106(4), (5). 
At least one Idaho district court has found that the Whistleblower Act limits the scope of 
recoverable damages such that damages do not include pain and suffering or front pay. See Van v. 
PortneufMed Ctr., Inc., 156Idaho 696, 1065 (2014) (Vanll). That issue was appealed but the Idaho 
Supreme Court declined to consider it because the court found no liability. Id. Nevertheless, the 
district court's decision in Van II was correct. Nothing in Section 2106 can be read as a "make-
whole" remedy. It contains no reference to pain and suffering or any other general damages Hammer 
believes she is entitled to. It also does not refer to front pay extending to Hammer's retirement as her 
claims suggests. Instead, it contains a list of six enumerated remedies, to the exclusion of all others. 
Thus, Hammer is not entitled to the broad relief she seeks. Consequently, in the event any portion 
of her Whistleblower Act claim proceeds, the Court should take this opportunity to grant partial 
summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley with respect to Hammer's damages. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
As shown above and in the accompanying materials, summary judgment is appropriate in 
this case. 
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I, KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and 
correct: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein, and if called upon to testify 
of them, I could do so competently. 
2. I am counsel of record for The City of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi, and Dewayne Briscoe, 
all named defendants in the current action. 
3. Several depositions have been taken in this case, jointly with a related federal case 
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Hammer et al. v. Sun Valley et al., Case No. 1: l 3-cv-211-EJL. Attached as exhibits are true and 
correct copies of excerpts from the following deposition transcripts: 
a. Exhibit A. Deposition transcript of De Wayne Briscoe (May 29, 2014). 
b. Exhibit B. Deposition transcript of Michelle Griffith (May 20, 2014). 
c. Exhibit C. Deposition transcript of Robert Youngman (May 20, 2014). 
d. Exhibit D. Deposition transcript of Franz Suhadolnik (May 21, 2014). 
e. Exhibit E. Deposition transcript of Nils Ribi (May 30, 2014). 
f. Exhibit F. Deposition transcript of Michelle Frostenson {April 23, 2014). 
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DeWayne Briscoe, including its Exhibits A - S, which was filed in the related Federal lawsuit. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
) 
) 
SHARON R. HAMMER and JAMES R. 
DONOVAL, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) Case No. l:13-cv-211-EJL 
) 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIB!, in his) 
individual and official capacity; and 
DEWAYNE BRISCOE, in his individual ) 
and official capacity, ) 
Defendants. 
REPORTED BY: 
DEPOSITION OF DEWAYNE BRISCOE 
MAY 29, 2014 
BEVERLY A. BENJAMIN, CSR No. 710, RPR 
Notary Public 
EXHIBIT ~ 63 
Hammerv. 
City of Sun Valley 
Page 126 
1 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
2 THE WITNESS: That was in question. My first 
3 year on the council there became a question of 
4 confidentiality by a council person, Joan Lamb, and 
5 breaking confidentiality of executive sessions. And 
6 there was a council discussion on exclusivity of 
7 executive sessions. 
8 And then recently we've had an attorney 
9 general's report which varies from that, assistant 
10 attorney general's report on confidentiality of 
11 executive sessions going beyond what I have understood 
12 before. So I understood they were to be confidential; 
13 however, in my term on the council we had another 
14 council person break that confidentiality, and nothing 
15 was done to her, she wasn't reprimanded, nothing 
16 happened done in that case with Joan Lamb. 
17 So in generalities I'm answering your 
18 question. My understanding personally is that I keep 
19 things confidential on executive sessions. Like I said, 
20 it's up to each council person to decide. 
21 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) After the female council 
22 member broke confidentiality, did the city council 
23 implement a policy on confidentiality regarding 
24 executive session? 
25 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
Page 127 
1 THE WITNESS: I can't answer that. I haven't 
2 looked at that part of our City policy manual or that 
3 for some time. I don't know at this time. 
4 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Are you doing okay? 
5 A. Oh, yeah. 
6 Q. Earlier I asked you if you recalled any city 
7 council member discussing criminal allegations against 
8 Sharon Hammer in the November 11, 2011 executive 
9 session, and you stated that you did not recall that. 
10 A. Yes, I still reaffirm that I do not recall. 
11 Q. What about the November 14 meeting, do you 
12 recall whether there was any discussion of criminal 
13 allegations at the November 14 meeting? 
14 A. Criminal allegations against who? 
15 Q. Sharon Hammer. 
16 A. I don't recall at that meeting. 
17 What do you want me to reference in this? 
18 Q. We'll get there in a second. 
19 What about the November 17, 2011 executive 
20 session, do you recall any criminal allegations being 
21 discussed in executive session there? 
22 A. No, I don't recall. 
23 Q. I understand. 
24 I'm showing you an affidavit that was 




















































May 29, 2014 
Page 128 
through 817. I'm going to ask you to take a look at 
paragraph 10. 
A. This isn't anything pertaining to me or my 
document. This is someone else's document. 
Q. Yes, Nils Ribi and his private attorney Keith 
Roark put this together. 
A. What was the date of this? 
Q. It looks like it is November 23rd. 
A. You want me to take a look at paragraph 10? 
Q. Paragraph 10, please. 
A. (Reviewing document.) The plaintiff is who? 
Q. The plaintiff is Sharon Hammer. 
A. I tried to understand. It's a long paragraph. 
I tried to understand it. 
Q. Yes, it is. In reading it it states that: As 
of November 18, the city council and mayor had reason to 
believe that Ms. Hammer may have committed serious 
misconduct, including possible criminal violations 
dealing with misuse of public funds and falsification of 
public records. Do you see that there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall any discussions about those 
items in the November 11, 14, or 17 executive sessions? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form; asked and 
answered. 
Page 129 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall. 
Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) One way or the other? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Mayor, why was Ms. Hammer's employment 
terminated? 
A. Ms. Hammer's employment was terminated at my 
recommendation to the council because I felt that it 
would be difficult to work with Ms. Hammer in the 
future. And I wanted a choice of naming my own 
administrator, similar to what Mayor Willich had done 
four years previously. 
Q. Why did you feel like it was going to be 
difficult to work with Ms. Hammer? 
A. One of the reasons was the letter that we 
discussed previously, in which she had said she had 
authority over the mayor, over the city attorney, over 
the city council. I don't know whether she put the 
implementation in that letter or not. But I felt that 
it would be difficult to work, if I had the total 
responsibility and someone else had the authority under 
that interpetation. I felt that I could work better 
with someone else. 
Q. What other reasons? 
A. That's pretty much it. My style of 
management, my style of management considerations 
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1 differed from what had transpired in the past. I wanted 
2 a management in a more strict control of the City. And 
3 I just felt that I could work better perhaps with 
4 another city administrator. 
5 Q. I'm sorry. I didn't catch that. 
6 A. I could work better with another city 
7 administrator, of going through the process again of 
8 city administration. 
9 Q. Showing you that letter that you were 
10 referring to, just to make sure we are on the same page, 
11 it's SH-TIMELINE 465 through 466. ls that the letter 
12 that you are referring to where she states that she has 
13 got authority to interpret the policies? 
14 A. Yes. "I have the authority to make final 
15 determination of the application of all Sun Valley 
16 personnel policies and procedures, and neither the Sun 
17 Valley City Attorney, the Sun Valley Mayor or the Sun 
18 Valley City Council has the authority to question or 
19 overrule such findings." 
20 But I terminated Sharon Hammer without cause. 
21 Q. Do you see --
22 A. I requested termination of Sharon Hammer 
23 without cause. 
24 Q. Why is that? 
25 A. Because that was my determination. 
Page 131 
1 Q. Who did you request that of? 
2 A. The council. It was the mayor's request to 
3 tenninate Sharon Hammer according to her contract that 
4 she helped write under the clause of -- what did we just 
5 say? 
6 MR. NAYLOR: Without cause. 
7 THE WITNESS: Without cause. And the council 
8 then reaffirmed that, and I informed the council that I 
9 felt that l would be able to work better with a new city 
10 administrator and I asked that she be terminated without 
11 cause. 
12 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Did you discuss her contract 
13 with the city council? 
14 A. I'm not sure. I believe the city -- I don't 
15 know whether the city council had a copy of her contract 
16 or not. I don't know at the time. 
17 Q. Did you look at her contract before you 
18 reached your determination? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. That you wanted to terminate her for cause --
21 or without cause? 
22 A. Yes, I knew that clause was in there, yes. 
23 Termination with cause, without cause. It was my 
24 determination to ask for the termination of the council 






















































Q. Let's go back to the letter that you were 
citing as the reason that you believed it would be 
difficult to work with Ms. Hammer. 
A. Let me correct you. I'm sorry. It's your 
deposition. But you said "the reason." l am just 
listing out some things during the course of this 
deposition of why l felt that I would rather work with a 
new city administrator. 
Q. What are those things? 
A. I have already listed them during the course 
of the conversation. And it's not pertinent because 
she's being terminated without cause. 
Q. Well, l would like you to help me identify 
what in your testimony today you believed supported your 
belief that you could not work with Ms. Hammer. 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. He just 
barely answered that. 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) For example, was it because 
she was in the Willich camp, was that a reason why you 
didn't believe you could work with Ms. Hammer? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: As I stated, and I'll state it 
again. It was my decision that I would rather work with 
a new city administrator, and it was my decision to ask 
the council to terminate her without cause. 
Page 133 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Yes. And I'm asking you 
about the testimony you just gave where you said, for 
all these reasons that you talked about today you 
reached that conclusion. I want you to help me identify 
all the reasons that led you to believe that you would 
work better with a new city administrator? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form; asked and 
answered. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe we have gone 
through that. But again, I'll come back to the question 
that my determination was to terminate her without 
cause, that I could work better with another city 
administrator. And what you have, what we have 
discussed previously, I've already answered. 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) You haven't identified all 
those things that you believe --
A. I don't have to. I terminated her without 
cause, so I don't need those things. 
Q. I understand. I'm looking for -- you keep 
using this phrase, I've identified a bunch of things 
today that have led me to believe that I couldn't work 
with her as an administrator. I just --
A. I don't believe I used that exact language. 
MR. NAYLOR: We can go back and read from the 
record. 
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1 MR. NAYLOR: Right. But factually what are 
1 
2 you talking about? If there is anything you want to put 2 
3 
3 on the record as a proffer to assist, then otherwise the 
4 way you've asked the question, it's objectionable. 4 
5 MR. SWARTZ: We'll file the proffer with the 5 
6 judge. 6 
7 MR. NAYLOR: Okay. Then that would prevent me 7 
8 from having an opportunity now to make a decision on how 8 
9 to advise my client because you are withholding the 9 
10 proffer from me. 10 
11 MR. SWARTZ: I don't have the documents. 11 
12 We'll file it with the judge. You guys can respond. 12 
13 And then ifwe come back a different day, we'll come 13 
14 back a different day. 14 
15 MR. NAYLOR: Just making my record. 15 
16 MR. SWARTZ: Yes. 16 
17 MR. NAYLOR: We'll read and sign. 17 
18 MR. SWARTZ: Thank you everybody for your 18 
19 time. 19 
20 (Deposition concluded at 4:22 p.m.) 20 
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9 correct, except for any changes that I may have listed 9 
10 on the Change Sheet attached hereto: 10 
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I, BEVERLY BENJAMIN CSR No. 710, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, certify: That the foregoing 
proceedings were taken before me at the time and place 
therein set forth, at which time the witness was put 
under oath by me; 
That the testimony and all objections made were 
recorded stenographically by me and transcribed by me or 
under my direction; 
That the foregoing is a true and correct record 
of all testimony given, to the best of my ability; 
I further certify that I am not a relative or 
employee of any attorney or party, nor am I financially 
interested in the action. 
IN WITNESS WIIBRBOF, I set my hand and seal this 
6th day of June 2014. 
\,_ .. ,.: r 
,\,.Jt .'(,;.(:., 
BEVERLY A. BENJAMIN, CSR No. 710 
Notary Public 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2636 
My co:uunission expires May 28, 2019 
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approves the budget, and decides on issues related to 1 
land use and planning and expenditures of City funds 2 
within the budget, to a certain extent. To the extent 3 
that they're outside the budget, I should say. So the 4 
city council sets the budget, and ensures that the 5 
budget is followed, and authorizes any extraneous 6 
expenditures. 7 
Q. Based upon your experience, in January of 8 
2012 did the city council review timecards? 9 
A. In January of2012? 10 
Q. Yes. 11 
A. We've never reviewed timecards. 12 
Q. And in your experience, beginning in January 13 
of 2012, did the city council review employee vacation 14 
reporting? 15 
A. We have established a finance committee, and 16 
the finance committee receives a report from the 17 
treasurer which indicates any payroll-related 18 
expenditures which are not ordinary. For example, if 19 
the police department has a lot of overtime, it's listed 20 
on that report. Beyond that, we don't see the details. 21 
Q. When was the finance committee established? 22 
A. I don't remember. It wasn't in place 23 
immediately. I think it was established maybe -- I'm 24 
guessing. You told me not to guess, so I don't know. 25 
Page 11 
Q. After you started sometime? 1 
A. Yes. 2 
Q. When you started in January of 2012, what 3 
was the procedure for approval of City expenditures? 4 
A. When I started? So you're referring to the s 
period before I was -- I have no idea what they did. 6 
Q. When you came on in January of2012 -- 7 
A. When I came on in January of 2012, bills a 
were paid, and I was new, and I don't know how things 9 
worked. It wasn't until we were seated for a period of 10 
time before I became clear on exactly how things worked, 11 
and at that time I believe the treasurer paid bills. 12 
What the mechanism was for her to do that, I don't know. 13 
Q. Did the city council approve expenditures? 14 
A. The city council filed -- received and filed 15 
expenditures, but we did not approve them. 16 
Q. Who approved them? 17 
A. I assume either the mayor or the city -- I 1a 
don't know, to be honest. Someone other than the 19 
council. 20 
Q. At city council meetings, would someone 21 
present a packet of City expenditures to the city 22 
council and ask them to approve them? 23 
A. They did not ask for our approval. They 24 




and we did get a list of expenditures. 
Q. Who would present those? 
A. They were enclosed in our package. I assume 
they were prepared before by the treasurer, but I don't 
know who presented them necessarily. It was just an 
agenda item. 
Q. Was there a period of time where the city 
council authorized the city treasurer to pay credit card 
expenditures and -- in advance of a city council 
meeting, and then the city council would later --
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Maybe before your time? 
A. Maybe. 
Q. And you came on at a pretty interesting 
time. I know you were receiving courtesy copies of 
letters from James Donoval regarding Sharon Hammer, and 
allegations being made against her, and her allegations 
against Nils Ribi, before you even -- before you were 
even sworn in it. Is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. When you were sworn in, did you have an 
understanding that Sharon Hammer had made complaints to 




Q. And when you were sworn in and took your 
seat, did you have an understanding that Nils Ribi was 
bringing allegations to light that he received from 
Michelle Frostensen about Sharon Hammer's misuse of City 
property and finances? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: When I took office? I don't 
know. Eventually I came to that understanding, but I 
don't know whether that happened before or after I was 
sworn in. 
BY MR. SWARTZ: 
Q. And you were sworn in in January of2012? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know why Sharon Hammer's employment 
was terminated? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. SWARTZ: 
Q. What is your understanding? 
A. She was terminated without cause in 
accordance with her contract. 
Q. Who first raised the idea of terminating her 
employment? 
A. The mayor. 
Q. And did he explain why he was looking to 
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1 tenninate her employment? 
2 A. Not specifically. 
3 Q. When did you first learn from the mayor that 
4 he was considering terminating her employment? 
5 A. I don't remember. 
6 Q. Was it at a city council meeting, an 
7 executive session, passing on the streets? 
8 A. It wouldn't have been passing on the 
9 streets. It would have either been -- and it wouldn't 
l.O have been in a public forum, so it could have been in 
11 some executive session, and we had a lot of them during 
l.2 that time, so I don't know which one. 
l.3 Q. Was it -- was it disclosed in an executive 
l.4 session, and then the decision was made at this city 
15 council meeting, or was it disclosed at an executive 
l.6 session and some time passed, and it was later disclosed 
l.7 in the city council meeting? 
18 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
19 THE WITNESS: My understanding is that the 
20 mayor has the authority to make that decision 
21 independent of the city council. So my understanding is 
22 that we were informed of the mayor's intent, and the 
23 decision isn't taken in executive session. No decisions 
24 are taken in executive session. So when he came to that 
25 in his mind, I don't know, and the decision was fonnally 
Page 15 
1 announced in an open meeting. 
2 BY MR. SWARTZ: 
3 Q. And I'm trying to get an idea of whether the 
4 open meeting took place on the same day as the executive 
5 session, or it was several days before -- an executive 
6 session was several days before the open meeting. Can 
7 you recall? 
8 A. I can't recall. 
9 Q. And was there any discussion in the 
10 executive session with the mayor about why he was 
11 looking to terminate her employment? 
12 A. Not specifically, no. 
13 Q. How about generally? 
14 A. I think -- you know, I don't want to tell 
15 you what I think he said. It's a two-and-a-half-year-
16 old interpretation of -- my interpretation of his words. 
17 I wouldn't pretend that they were exact words or 
18 anything to that effect. 
19 Q. And I'm just looking for what you recall. 
20 I'm not looking for you to quote him. 
21 A. The mayor -- the mayor had the right to 
22 terminate the city administrator, and wanted someone who 
23 he interviewed and could work with. 
























































Q. Did he ask for your blessing on his 
decision? 
A. He infonned us of his decision. We later --
we later voted on it in an open session, so to the 
extent that you think that's a blessing, that's what 
happened. I think the mayor, as a courtesy, advised us 
in an executive session that he intended to tenninate 
the city administrator. In an open session, we, as a 
council, voted. 
Q. And that vote wasn't necessary, ifl 
understood you correctly. He could have made that 
detennination without --
A. I believe so. That's my understanding. 
Q. Did he tell you why he was looking to have 
the city council vote on it? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ask? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it an agenda item? 
A. I don't think so. I don't know. 
Q. Did you vote in favor or against? 
A. 1 voted in favor. 
Q. Why did you personally vote in favor of the 
termination? 
Page 17 
A. I felt that the mayor would work best with a 
direct employee whom he had interviewed, and had a part, 
the largest part, in hiring, and I don't think that's 
particularly unique to that city council or our city. 
The same thing just happened in Ketchum. 
Q. There was a press release that was issued 
after Sharon Hammer's tennination. Tab 20. It's Bates 
No. Hammer 327. Do you recognize that? 
A. By recognizing it, are you asking me if I 
understand what's in front of you, or ifl remember it? 
Q. Have you seen it before? 
A. I probably did see it, but I don't remember 
it. 
Q. Was the issuance of this paid ad a topic of 
conversation in the executive session? 
A. You said it is a press release at first. 
Was it a press release or --
Q. 1 apologize. It was a paid ad that's 
published in the Mountain Express, in red ink. This may 
not be the actual size. 
A. Okay. Sorry. I just read it. What were 
you asking me about it? 
Q. Just whether you recognized it. 
A. Does recognize mean I remember it? I don't 
remember it. It seems factual. I'm not saying that it 
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A. I was. 
Q. Do you recall what happened with that claim? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of being asked 
for approval of what to do with that claim? 
A. When you say -- I'm not pretending that 
something happened or didn't happen, and it's very 
difficult to remember that far back, to be very honest 
with you, and there was a lot going on. And this is not 
my full-time job. I have two kids and a job and a house 
and a husband, so where this ranges in my memory bank, 
you know, I don't remember. 
Q. Fair enough. Do you have any recollection 
of Patty Ball's investigation into Sharon Hammer's 
allegations about Nils Ribi's conduct? 
A. I know that there was a report that was 
produced as a result of that. 
Q. Do you recall what the report stated? 
A. I think the conclusion of the report was 
that there was inconclusive evidence, or something to 
that effect. 
Q. Do you recall any discussions in executive 
session or in the public forum about Nils Ribi having a 
conflict of interest in continuing to deal with Sharon 
Hammer and the allegations against her, in light of her 
Page 27 
allegations against him? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know how far back the allegations of 
Ms. Hammer's misuse of City finances went? I know they 
came out in November of 2011. Do you know how far back 
they went? 
A. In Patty Ball's report, or in the forensic 
audit? 
Q. In Patty Ball's report. Let's start there. 
A. No idea. 
Q. How but forensic audit? 
A. I want to say the forensic audit went back 
two years, maybe three. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know who at the City provided 
documentation to Patty Ball regarding the allegations 
against Sharon Hammer? 
A. No. Patty Ball was finished by the time I 
was sworn in, so I have no idea what happened. 
Q. You just got a summary of the report? 
A. I got the report. I was permitted to read 
the report. I didn't get a copy of it, and the report 
was presented verbally by Patty Ball. 

































































Ball gave you the summary of her findings and advised 24 




engaged in criminal conduct, was there any discussion 
about terminating her employment? 
A. No. There was discussion about finding out 
what had really happened. 
Q. Wasn't that Patty Ball's -- wasn't that the 
result of her investigative report? 
A. My takeaway from that investigative report 
was that we were obligated to investigate what she 
believed to be criminal activity. I did not view her 
report as conclusive. I viewed the need for a further 
step, which was the forensic audit. That was my 
takeaway. 
Q. Did anybody vote against the forensic audit? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. Not that I recall. 
Q. Do you recall any discussion about releasing 
the Patty Ball report to the Blaine County prosecutor? 
A. Do you have a choice? Would we have had a 
choice to do that? 
Q. I'm just asking whether you recall any 
discussion. 
A. I don't. Sitting here, I would say that if 
the county prosecutor wants something, you have to give 
it to him. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of the City 
turning the report over to Blaine County prosecutor? 
Page 29 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of discussion 
of making the report public? 
A. The Patty Ball report public? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't believe that that's been done. I 
remember discussions about making the forensic audit 
report. I don't remember discussions about the Patty 
Ball report being made public or not. I don't know. 
Maybe. 
Q. Why did you personally vote to terminate 
Sharon's employment? 
A. I thought the mayor would work better with 
someone that he had a hand in interviewing and hiring. 
And as I said before, that's not particularly 
extraordinary. It happens -- I think the previous mayor 
hired Sharon, and I think that the current mayor of 
Ketchum is in the process of hiring an administrator, 
and I think the previous mayor of Ketchum hired that 
administrator. It seems to be the way forward for 
mayors and administrators. 
Q. Did you ever tell Dave Wilson that you felt 
like the City of Sun Valley made a mistake by not 
allowing Sharon Hammer to respond to the allegations 
made against her in the Patty Ball report or the 
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1 forensic audit? 
2 A. Dave Wilson? No. Not that I remember. 
3 Q. You know who Dave Wilson is? 
4 A. I do. 
5 Q. Do you feel like the City made a mistake by 
6 not allowing Sharon Hammer an opportunity to respond to 
7 the allegations being made against her? 
8 A. Well, I thought that that was the purpose of 
9 the forensic audit. 
10 Q. Do you know why the city council reversed 
11 itself in allowing the employees to comment on that 
12 forensic audit report before it was made public? 
13 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
14 THE WITNESS: The city council reversed 
15 itself? So you'll have to explain what happened and 
16 then what you view as the reversal. 
17 BY MR. SWARTZ: 
18 Q. Sure. When it was completed, the forensic 
19 audit, the City announced that before it would be made 
20 public all the employees that were mentioned in it would 
21 have an opportunity to review it and make comment on it, 
22 and next thing everybody knows, it was released. 
23 A. I don't think that's what happened. 
24 Q. Do you think employees that were mentioned 
25 in that report had an opportunity to review it and 
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1 comment on it? 
2 A. I think the mayor saw every single one of 
3 those employees. I think he spent weeks in meetings. 
4 Q. Do you think that also included Sharon? 
5 A. Presumably. I don't know. 
6 Q. Going back to that press release, Bates --
7 A. Press release or advert? 
8 Q. Yes. It's an advertisement, 327. Do you 
9 know who paid for that? 
10 A. I would assume the City, but I don't know 
11 that for a fact. 
12 Q. How many times since January of2012 have 
13 you seen the City pay for an advertisement in the Idaho 
14 Mountain Express, publicizing the termination of an 
15 employee's employment? 
16 A. I don't even remember this one, so if there 
17 are I 5 more in here, and you show them to me, I will 
18 believe that they were accurate, but I don't remember 
19 any of them. 
20 Q. Do you recall any discussion in an executive 
21 session about placing a paid ad --
22 A. No. I don't recall a discussion about it. 
23 Q. Have you ever come to know, in any of the 
24 expenses that Sharon Hammer was involved in, and that 






















































A. Repeat that. 
Q. Sure. Were any of the -- any of the 
expenses that Sharon Hammer was believed to have engaged 
in, and were believed to have been inappropriate, were 
any of those expenses not approved? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. It all happened 
before I got there. 
BY MR. SW ARTZ: 
Q. Have you learned since January of2012 that 
any of those expenses weren't approved by the treasurer 
or the city council? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: Well, there's no -- have I 
learned since they weren't approved? No. But that 
doesn't mean that it didn't happen, so I don't know. 
BY MR. SWARTZ: 
Q. Sure. I'm just asking for your personal 
knowledge. Since January of -- I know you just took 
your seat in January of 2012, and Sharon was terminated 
on the 19th of 2012, and you may not have had a chance 
to interact much with her, because she was on leave, and 
there for a limited period of time -- did you ever see 
Nils Ribi interact with Sharon Hammer? 
A. Not in a way that stands out in my mind. I 
Page 33 
mean, I don't remember what happened between the first 
and 19th, whether we had meetings and we were all there. 
I don't even remember. 
Q. Ms. Griffith, I think that's all I have for 
you today. That was painless, huh? 
MR. NAYLOR: Let's take a quick break. 
(A Break Was Taken.) 
EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. NAYLOR: 
Q. Michelle, when you voted to approve the 
mayor's decision to terminate Sharon Hammer's contract, 
that was with cause or without cause? 
A. It was without cause. 
Q. And do you recall what your understanding 
was at that time, why it was without cause? 
A. I thought that the mayor needed to interview 
and hire his own -- bad phraseology, but I can't phrase 
it any better than that on the fly -- city 
administrator. 
Q. To the allegations of misconduct, criminal 
conduct, did any of that factor into your decision to 
terminate Sharon Hammer's --
A. None. That was clear. They were only 
allegations at that time. 
Q. Do you recall how the forensic audit was 
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1 made public? 
2 A. I think that the county prosecutor made it 
3 public, I think. 
4 MR. NAYLOR: That's it. That's all the 
s questions I have. 
6 (Deposition Concluded at 2:3 l p.m.) 
7 (Signature Was Requested.) 
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I, DIANA KILPATRICK, CSR No. 727, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, certify; 
That the foregoing proceedings were taken before 
me at the time and place therein set forth, at which 
time the witness was put under oath by me; 
That the testimony and all objections made were 
recorded stenographically by me and were thereafter 
transcribed by me, or under my direction; 
That the foregoing is a true and correct record 
of all testimony given, to the best of my ability; 
I further certify that I am not a relative or 
employee of any attorney or party, nor am I financially 
interested in the action. 
IN WITNESS WHBRBOF, I set my hand and seal this 
30th day of May, 2014. 
,'V.:,,~+.j.., ;~-~f-'.~!::i~ 
DIANA KILPATRICK, CSR, RPR 
Notary Public 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
My Commission expires January 13, 2017 
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City of Sun Valley 
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1 saying, to try to approach a system that was 
2 straightforward, whenever a problem was brought up, that 
3 we tried to resolve it. If it was in the policy, we 
4 tried to modify and edit that policy so it would work 
5 better. So I can't remember the wording of that, so I'd 
6 have to review it, review the exact wording to see if I 
7 would, once again, interpret it as meaning that the city 
8 administrator would interpret all policies. I don't 
9 know. Like said, I'd have to read it. 
10 Q. That's not an understanding that you had 
11 while you were sitting as a city council member? 
12 A. No. I didn't think that any one person 
13 would be the interpretive authority on policy, that we 
14 were all trying to have good policies, and ones that 
15 worked for the City, and that the interpretation, as I 
16 said multiple times, would be straightforward. There 
17 would be no need for interpretation. 
18 Q. That's the goal. Right? 
19 A. That's the goal. Whether or not you achieve 
20 that is pretty much a gradual, slow, refinement-type 
21 process. 
22 Q. Did you vote to terminate Sharon Hammer's 
23 employment? 
24 A. We consented to a decision that can only be 
25 made by the mayor. That was my understanding when we 
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1 consented to the termination of the employment contract. 
2 Q. What does it mean to consent? Does the 
3 mayor have to get your consent? 
4 A. No. He just wanted it. 
5 Q. And did you give your consent? 
6 A. Yes. I voted in favor, to consent to the 
7 termination of the employment contract. 
8 Q. And this was Mayor Briscoe at the time? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Who wanted to terminate the contract and 
11 wanted the city council's consent? 
12 A. Yes. Correct. 
13 Q. Was the consent of the council unanimous, do 
14 you recall? 
15 A. Yes, it was. 
16 Q. Was the vote taken in executive session? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Was it taken in a public session? 
19 A. Yes, it was. 
20 Q. Was there a discussion -- was that the 
21 January 19th, 2012 meeting? 
22 A. That -- the exact date, I don't know, but it 
23 would be right about that time period, yes. 
24 Q. Was there any discussion before that meeting 
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meeting the first time that it was raised? 
A. I'd been made aware from Mayor Briscoe that 
he was having difficulty working with Sharon, prior to 
that meeting. 
Q. What was the difficulty that Mayor Briscoe 
was having? 
A. He just said he was having trouble working 
with her. 
Q. When did he take office? 
A. Somewhere very early, January 3rd, 
January 2nd, something like that. 
Q. So between January 3rd and January 19th, you 
were made aware that Mayor Briscoe was having a 
difficult time working with Sharon Hammer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he elaborate on what he meant? 
A. No. Didn't elaborate. 
Q. Did you ask? 
A. It was a very informal conversation, and I 
didn't feel comfortable, you know -- I was never 
comfortable with details of what personnel issues might 
be. I didn't run for office to be involved with 
personnel issues. I ran for office to be what I was 
elected to be, as a policy maker. So I actively 
avoided, you know, any kind ofreal involvement with 
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personnel matters, administrative matters of the City. 
It wasn't my purview to do so. It wasn't my authority. 
Someone could ask for my advice, but I was never 
actively involved. 
I was listening to the person who had to 
work with the person, and I took that as input. 
Q. Prior to giving your consent to terminate 
Sharon Hammer's employment, did you have an 
understanding that there were allegations made about her 
misuse of City money? 
A. Yes. There were allegations on the table. 
Q. Did you believe those allegations to be true 
when you consented to terminate her employment? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I didn't believe anything at 
that point. I wanted evidence. 
BY MR. SW ARTZ: 
Q. Did you have evidence at that point? 
A. No. We had the beginnings of an 
investigation, or data presented by the treasurer. That 
was it. 
Q. As of January 19th? 
A. That I had available to me, yes. That I 
became aware of. 
Q. What was the scope of the allegations that 
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1 Q. I know she brought allegations forward in 
2 November 201 l, but what was the look-back period, do you 
3 recall? 
4 A. Well, if you go back to my notes, she was 
5 looking back as far as '08, apparently, because she has 
6 a note here in July of'08 that there were 40 hours of 
7 vacation that Sharon had taken, so I would say back to 
8 2008. 
9 Q. Did you ever ask why Michelle Frostensen 
10 waited so long to bring those allegations forward? 
11 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
12 THE WITNESS: I did not ask her that 
13 question. 
14 BY MR. SWARTZ: 
15 Q. Do you have any idea why she chose to go all 
16 the way back to 2008? 
17 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Calls for 
18 speculation. 
19 THE WITNESS: The answer is, I don't know, 
20 nor could I speculate. 
21 BYMR. SWARTZ: 
22 Q. Do you recall allegations that Ms. Hammer 
23 had falsified public records ever being discussed in 
24 executive session? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Was it ever discussed in executive session 
2 whether Michelle Frostensen should be investigated for 
3 the approval of these expenditures that were now being 
4 characterized as being inappropriate? 
5 A. I don't remember discussing that. There was 
6 an ongoing investigation, so I personally didn't have 
7 the data to give any direction there. 
8 Q. Do you recall whether the city council ever 
9 authorized Nils Ribi to disclose what took place in an 
10 executive session in the public record? 
11 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
12 Foundation. 
13 THE WITNESS: My recollection is we would 
14 never -- I would never approve of that. At the time I 
15 felt like the executive sessions were to be private. I 
16 later found out, in my education with the attorney 
17 general, that they depend on things leaking out. 
18 BY MR. SWARTZ: 
19 Q. They depend on things leaking out of 
20 executive session? 
21 A. They stated -- I was surprised. They said 
22 certain things should be leaked. They said that. I 
23 couldn't believe it. I still don't believe it. I don't 
24 think it's correct, but that's my opinion, it's not the 






















































Q. Do you have any recollection of the city 
council authorizing Mr. Ribi to disclose what transpired 
in an executive session to his personal attorney, Keith 
Roark? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
Foundation. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall approving 
anything that had to do with informing anybody outside 
those present in the executive session and those that 
were directly impacted by the executive session to be 
informed. 
BY MR. SWARTZ: 
Q. Other than allowing Sharon Hammer to be 
presented with the allegations that we talked about 
earlier when Mayor Willich and Adam King came to her and 
presented her with the allegations and gave her a chance 
to admit or deny them, did the city council discuss 
giving her an opportunity to respond to the allegations, 
present her own data, anything along those lines? 
A. That was my expectation, that our advice at 
the time was to talk to Sharon about the allegations and 
get a response, and probably the response would be, 
Well, it's not true, and this is why. 
That was my expectation that the council --
not council, but the mayor would receive this, and the 
Page 81 
mayor could decide how he would interact with the 
council on that one, on those responses. But I never 
was exposed to any response, written, other than the 
verbal denial of charges of all allegations. That was 
what I was informed about. 
Q. Did you ever observe Mr. Ribi interact with 
Ms. Hammer in a way that you believe was -- let me ask 
it this way. Did you ever see Nils Ribi raise his voice 
to Sharon Hammer? 
A. When you say raise his voice, I mean, what 
do you mean by that? Because it could either mean -- it 
could mean a number of things. What exactly do you 
mean? 
Q. Raise his voice beyond normal speaking 
level. 
A. For Mr. Ribi, no. His speaking level was 
all very -- at a high volume. That's the way he speaks. 
Q. Did you ever see Mr. Ribi approach 
Ms. Hammer in a threatening way? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Do you have any idea when Mayor Briscoe made 
the decision that he wanted to terminate Ms. Hammer's 
employment? 
A. As I said earlier, I had an informal, brief 
conversation where he said he had great difficulty 
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working with her, and then we had executive session l 
where he was asking for our consent to terminate the 2 
contract. 3 
Q. It was in executive session, or it was done 4 
in the public portion of the meeting? 5 
A. The consent was - we can only vote in 6 
public session. It's illegal to vote in executive 7 
session. So the vote was in the public section, but the 8 
discussion, his reasons for wanting to terminate the 9 
contract was in executive session. 10 
Q. Tell me about his reasons. ll 
A. That he had great difficulty working with 12 
her, and that he thought it would be best if we moved 13 
on. Best for everyone. 14 
Q. Do you recall anything else from that 15 
executive session? 16 
A. No. That was basically the subject of it. 17 
Q. Did anybody disagree with his recommendation 18 
for terminating her employment? 19 
A. Not that I remember. Based on each 20 
individual had their reasons why they were consenting. 21 
Mine was that he could not work with her. I couldn't 22 
further, nor would I want to, find out all the details 23 
of that. He's just telling me as a manager he can't 24 
work with this person, will you please consent so that I 25 
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feel comfortable terminating the contract. 1 
Q. What were the other council members' reasons 2 
for consenting? 3 
A. I wouldn't know. 4 
Q. They weren't discussed? 5 
A. I mean, I'd have to go and ask them, what 6 
was your reason in the end? Who knows for certain. I 7 
can't say. It's total speculation on my part. 8 
Q. It wasn't discussed? 9 
A. No. Not in a direct way. 10 
Q. Not in a direct way? 11 
A. Nobody said, I am doing this for this 12 
reason. There was a general discussion, and then there 13 
was a vote in the public part of the session. 14 
Q. Have you ever come to learn of any act of 15 
misconduct that Ms. Hammer engaged in during her 16 
employment? 1 7 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 18 
THE WITNESS: I'm not remembering the 19 
details of the investigative reports as it relates to 20 
Sharon. I'd have to review those reports to be able to 21 
answer that question. That's what I'd have -- what I 22 
say on that. 23 
BY MR. SWARTZ: 24 




just curious if you have any personal belief that Sharon 
did anything wrong during her employment. 
A. You know, it comes down to what is wrong, 
and I'm reticent to be a judge of that, so I just do not 
have a position, without -- I'm a database person. I 
don't have the data in front ofme, and I can't feel 
comfortable saying yes, particularly yes to that 
question, without the data in front ofme. 
Q. So as you sit here today you have no 
recollection of Ms. Hammer having done anything wrong as 
an employee of the City of Sun Valley? 
A. Like I said, it depends on what's considered 
wrong, and I'd need to review that. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of Ms. Hammer 
having misused City funds? 
A. Not that I could say right now. 
Q. Did she misuse City property? 
A. I would, once again, have to review the 
reports where the data lies on these issues. A lot of 
this, for me, was put aside when the termination --
mentally was put aside when the termination occurred. 
Q. Meaning you forgot about it after her 
employment was terminated? 
A. It wasn't something that 1 was thinking 
about anymore. It had been a while, so I would have to 
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review the reports and decide, yes, that was wrong, and 
this was okay, or whatever the case may be. I wouldn't 
want to speculate on that. That would be unfair. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of disagreeing 
with anything that was in the investigative report? 
A. No. Because I'm ignorant of the 
administration of the City. It wasn't part of my job, 
and it was all about the administration of the City. 
Q. Do you recall Kelly Ek filing a tort claim 
against the City of Sun Valley? 
A. I was informed that a tort claim had been 
filed. 
Q. Do you know what happened to resolve that? 
A. No. I was informed that a settlement had 
been reached. I had no involvement whatsoever. 
Q. Would that be the same with respect to 
Michelle Frostensen's tort claim that she filed? 
A. That's correct. 
MR. SW ARTZ: I think, with reserving the 
right to come back once we get our privilege Jog, and 
nonresponsive Jog, I think we can wrap it up for today. 
Mr. Naylor may have some questions for you. 
Ill 
MR. NAYLOR: Let's take a quick break. 
(A Break Was Taken.) 
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1 Q. What do you mean when you received one side of 
2 the story for several weeks? 
3 A. This is it. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. Yeah. I was not allowed into anything that 
6 was going on in city hall. 
7 Q. Not until you were sworn in? 
8 A. Not till I was sworn in. 
9 Q. So any meetings that you would have attended 
10 on the other side of the story would have occurred after 
11 January of2012? 
12 A. Right. 
13 Q. Do you recall what Mayor Briscoe discussed 
14 with the city council about his desire to terminate 
15 Sharon Hammer's employment? 
16 A. Not exactly. But it was my understanding at 
17 the time, and still is, that the city supervisor serves 
18 at the pleasure of the mayor. And it's not unusual for 
19 mayors to want to bring in people that they think they 
20 can work with, which includes the fire chief, the police 
21 chief, et cetera. I believe that the city council has 
22 only jurisdiction over the non -- the people other than 
23 in those positions, unless the mayor brings them into 
24 it. That was my understanding at the time. 
25 Q. And I need you to help me understand just a 
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1 bit more. Did he explain to the city council why he was 
2 looking for the city council's consent to his proposed 
3 tennination of Sharon Hammer's employment? 
4 A. There was numerous discussions. And there was 
5 also an education process for me. But my -- at that 
6 time my knowledge was that the mayor did not need our 
7 consent, ifhe so chose. But as a courtesy, it's a good 
8 idea for a mayor to bring in the city council on these 
9 matters. 
10 Q. Did Mayor Briscoe describe, explain, elaborate 
11 upon why he wanted to terminate Sharon's employment? 
12 A. Not to me personally. And there was so many 
13 meetings in there that I can't recall what took place at 
14 any specific meetings. We had -- I believe we had 52 
15 meetings of the city council in a period of six months. 
16 Q. Did any of the meetings before the termination 
17 of Sharon Hammer's employment include discussions about 
18 misconduct that Ms. Hammer was alleged to have engaged 
19 in? 
20 A. I believe the Hammers told me the misconduct 
21 she was alleged to have engaged in, and they were heavy 
22 on alleged, but they explained that to me. Because we 
23 had long conversations at my house on three or four 
24 occasions. 



















































Franz M. Suhadolnik 
May 21, 2014 
Page 16 
taking office and the termination of Sharon Hammer's 
employment involve any discussions about that misconduct 
that she was alleged to have engaged in? 
A. Possibly, but I don't recall specifically, 
because we were getting information from all kinds of 
sources. The ex-mayor was active in providing 
information unsolicited. 
THE COURT REPORTER: Did you say "unsolicited" 
or "solicited"? 
THE WITNESS: Unsolicited. For the most part. 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) This is a December 27,201 I, 
memorandum to Mayor Willich and the Sun Valley City 
Council from Sharon Hammer. It's the first page of what 
you brought today. And there's a notation at the top 
right-hand corner that says, "What would have to happen 
for Mayor Briscoe to fire Sharon?" 
A. Right. 
Q. Do you see that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Can you tell me about that comment? 
A. That was my question. As I recall, Mayor 
Willich suspended Sharon Hammer. Sharon Hammer was then 
reinstated by Mayor Willich. When Mayor Briscoe took 
office, Mayor Briscoe suspended Sharon Hammer. So my 
question here is, ifhe wanted to terminate her, what 
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would have to happen. 
Q. Did you have your question --
A. That was the question for me, that I asked 
myself in making these notations. 
Q. Did you have your question answered by anyone? 
A. I don't know if it was answered by anyone. 
But we're very restricted on what we do by the state 
open meetings law in talking with other members in the 
council, and so forth. The present members of the 
council weren't too helpful to me in becoming involved 
in this thing or acquainted. It was sort of a 
learn-as-you-go. And so at some point, either through 
my research or some other way, I came to the conclusion 
that the mayor had the right to terminate the city 
supervisor, according to her contract, as the contract 
was defined to me by the city attorney. 
Q. Who was the attorney that you spoke to about 
the contract? 
A. I believe it was the city attorney. 
Q. Who was that? 
A. Adam King. 
Q. And did you go to Adam King individually or 
was this a meeting? 
A. It might have been -- it wasn't 
individually -- it might have been prior to a council 
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1 were against Mr. Ribi and Mr. Youngman? 1 
2 A. I do. 2 
3 Q. What were those? 3 
4 A. She -- as I understand, she accused Mr. Ribi 4 
5 of harassment. I don't know specifically with Mr. 5 
6 Youngman. I was pretty much in the dark what had 6 
7 transpired before my swearing in. All I knew was what I 7 
8 had read. And there's very little discussion of it. 8 
9 And as you know, you can't discuss something with one 9 
10 councilman and then discuss the same thing with another 10 
11 councilman separately. That's a serial meeting. 11 
12 MR. SW ARTZ: Okay. I don't think I have 12 
13 anything further. 13 
14 (Deposition concluded at 10:38 a.m.) 14 
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1 of institutional problems going on within the city 
2 administration and the management of the City. 
3 Q. Did you suspect that at the time? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. What are you saying, we are correct; correct 
6 about what? 
7 A. For going forward with the audits, the reason 
8 for the audits. 
9 Q. What was the reason for the audit? 
10 A. The Patty Ball report. 
11 MR. SWARTZ: Give me a second. I have another 
12 binder I need to grab. 
13 ( Off the record.) 
14 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Mr. Ribi, as 1 understand it, 
15 Michelle Frostenson came to you on -- she texted you on 
16 November IO, 2011 and asked you to call her. Do you 
17 recall that? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. Do you recall what she told you when you 
20 returned her text message? 
21 A. I did not return her text message. 
22 Q. By phone, I presume you returned it by calling 
23 her as she requested. 
24 A. Yes. When I received her text message, I was 
25 in a local emergency planning meeting. She texted me, I 
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1 believe, around 11 :00 in the morning. Ms. Hammer was 
2 also in that same meeting, she was sitting right in 
3 front of me, as a matter of fact, and we spoke about 
4 some things that had come up in that meeting that 
5 related to the City and just had a nice discussion. 
6 I saw the text then at the end of the meeting, 
7 and I left the meeting. And since I was headed towards 
8 City Hall to go get my mail, I called Michelle and said, 
9 What's up? And she said, I need to talk to you. I 
10 said, Well, I'm headed toward City Hall, let's talk. 
11 And she said, No, l don't want to talk to you at City 
12 Hall. l said, Where do you want to talk? She said, 
13 Some place private. I said, Okay. And 1 tried to think 
14 of some place. 
15 And on the way to the mail is a place over by 
16 Wildflower Condominiums that is just kind of over this 
17 little knoll, it's a little park area. So l said, Why 
18 don't we meet there. She said, Fine. So that is where 
19 we met. 
20 Q. Was November 10 a weekend? 
21. A. I think it was the day before Veterans Day, so 
22 whatever day that was. It would have been a Thursday, 
23 because the LEPC meets on Thursdays. 
24 Q. So her text came to you on a Thursday? 
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Q. And she was in town or --
A. She must have been, because I met her probably 
around noon when the meeting was over, the LEPC meeting 
was over. 
Q. When you met with Ms. Frostenson in the park, 
what did you learn? 
A. She told me that she had something that she 
wanted to speak to the city council, and I asked her 
what it was about. And she told me that she had gone to 
Mayor Willich in October with some information and he 
had not done anything about it. And so I said, Well, 
what is it? And she started telling me. 
And I said, Wait a minute here, this is all 
news to me. Whatever it is that you want to tell me you 
need to tell this to the whole council. And 1 said, If 
the rest of the council wants to have an executive 
session, that's what would be appropriate. And I said, 
But I don't want to say anything to the other council 
members unless this is serious. If this is just minor 
stuff, don't waste our time. 
She convinced me it was serious and she gave 
me an overview. And I told her, I said, If the rest of 
the council wants to have a meeting, you need to be 
prepared with data and documentation. And then we left 
it at that. 
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Q. When she began to give you an overview, what 
did she state to you? 
A. She just gave me an overview of kind of what 
she presented at the executive session the next day. 
Q. Did she have any documents with her? 
A. No. 
Q. What do you recall that she told you while you 
were meeting in the park? 
A. She gave me an overview of the vacation 
issues, the use of the car issue, the credit card issue, 
the BLM issue, and then a couple of others I can't 
remember off the top of my head. I didn't take any 
notes, I was just listening. 
Q. What was the vacation issue that she relayed 
to you in the park? 
A. The same one that was discussed at the city 
council meeting on the 11th. 
Q. What was that? 
A. What was that? 
Q. Yes. 
A. The time off issue that she discussed in 
detail at the council meeting. 
Q. I'm just asking you what is that, what is the 
vacation issue, the time off issue? 
A. What is it? 
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1 Q. Yes. Can you describe what she described to 
2 you the vacation issue was? 
3 A. I can't remember exactly what she said at that 
4 particular meeting on the 10th, but it was related to 
s the vacation issue. 
6 Q. Did it involve a particular employee? 
7 A. Yes. 
s Q. What employee? 
9 A. Sharon Hammer. 
1 o Q. Any other employees? 
11 A. It may have involved other employees. I can't 
12 remember specifically on that particular day. 
13 Q. What was the credit card issue that she spoke 
14 to you about on the 10th of November? 
1s A. Same thing. 
16 Q. What was that? 
1 7 A. What do you mean "what was that"? 
1s Q. What did she describe to you was the serious 
19 issue with the credit card? 
20 A. The unauthorized use of the credit card for 
21 personal use. 
22 Q. Who did she allege was utilizing the credit 
23 card in that manner? 
24 A. Sharon Hammer. 











A. She may have. I don't know. Again, it was an 
overview and it was on that particular day, and l didn't 
take any notes. 
Q. Did she relay to you how much she believed 
Sharon Hammer had spent without authorization? 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. Whether she gave you a figure or not? 
A. I can't remember on that particular day. 
Q. What was the BLM issue? 
A. It had to do with something about modification 
of time and adjustment of times of some employee in 
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1 believe it was serious enough that you were going to not 
2 waste the council's time and reach out to them and call 
3 an executive session? 
4 A. Based on what she told me it sounded very 
5 serious. It sounded like something that, especially 
6 since the mayor had not taken any action on it, the 
7 council needed to hear this. I took it very serious. 
8 This was our fiduciary duty to the taxpayers to deal 
9 with this, to at least hear it. 
10 Q. Why the urgency of calling the meeting the 
11 next day, the 11th? 
12 A. Because we had just learned about it. This is 
13 not something you sit on. You take action. You hear 
14 it, you take action, let's move on it. 
15 Q. Even ifit was a dollar alleged to have been 
16 misspent? 
17 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
18 THE WITNESS: Could you repeat that question. 
19 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Did you have any idea of how 
20 much Ms. Frostenson was alleging was at issue? 
21 A. I don't know if she gave me specific dollar 
22 amounts, but it appeared there was significant dollar 
23 amounts involved. 
24 Q. Appeared based upon what? 
25 A. Based upon what she told me. 
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1 Q. So she gave you some numbers of some sort. 
2 A. Of some sort, yes. And it sounded like 
3 significant taxpayer money involved. 
4 Q. How long did your meeting on the I 0th with 







A. I didn't keep track of time, but I'm guessing 
it was 15 minutes to half an hour. 
Q. When you told Michelle that she needed to have 
data and documents to back up her allegations, did she 
















A. I believe she told me that she could put 
together that information. order to gain additional money for the City or something 12 
like that. 13 Q. Was it your impression that it wasn't already 
14 put together? Q. Did she attribute whatever that was to Sharon 
Hammer? 
A. It's possible, yes. 
Q. Are you guessing or do you remember 
specifically? 
A. I believe that's what was said. 
Q. Did she have any allegations about any other 
employee on the I 0th other than Sharon Hammer? 
A. It's possible, yes. 
Q. Do you remember any? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. What is it about what she said that led you to 
1s A. Well, I believe what she said was she could 
16 put that together for the meeting. 
11 Q. Did she indicate whether she already had 
18 materials that supported her allegations? 
19 A. I believe she gave me that impression, yes. 
20 Q. What did you do following your 15 to 30 minute 
21 meeting with Michelle in the park? 
22 A. I then contacted Council -- let me think --
23 Council Member or Council President Briscoe, I can't 
24 remember at that point. I think Council Member Briscoe 
25 was council president at that point by phone and then 
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1 Council Member Youngman by phone. I couldn't reach 
2 Council Member Lamb, she apparently was out of town and 
3 was not available. 
4 Q. What did you state to Mayor Briscoe when you 
5 contacted him? 
6 A. I said to him that I had just been contacted 
7 by Michelle Frostenson and that she had given me 
8 information that was very important regarding a 
9 personnel matter and that we needed to meet as soon as 
10 possible. And realized that we had a 24 hour notice 
11 provision, and I would also be contacting Council Member 
12 Youngman and Council Member Lamb and seeing what we 
13 could do to make arrangements to have a special 
14 executive session. 
15 I also indicated that it would probably be 
16 best ifwe had council members call the special meeting 
17 rather than asking Mayor Briscoe, since he obviously 
18 could be possibly involved in this. 
19 Q. Mayor Briscoe? 
20 A. Excuse me. Mayor Willich, since he may be 
21 possibly involved in this since he didn't want to do 
22 anything about it. 
23 Q. How do you know that Mayor Willich didn't want 
24 to do anything about it? 
25 A. Because, as I spoke to you earlier, I told you 
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1 that she had approached him with this same information 
2 in October and he had not done anything about it. 
3 Q. Did you do anything to confirm that? 
4 A. No. But that was something we were going to 
5 bring up, and obviously I felt that we would bring it up 
6 in the executive session. 
7 Q. Was to ask Mayor Willich whether he did 
8 anything in response to the allegations? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. Did you elaborate on what the personnel matter 
11 was that you referred to when you spoke to Mayor 
12 Briscoe? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Did you ask? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Was it a personnel matter or was it a 
'17 financial issue? 
18 A. It sounded like a personnel matter to me. 
19 Q. Why did you characterize it as that? 
20 A. Because it involved personnel. 
21 Q. It involved personnel doing something they 
22 shouid not have done? 
23 A. That was the allegation that Michelle 
24 Frostenson made. 
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probably not quite the right way to phrase it. 
I guess, bluntly, it was allegations that an 
employee had stolen money from the City; is that fair? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: That is your interpretation. 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Is that a fair interpetation, 
is that the way you understood it as a fiduciary, that, 
Oh, wow, we have somebody who is taking money from the 
City and they are not authorized to do it? 
A. No. It was my interpretation that there is 
some allegations here, we need to hear what this is 
about. 
Q. And it involved an employee and it involved 
misuse of funds and City equipment. 
A. Potentially. 
Q. Tell me about your phone call with 
Mr. Youngman. 
A. Same as with Mayor Briscoe -- or excuse me, 
Council President Briscoe. 
Q. When you reached out to Joan Lamb, did you 
leave her a voicemail, did you send her an e-mail, 
anything like that? 
A. I couldn't reach her. I did not send her an 
e-mail. 
Q. You tried to call her? 
Page 37 
A. I believe I may have. 
Q. Do you recall what happened when you might 
have called her? 
A. I'm not sure. I don't remember. 
Q. Whether you got a voicemail or --
A. I don't remember. 
Q. How did you learn she was out of town? 
A. I believe when I arrived at City Hall later, 
perhaps Kelly Ek or somebody at City Hall told me she 
was out of town. 
Q. Are you just guessing about that or do you 
specifically remember? 
A. Someone told me, I don't know who it was. 
That was a day that City Hall was closed, but I know 
Kelly Ek was there at City Hall that day to assist with 
the noticing of the meeting. 
Q. Were there any other employees present on --
are you talking about the 10th? 
A. The l 0th. Yes, I guess they were open that 
day. Yeah, they were open. So I'm thinking that -- I'm 
confused, because it was the next day that it was 
closed. So she was there. Yes, there probably were 
other employees there too. 
Q. At any time during your term as a city council 
member did you and Joan Lamb have a disagreement about 
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A. I'm not sure. I don't remember. 
Q. You've got Idaho Code 50-204 and your notes 
state --
A The first one is some minutes of May 15th, 
2008 I believe where we approved the appointment of her 
as the city administrator. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to 
interrupt you. 
Q. That's okay. Then you have got a copy of 
Idaho Code 50-204 and a notation that says: "City 
administrator not designated by resolution or 
ordinance." 
A. And I believe in the copy I had the line "and 
such other officers as designated by the council" was 
highlighted. 
Q. Were you trying to determine the proper 
procedure for terminating her employment by looking 
at --
A I think that might have been why that was 
there. 
Q. You've got the May 15, 2008 meeting minutes 
that says she's an appointed officer, then you are 
looking at the statute that tells you how to deal with 
appointed officers; right? 
A. Right. 
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Q. And then you have a copy of Ms. Hammer's 
contract? 
A That is correct. 
Q. So since this wasn't copied in color there may 
be some highlighting on the contract as well? 
A. I don't recall that. 
Q. What was the purpose of having a copy of 
Ms. Hammer's contract? 
A. I suspect to discuss the terms of the 
contract. 
Q. Was there any discussion about terminating 
Ms. Hammer with cause? 
A Not that I recall. 
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1 that time and determined that it was hard for him to 
2 work with her and that he wanted to choose his own city 
3 administrator, and that his management style was 
4 different than the management style that the previous 
5 administration had operated under, and that he wanted to 
6 have a city administrator that would work under his 
7 management style. Those were the three reasons that I 
8 reco II ect. 
9 Q. Did any of the council members ask him to 
10 elaborate on any of the reasons why he was wanting to 
11 terminate Ms. Hammer's employment? 
12 A Not that I recollect. 
13 Q. Why did you personally vote to support the 
14 termination of Ms. Hammer's employment? 
15 A. Because that is what the mayor wanted. 
16 Q. Do you know if Mr. Naylor was present by phone 
17 for the entire January 19th meeting? 
1s A To the best of my knowledge, yes. 
19 Q. And Adam King was present for the entire 
20 meeting? 
21 A To the best ofmy knowledge. 
22 Q. Do you recall taking any precautions when 
23 turning over the Patty Ball report to the Blaine County 
















MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form; foundation. 
THE WITNESS: That was not my obligation. I 
had nothing to do with that. 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Did you ever disclose the 
Patty Ball report in any manner into the public forum? 
A. Which Patty Ball report? 
Q. Any of them. 
A. I disclosed one line of the Patty Ball report 
regarding me publicly, yes. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, throughout your term as a city council 
member you maintained a blog online; correct? 
Q. I realize that Mayor Briscoe did not elaborate 14 A Yes. 
with you the on the phone when he spoke to you on either 15 Q. And you commented numerous times on your blog 
the 18th or the 19th about why he couldn't work with Ms. 16 regarding Sharon Hammer; isn't that correct? 
Hammer. But do you recall whether he elaborated on his 17 A I would not call it commenting. I posted blog 
inability to work with Ms. Hammer during the January 18 posts that included copies of press releases or links to 
19th, 2012 executive session? 19 stories with introductions explaining what it was in 
A. I believe he gave a few reasons. 20 most cases. 
Q. What do you recall? 21 Q. Why were you doing that? 
A. From what I recall, and I didn't write down 22 A To inform the citizens about what was going 22 
23 any notes or any reasons, but to the best of my 




Q. At any point in time did anyone ask you to 
stop posting on your blog regarding Ms. Hammer? 25 experiences with her from when he became mayor up until 25 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
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3 Shorthand Reporter, certify: That the foregoing 
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9 under my direction; 
10 That the foregoing is a true and correct record 
11 of all testimony given, to the best of my ability; 
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1 A. We held an executive session on November 11th. 1 led to the calling of this executive session? 
2 Q. What happened in that executive session -- 2 A. Nils Ribi. 
3 November 11th of 2011 -- 3 Q. When did you speak with Mr. Ribi? 
4 A. That is correct. 4 A. I believe it was on the 10th, but it may have 
5 Q. -- what happened in that executive session? 5 been on the 9th. I'm pretty sure it was the 10th. I 
6 A. I shared my concerns with the council. 6 didn't go up to the city on Wednesdays, usually. 
7 Q. Who was present? 7 Q. Did you speak to anyone other than Mr. Ribi 
8 A. Adam King, Mayor Wayne Willich, Councilman 8 about your concerns? 
9 Nils Ribi, Councilman Bob Youngman, Councilman Dewayne 9 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Foundation. 
10 Briscoe, and myself. 10 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
11 Q. And what were the concerns that you shared 11 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) Who? 
12 with these individuals on November 11th? 12 A. Mayor Willich. 
13 A. I shared with them concern about personal use 13 Q. When? 
14 of a city vehicle by Sharon Hammer. I shared concern 14 A. October 5th, 2011. 
15 about the use ofa city credit card to purchase fuel for 15 Q. Did you speak to anyone other than Mr. Ribi 
16 personal use of a city vehicle by Sharon Hammer. I 16 and Mayor Willich about your concerns prior to the 
17 shared concern about lack of reporting of vacation over 17 November 11th executive session? 
18 three years by Sharon Hammer. That's all I can clearly 18 A. Yes. 
19 remember. I believe there were other topics that we 19 Q. Who? 
20 talked about, but that's what I clearly remember 20 A. Several people. 
21 discussing. 21 Q. Who? 
22 Q. Were your concerns related solely to Sharon 22 A. Kelly Eck. 
23 Hammer, or did they involve any other employees or 23 Q. When? 
24 contractors of the City of Sun Valley? 24 A. I can't answer that question. Diane Shay. I 
25 A. I specifically went to the council concerning 25 sought professional advice from an individual outside of 
Page 15 Page 17 
1 Sharon Hammer. l city hall. I don't recall his name at this time, but 
2 Q. Was there executive session already scheduled 2 it's in the records. He was an HR specialist who was 
3 for you to share your concerns, or did you request that 3 associated with Starley-Leavitt. 
4 an executive session be set up so that you could share 4 Q. Starley-Leavitt? 
5 your concerns? 5 A. Leavitt. They were our benefits 
6 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Compound. 6 administrators for city, City of Sun Valley. 
7 THE WITNESS: Twenty-four hours' notice was 7 Q. And you spoke to this HR specialist about your 
8 given that there would be an executive council meeting. 8 concerns concerning Ms. Hammer? 
9 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) Who gave the notice? 9 A. I spoke to him about my concerns about misuse 
10 A. I don't know. Would you rephrase the second 10 of city property. I asked his advice on how I should 
ll part of the question? I don't remember it. ll handle a situation professionally and legally, yes. 
12 Q. Yeah. Who gave the notice that this 12 Q. And it was related only to Sharon Hammer? 
13 November 11th, 2011, executive session was going to be 13 A. I'm not sure I even told him who it was. It 
14 called? 14 was a long time ago. 
15 A. I -- I assume it was the city clerk, but I 15 Q. When you spoke to Diane Shay, do you recall 
16 really don't remember. 16 when that was? 
17 Q. This was a special executive session; this 17 A. I don't. 
18 wasn't a regularly scheduled executive session? Is that 18 Q. Was it specific to Sharon Hammer? 
19 right? 19 A. Yes. 
20 A. We don't have regularly scheduled executive 20 Q. Was it before or after you spoke with Mayor 
21 sessions. They're all special. 21 Willich? 
122 Q. Do you know what occurred that gave rise to 22 A. I don't remember. 
23 the need to call this executive session? 23 Q. What did -- what position did Diane Shay hold? 
24 A. Yes. My concern. 24 A. Colleague. 
25 Q. Who did you speak to about your concerns that 25 Q. That was her title, "colleague"? 
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you ask Diane Shay how she knew that Sharon Hammer 
didn't report these golfing trips? 
A. She asked me if Sharon reported them. 
Q. And what did you do in response to that 
question? 
A. I told her no. 
Q. So you reviewed Sharon -- at the time you were 
employed at the City of Sun Valley you reviewed Sharon 
Hammer's timecards? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: Sharon Hammer didn't fill out 
time cards. 
Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) What did you review in order 
to tell Diane Shay that Ms. Hammer did not report this 
golfing outing? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: There was nothing to review. If 
she took time off, she emailed me and told me to deduct 
her hours. 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) So she would contact you; 




reporting paid time off? 
A. I can't answer that question other than to 
tell you that she would report her time off through 
Hammerv. 
City of Sun Valley 
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l MR. NAYLOR: Okay. I mean, you're not being 
2 instructed not to answer --
3 THE WITNESS: Right 
4 MR. NAYLOR: -- is what I want the record to 
5 reflect. 
6 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Tell me about your 
7 communications with Kelly Eck regarding your concerns 
8 about Sharon Hammer. 
9 A. Kelly came to me repeatedly over an extended 
10 period of time with concerns about how often Sharon was 
11 gone and how she couldn't possibly have that much 
12 vacation available to be gone that often. 
13 Q. And what did you do in response to Kelly Eck 
14 coming to you and her sharing her concerns? 
15 A. Often I would just shrug my shoulders. This 
16 took place over an extended period of time. It wasn't 
l 7 one incident. 
10 Q. An extended period of time where Kelly Eck 
19 would come to you and share her concerns? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And you would just shrug your shoulders? 
22 A. On several occasions I did. It put me in a 
23 rather awkward position. 
24 Q. Why? 
25 email to me so that I would know to deduct it from her. 25 A. Well, I didn't feel like it was -- I felt like 
Page 23 Page 25 
1 Q. Did she report it to anyone else other than 1 she should be going to the mayor. 
2 yourself? 2 Q. Did you tell her that? 
3 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 3 A. I did tell her that a few times. Not every 
4 THE WITNESS: I can't answer that question. 4 time. 
5 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Because you don't know? 5 Q. Do you know if she ever did? 
6 A. I don't know. 6 A. I don't. 
7 Q. It could be that she reported her time to 7 Q. When you told Diane Shay that she should take 
8 someone other than yourself? 8 her concerns to the mayor, do you know if she ever did? 
9 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Calls for 9 MR. NAYLOR: Objection; asked and answered. 
10 speculation. 10 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
11 THE WITNESS: Again, I don't know. 11 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) When you received these 
12 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) So what did you look at to 12 concerns from your co-workers, did you take them to the 
13 answer Diane Shay's question about whether Ms. Hammer 13 mayor? 
14 reported time off related to these golf outings? 14 A. On October 5th of 2011. 
15 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 15 Q. When you shared your concerns about the 
16 THE WITNESS: It's a pretty simple question to 16 vehicle, the credit card, and vacation? 
17 answer. Sharon Hammer hadn't reported hardly any time 17 A. Yes. 
18 off during the time she worked at the city unless she 18 Q. When you went to the mayor on October 5th of 
19 was gone for long periods of time. 19 2011, did you have any written materials to substantiate 
20 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) Did you look at anything 20 your concerns? 
21 before you answered Diane Shay's question? 21 A. I did. 
22 A. I can't answer that. 22 Q. What did you have? 
23 MR. NAYLOR: Just for clarification, why can't 23 A. I had put together a list of time away from 
24 you answer that? 24 the office that I could substantiate through email that 
25 THE WITNESS: I don't remember. 25 wasn't reported as vacation. I put together a 
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which made be laugh. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because that didn't matter to me. I'd gone to 
him about Sharon Hammer. And I told him at that point, 
I said, "What you do with this information is your 
business. It was my job to tell you." 
Q. Did you raise concerns about Sharon Hammer on 
this follow-up meeting with --
A. No. 
Q. -- Mayor Willich? 
Why? 
A. I had done my job. And that's exactly what I 
Page 40 
l it went. 
2 Q. Did you leave the packet of materials with 
3 Mayor Willich? 









Q. What did you do with it? 
A. I kept them in a folder. 
Q. At home or at City of Sun Valley? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. You don't recall where the folder was? 
A. No. 
Q. 
just told you. I knew he was fishing, that he -- I knew 13 
Did you provide that packet to anyone else? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. When? 
MR. SW ARTZ: Ever. 
he wasn't going to do anything at that point. It was 14 THE WITNESS: Some format of that packet was 
three weeks later, and it was like he was just trying to 15 presented at a later date. I had done a lot of research 
pacify me. And that's why I said that I didn't care 16 on vacation, matching up emails with vacation taken and 
what he did with the information, that I had done my job 17 time reported off, so, yes. 
in informing him. 18 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) Who was it presented to? 
Q. Did you ask about your concerns that you had 19 A. Over the period of six months, many people. I 
expressed to Mayor Willich at this follow-up meeting? 2 o can't even answer that question, I mean, with any form 
A. No. 21 of accuracy. It was -- I believe Patti Ball. I believe 
Q. And you just laughed at him when he told you 22 I gave a copy of it to Scott Birch. I do not recall 
about his follow-up on Mal Pryor? 23 whether each council member got a copy ofit-- oh, I do 
A. I did not laugh at him. I was actually very 24 recall I was asked to prepare the information for a --
serious. 
Page 39 
Q. I'm sorry. I misunderstood your testimony. I 
thought you said that when he told you that, you 
laughed. 
A. I didn't laugh at him; I laughed inside. I 
apologize. I wasn't clear. 
Q. Any other follow-ups with Mayor Willich after 
that October 5 meeting and then the meeting that took 
place three weeks later? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. The packet of materials that you had prepared 
for your October 5 meeting with Mayor Willich, did 
anyone ask you to prepare that packet? 
A. No. 
2 5 for an executive council meeting, so I prepared seven 
Page41 
1 packets of the information. 
2 Q. Was that for the November 11th --
3 A. No. 
4 Q. -- 2011 meeting? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Do you recall what meeting that was for? 
7 A. I don't. 
a Q. Did you take any materials with you to the 
g November 11, 2011, executive session? 
10 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Asked and 
l.l answered. 
l.2 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
l.3 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) What materials did you bring 
Q. Prior to preparing -- prior to your meeting 14 with you? 
with Mayor Willich, had you raised your concerns about l.5 A. I brought a spreadsheet, a fuel -- credit card 
Sharon Hammer with anyone other than Kelly Eck, Diane 16 charges with me. I brought some format of vacation time 
Shay, or this HR specialist? l.7 taken off. I believe that was ... 
A. I don't remember. is Q. Was that the same packet you tried to provide 
Q. When did you prepare the packet of material l.9 to Mayor Willich on your October 5 meeting? 
that you presented to Mayor Willich? 20 A. I believe I had done more research during that 
A. Shortly before I met with him, probably the 2l. time, between October 5th and November 11th. So there 
day before. I don't think it was -- I think I called 22 was more to it. 
23 him from home and asked him ifl could meet with him. 23 Q. Why were you doing more research? 
24 
25 
And then the next day I met with him. I'm not 24 A. I believe I spent a great deal of time between 
completely confident of that, but I believe that's how 25 the time I talked to Nils Ribi and the time I met for 
Pages 38 - 41 (10) M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc. 
(208)345-961 l(ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-SSOO(fax) 
Hammerv. 
City of Sun Valley 
Page42 
Michelle D. Frostenson 
April 23, 2014 
Page44 
1 the executive council meeting putting that information 1 questions. I provided information for her. She told me 
2 together. 2 that -- this isn't verbatim because it's been a long 
3 Q. When did you speak with Mr. Ribi? 3 time -- but, basically, she said I had two choices: I 
4 A. I don't recall if it was Wednesday the 9th or 4 either had to disclose what I knew or I needed to 
5 Thursday the 10th. 5 resign. I told her I couldn't afford to resign and that 
6 Q. After you met with Mayor Willich on October 5 6 I felt like the right thing to do would be to disclose 
7 and then your three-week meeting with him afterward, 7 it. 
8 following that meeting, is that when you spoke with Nils 8 And so I immediately got off the phone with 
her and tried to call Nils. And that's how it 
precipitated my conversation with Nils. 
9 Ribi? 9 
10 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 10 
11 THE WITNESS: I spoke with Nils Ribi on either 11 Q. You got an email from Sharon saying you needed 
to discuss inventory. She tells you that something 
substantial has walked out of the building. What was 
that substantial thing that went missing? 
12 the 9th of November or the 10th of November. 12 
13 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) Was that the first time that 13 
14 you spoke with Mr. Ribi about your concerns about Ms. 14 
15 Hammer? 15 A. I don't know. 
Q. You didn't ask? 
A. I did not ask. 
16 A. Yes. 16 
11 Q. Did he come to you or did you go to him? I 11 
18 don't know if Mr. Naylor's got the answer to that 10 Q. And then you call the auditor and say Sharon 
Hammer has told me that something substantial has gone 
missing, and the auditor tells you, well, you need to 
disclose what you know or you need to resign? 
19 question or not, but if you guys need to go chat, you're 19 
20 welcome to. 20 
21 A. No. There's just more to it. 21 
22 Q. Well, now's the time. Let's hear it. 22 A. Oh, I told her everything at that point, that 
I had a conversation with the mayor. 23 A. I called Nils Ribi -- I don't know ifl called 23 
24 him or texted him -- I was on the way up to the city, so 24 
2 5 it must have been on Thursday, the first time I tried to 2 5 
Q. What went missing? 
MR. NAYLOR: Let her finish. 
Page43 
1 contact him, because I always worked on Tuesdays and 
2 Thursdays. So it must have been Thursday that I 
3 contacted him. I was on the way up to the city, and I 
4 believe I tried to call him, and he didn't answer his 
5 phone. So I believe I tried texting him when I got to 
6 work. And then I tried to call him again, and he called 
7 me back. And then I met with him right after that. 
8 Q. Why were you reaching out to Nils Ribi? 
9 A. I had received an email from Sharon Hammer, I 
10 believe it was Tuesday evening of that week, that said 
11 we need to discuss inventory. And so I talked with her 
12 the next day, which was Wednesday, over the phone. And 
13 she told me that she had known for a while that 
14 inventory was walking away, but now something 
15 substantial had walked, and we needed to do something 
16 about it. 
17 And that precipitated a call to the auditors, 
18 who were corning the next week to do an audit on the 
19 city. On my way up to the city that Thursday morning, I 
20 called Jodi Daugherty, and I told her about the 
21 conversation. And she told me -- she says, "That's a 
22 significant deficiency, and it will be reported in the 
23 audit." 
24 That's like getting an "F" on your audit. And 
25 we talked for quite a while. She asked me a couple of 
Page45 
1 MR. SW ARTZ: That's what I'm asking, is what 
2 went missing. 
3 MR. NAYLOR: No. That's not the pending 
4 question she was answering. 
5 MR. SW ARTZ: That was the question. 
6 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) What went missing? What was 
7 the thing that you told the auditor that Sharon Hammer 
8 told you went missing? 
9 A. I don't know. 
10 Q. How did you describe what went missing to the 
11 auditor? 
12 A. I didn't. I told her about the conversation 
13 that I had with Sharon. 
14 Q. Where Sharon told you that something went 
15 missing? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And the auditor says, all right, so here are 
10 your options: You either need to go disclose this 
19 unidentified thing that went missing or you need to 
20 resign? 
21 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Misstates 
22 her testimony. 
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is not what I said. I 
24 -- we had been told the year before -- I probably am not 
2 5 going to get this terminology correct -- but after an 
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audit is complete, they have -- they have a list of 
findings that they present to management. And during 
the following year, you are to address those fmdings. 
You actually is have to tell them how you're going to 
address them. You have to respond to the audit 
findings. 
And one of those findings was that we needed 
to set up an inventory system. So when I shared this 
information with Ms. Daugherty, it precipitated this 
response from her. I also shared with her the other 
issues that I had gone to the mayor about. And that 
whole conversation ended up in her suggestion to me. 
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) That you should contact Nils 
Ribi? 
A. No. 
Q. Why did-- why did you contact Nils Ribi? 
A. Because I needed to tell the council. That 
Hammerv. 
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1 going to be here next week, and I have to do my part or 
2 I'm going to find myself in a very precarious 
3 situation." 
4 He said "Okay, let me call" -- I believe he 
5 said he was going to call Bob Youngman. And that was 
6 the end of the conversation. I went back to city hall. 
7 And I don't know who told me, but I believe Nils called 
8 me back, and told me that they were going to have an 
9 executive meeting the next day, and it was going to be 
10 later in the afternoon because they had to give 
11 24 hours' notice. 
12 Q. Did he tell you that he wanted you to join the 
13 meeting? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Did he ask you to bring anything with you? 
16 A. I don't remember. I don't remember if he did 
17 ornot. 

















was the next step. I needed to disclose to the council 
the information that I had. 19 
Q. Did you reach out to any other council member 20 
concerns with him, but you said there's an audit next 
week and this inventory issue has come up, and I'm going 
to be on the hook for it? other than Mr. Ribi? 21 
A. No. 22 A. I -- I did tell him enough to make sure he 
understood the importance of this. I did -- I don't 
remember exactly what I said to him, but I shared with 
him I had a meeting with the mayor on October 5th, and I 
Q. Why? 23 
A. John Lamb was on vacation. I had already 24 
talked to Mayor Willich. I didn't even know Dewayne 25 
Page47 
1 Briscoe. I hadn't had more than ten words' 
2 communication with him in the entire time he'd been on 
3 the council, and pretty much the same with Bob Youngman. 
4 I had years of working with Nils Ribi. He'd been there 
s almost as long as I had. And I trusted him. 
6 Q. And so when you contacted Nils Ribi, did you 
7 share with him at that time your concerns, or did you 
s just tell him generally I have concerns, and he decided 
9 to set up the executive session? 
10 A. When he returned my phone call at city hall, I 
11 said, "I have something I need to talk to you about 
12 immediately." 
13 And he said, "Okay." 
14 And I said, "And I don't want to do it at city 
15 hall." 
16 And he said, "Okay. Well, where do you want 
11 to meet me?" 
18 And I said, "I don't know, somewhere, 
19 somewhere away from city hall. How about Sun Valley 
2 o Company?" 
21 And so we met at Sun Valley Company. And I 
22 shared very little with him because I had no proof with 
23 me. I just said, "This is what -- these are my 
24 concerns, and I don't know what to do with them, but 
25 I've got this situation with the auditors. They're 
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1 brought these things up to him, and then I had this 
2 email from Sharon and this conversation, and I just 
3 talked to the auditors. And I told him, I said, "We 
4 need to do something immediately." 
5 Q. And the concern with the audit was this lack 
6 of inventory control? 
7 A. I don't know what I can tell you that I know 
8 now. I know a lot more now about it than I did then. 
9 But I believe my understanding then was that I could be 
10 held personally liable ifl didn't disclose, because of 
11 state statute, what I knew. And it needed-- the timing 
12 of it was critical that it happen before the auditors 
13 arrive the next week. 
14 Q. So as I'm understanding it -- you correct me 
15 ifl'm wrong -- but we essentially have four concerns 
16 that you brought to Nils Ribi: One was this inventory 
17 control and the impending audit, and then the other 
18 three things related solely to Sharon Hammer, and that 
19 was the vehicle, credit card, and reporting of vacation; 
20 is that correct? 
21 A. I don't remember exactly the conversation I 
22 had with him. I believe I shared all of those concerns 
23 with him. It was quick. It didn't last very long. It 
24 was just five minutes and over. 
2 5 Q. And then from the time that you had that very 
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1 quick meeting with Mr. Ribi and the November 11 meeting, 1 exactly when I acknowledged that information or sought 
2 you said you did a bunch of research between those two 2 legal counsel, and that. 
3 periods of time; right? 3 Q. Did anyone ever tell you that your job would 
4 A. I put together -- I put together something 4 be protected? 
5 that I could hand out to the council, because I felt 5 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
6 like -- I was pretty scared. I mean, I could have lost 6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
7 my job over just what I was doing. It was not an easy 7 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Who told you that? 
8 thing for me to do. So I wanted to make sure that I had 8 A. Patti Ball. 
9 documentation to back up what I was saying. I didn't -- 9 Q. Anyone else? 
10 so it -- this was not an easy thing for me to do. 10 A. I don't know. It would have been satisfying 
11 Q. What was your job with the City of Sun Valley? 11 enough to hear it from Patti Ball, but I wouldn't 
12 A. I was the treasurer. 12 remember if anyone had. 
13 Q. That's an appointed position; is that correct? 13 Q. Patti Ball told you your job would be 
14 A. That is correct. 14 protected? 
15 Q. Who appointed you? 15 A. She didn't say it exactly like that. 
16 A. I believe it was the mayor and council. 16 Q. Wel~ how did she say it? 
17 Q. Who had the ability to terminate your 17 A. She stated -- this is not verbatim -- but she 
18 position? 18 implied to me that as a whistleblower I had certain 
19 A. I -- you know, I'm not a legal expert. I 19 protections under the law; and that if I found myself in 
20 don't know. 20 any compromising position where I felt like my job was 
21 Q. As an appointed employee, did you know that 21 in danger, that I should contact her at that point when 
22 only the mayor, with the approval of the city council, 22 we were in the investigation. 
23 could remove you from your position? 23 Q. Did you ever have a need to contact Patti Ball 
24 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Calls for 24 and share that your employment was in danger? 
25 legal conclusion, misstates the law. 25 A. I had a need, but I never contacted her. 
Page 51 Page53 
1 THE WITNESS: At some point during that 1 Q. Did you contact anyone about your belief that 
2 process I'd done my homework and asked some questions, 2 your job was in danger? 
3 and I did find that out. 3 A. Yeah. Kirt Naylor. 
4 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) You say "at some point." Can 4 Q. Anyone else? 
5 you give me a -- 5 A. I'm not sure I understand the question. 
6 A. No. 6 Q. Did you contact anyone else? 
7 Q. -- reference? 7 A. I talked to my husband about it on a daily 
8 A. No. 8 basis. 
9 Q. At some point did you become concerned about 9 Q. Anyone else? 
10 losing your job? 10 A. I suspect I talked to friends about it. 
11 A. Oh, I was concerned about losing my job on 11 Q. Anyone else? 
12 October 5th when I went to the mayor. 12 A. I don't know. And we're talking three years 
13 Q. And then was it that concern that led you to 13 ago. I don't know. 
14 do your research into how you could lose your job? 14 Q. When you met with Mr. Ribi on November 9th, 
15 A. I don't believe so. 15 did you share with him what transpired during your 
16 Q. What led you to figure out, ask questions to 16 October 5 meeting with Mayor Willich? 
17 figure out how you could lose your job? 17 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. Asked and 
18 A. I don't know. We're talking -- an enormous 18 answered. 
19 amount of things went on during that nine months that 19 THE WITNESS: I believe I did tell him I had a 
20 made me very uncomfortable. It could have been anytime 20 meeting with Mayor Willich, and that I had discussed 
21 during that nine months that I did the research. 21 this with him, and that he hadn't done anything with the 
22 Q. From nine months -- help me out with the 22 information I'd given him. 
23 period of time. What nine months? 23 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) What did you do to confirm 
24 A. Well, from the time I went to the mayor until 24 your statement to Mr. Ribi that Mayor Willich hadn't 
25 the time I quit working for the city. I can't tell you 25 done anything to address your concerns? 
\'lin-l-Scrip1m; M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc. 
(208)345-961l(ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-SSOO(fax) 
fil).£.ages 50- 53 
EXHIBIT f' 
902 
Michelle D. Frostenson 
April 23, 2014 
Hammerv. 
City of Sun Valley 
Page 54 Page 56 
l. A. I think my exact words to Nils Ribi were: The 1 end of the city, as an appointed treasurer. I could be 
2 only noticeable change is that the City of Sun Valley 2 held personally liable. 
3 decals are missing off of her city vehicle. 3 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) In fact, part of your job was 
4 Q. Did you ask Mayor Willich whether he followed 4 to stand in front of the city council under oath and to 
s up on your concerns? 5 verify expenditures made by the city; right? 
6 A. He'd already told me that -- that he was in 6 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
7 the process of discussing Mal Pryor's situation or 7 THE WITNESS: I was not aware of that during 
s addressing Mal Pryor's situation. It had only been a 8 the time of my appointment with the city. I do not 
9 couple days before that that he told me that. 9 believe that ever happened at city hall in all the years 
1.0 Q. And so you went to Nils Ribi, and you said 10 that they had been a city. I don't know that for sure. 
1 l. "The mayor's not addressing my concerns that I brought 11 But I went back and looked in council packets, and I had 
12 to him"? 12 not seen any documentation of that. Had I known that 
13 A. What I said to Nils Ribi, ifl remember 13 that was the legal responsibility, it would have been 
14 correctly, is that the only apparent change is that 14 happening. I did not know. 
15 there are no city decals on her vehicle anymore. 15 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) As the treasurer for the City 
l.6 Q. Did you do anything to confinn whether Mayor 16 of Sun Valley, did you do anything to confirm 
1 7 Willich was following up on your concerns before you 17 expenditures that were made by the city? 
1 s told Nils Ribi that you believed Mayor Willich was not 18 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
l.9 following up on your concerns? 19 THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that question, 
20 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 20 please? 
21. THE WITNESS: I believe I answered that 21 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Sure. As the treasurer for 
22 already. 22 the City of Sun Valley, was it part of your job to 
23 Q. (BY MR. SW ARTZ) Is that a no, you didn't do 23 confinn expenditures that were made with city money? 
24 anything to confirm whether Mayor Willich was following 24 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
25 up on your concerns? 25 THE WITNESS: I believe had I known someone 
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1 A. I had talked to the mayor a few days before 
2 that. The mayor had brought me into his office and told 
3 me what he was doing. So there was no need to confirm 
4 anything because he had already told me. 
5 Q. He told you, "I'm following up with Mal 
6 Pryor"? 
7 A. Yes. 
a Q. And you didn't ask anything about your 
9 concerns regarding Sharon Hammer? 
10 A. What I said to him was, "I don't really care 
11 what you do with this. I did my part. I told you about 
it." 
Because at that point I recognized he wasn't 
going to do anything. At least in my opinion, it looked 
like he wasn't going to do anything, because her city 
vehicle had no decals on it anymore. It wasn't 
identifiable as a city vehicle anymore; they had been 
Page 57 
1 was fraudulently misusing city funds, it would have been 
2 my job to make sure that I reported that. And I did 
3 have my suspicions at times, and I did report them. 
4 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) On October 5th? 
s A. No prior to that. I had sent emails to Sharon 
6 Hammer about the credit card use in the fire department. 
7 Q. What about Sharon Hammer's use of the city 
8 vehicle prior to October of201 l? Did you raise that to 
9 anyone? 
10 A. To her on many occasions. 
11 Q. Anyone else? 
12 A. Not anyone in a position of authority. 
13 MR. NAYLOR: How are you doing, Jahnene? It's 
14 been an hour and a half. Need a break? 
1s MR. SWARTZ: Yeah, let's take a break. 
16 (Recess was held.) 















removed. 18 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Ms. Frostenson, when did your 
Q. Why were you so intent on having someone 19 employment as the treasurer for the City of Sun Valley 
address your concerns about Sharon Hammer? 20 begin? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 21 A. I don't recall. When I was hired, I was not 
THE WITNESS: The policy strictly stated at no 22 hired as the treasurer. 
time shall any employee drive a city vehicle for 23 Q. Were you the treasurer before Ms. Hammer's 
personal use. It was my responsibility to make sure 24 employment began? 
that policies were followed in relation to the financial 25 A. I believe so. 
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1 know, the mayor. I had not been sworn in. 
2 And somewhere along the line, Bob Van Ort got 
3 into some difficulty with some staff people, and he was 
4 either fired or asked to resign. And that -- and I have 
5 no knowledge about how that all came about, but he was 
6 gone. 
7 And with Mayor Thorson's help, we interviewed 
8 a couple of potential interim city administrators, and 
9 then we hired -- whose name just escaped me -- Jerry 
10 Osterman, and he had some 35 years in city 
11 administration and so forth. Terrific guy. Helped me 
12 tremendously. 
13 Then we went on a search for the, I'll say, 
14 permanent city administrator, and we interviewed, I'm 
15 going to say, five or six candidates, meetings with 
16 council members, and so forth. 
17 I proposed hiring Sharon Hammer as the city 
18 administrator, and I think she was unanimously approved 
19 and endorsed by the council. And she started in June of 
20 '08. So Sharon Hammer was the city administrator from 
21 June of'08 until later. 
22 Q. Through the end of your term? 
23 A. Through the end of my term. 
24 Q. How would you gauge her performance as a city 
25 administrator during that period of time? 
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1 A. I thought she was outstanding in all respects. 
2 Very enthusiastic. She took EMT training, became a paid 
3 on call firefighter and was totally engaged in the city 
4 and, you know, I think, served our city very, very, 
5 remarkably. 
6 I spent a lot of time with the Boeing Company 
7 managing large groups of people, and she was one of the 
8 best people I had worked with over 30-some-odd years. 
9 Q. Did you ever come to know Sharon Hammer to 
10 have engaged in any misconduct during your term as 
11 mayor? 
12 MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
13 THE WITNESS: Not that I know of, no. 
14 Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) At some point in time, did 
15 Michelle Frostenson, the city treasurer, present 
16 allegations to you about misconduct that she believed 
17 Ms. Hammer to have engaged in? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Do you recall when that was? 
20 A. You just asked me a little while ago about 
21 reviewing dates, and I went back and reviewed the 
22 October 5th meeting with Michelle Frostenson. I didn't 
23 have it in my calendar as "Meet with Michelle 
24 Frostenson," but it was October 5th of 2011. 
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A. Yeah, my office. 
Q. And did Ms. Frostenson alert you to why she 
was wanting to meet with you prior to the meeting? 
A. No, she -- I had an open-office policy. 
Anybody could wander into my office anytime they wanted 
to. And she came in and she said, "Mayor, I have 
something to discuss with you. 11 I'm trying to say words 
that are my impressions, and they may not be perfectly 
accurate. 
Q. Certainly. 
A. But, you know, somebody says, "Oh, sure, come 
on in. 11 And she had the little stack of papers in her 
hand. And she said, "I wanted to talk to you right now 
while Sharon isn't in the office." 
I said "Oh, okay. 11 And she started with an 
allegation that I thought was very serious, but not 
about Sharon. The allegation was that she was very, 
very much concerned about the audit that was coming up 
in December, because we were going to be --you know, 
the books were closed at the end of the fiscal year, end 
of September.· 
And she said, "I am really worried about the 
audit report, because there's been improper vacation 
accruals going on, and it looks like it's about 
$133,000. 11 
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I said, "Whoa, didn't know anything about 
that." And I said, "Oh." So the second thing that she 
was very much concerned about was improper charging of 
our firefighters to the State ofldaho and to BLM and 
maybe the forest service when we went out on a wildfire 
fighting assignment. And I said, "Oh." 
Then in a kind of conspiratorial manner, she 
said, "Now, as far as Sharon is concerned," and so she 
had that -- you know, her concerns for her job first. 
Yeah, $133,000 mischarged, that's a big deal. That was 
for the total staff. And then also cheating the State 
of Idaho -- mischarging or cheating the State of Idaho 
or the BLM, a federal agency, that's a big deal. 
So I had those two things in my mind, like, 
whoa, these are real revelations. And then she started 
into the, I'll say, personal stuff of Sharon driving the 
city vehicle, and I'm trying to remember what the other 
thing was. 
But I somewhat stopped listening at the city 
vehicle thing, because that was a surplus police car 
that was, basically, scrap value. And I was -- I had my 
mind full of the 133,000 bucks. And then she went into 
other personal things, like Sharon Hammer is chasing 
around with Eric Evans, you know, the building 
department guy. 
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1 And so by that time, I was just listening, not 
2 answering, not responding. I said, "Okay. Okay. I'll 
3 have to look into this." And then she left. 
4 Now, what kind of concerned me about this was, 
5 say, okay, Michelle is putting together like a package 
6 of allegations about Sharon Hammer. Like she was, you 
7 know, putting this whole report together. And I 
8 remember that she and Council Member Ribi, apparently, 
9 had done one of these things before when they got 
10 Virginia Egger, the city administrator, way back in '07, 
11 removed. 
12 And you say, "Well, what do you know about 
13 that?" Well, soon after I was elected, Council Member 
14 Ribi sat down with me, like in the spring of '08, and he 
15 had a dossier of material that he showed to me on 
16 Virginia Egger with some checks in there that were 
17 improperly written. 
18 And I said, "Oh." I says, "Well, that's why 
19 she was" [sound effect]. They put the story together 
20 that she had resigned and everything, but they gave her 
21 six months' severance pay, and I thought, "Gee, that's 
22 interesting. How do you resign and get severance pay? 
23 But I dismissed it then. I just, you know, 
24 kind of forgot about it until this day when Michelle 
25 Frostenson came to me, because then it triggered my 
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1 memory, "Hmm, wasn't" -- "weren't those checks supplied 
2 to Council Member Ribi by the treasurer, Michelle? 
3 Don't know." 
4 But in any event, at that point, I'm thinking, 
5 right away, something kind of smells here. It's just 
6 not passing the smell test. You know, Michelle had all 
7 of this time, and all of a sudden one month before the 
8 election and da-da-da. 
9 And I thought, well, the auditors don't arrive 
10 until December, so we have some time to do our own 
11 investigation, look into this, take care of it. Right 
12 after the election, when all of that is out of the way, 
13 and then we can get to work on it. That was my 
14 attitude. 
15 Q. In addition to the city vehicle, did Michelle 
16 Frostenson raise concerns about Sharon Hammer using the 
17 city funds to fuel the city vehicle for personal trips? 
18 A. I don't recall that, no. 
19 Q. Did she raise any concerns about Sharon not 
20 reporting her time accurately? 
21 A. 1 don't recall that. She buried the Sharon 
22 Hammer improper vacation accrual into that $133,000 
23 story. 
24 Q. During your term as mayor, whose job was it to 






















































A. Track vacation time? 
Q. Well, so there's $133,000 that Michelle 
Frostenson is saying wasn't properly tracked. 
A. Oh, yeah. Michelle. I mean, preparing the --
yeah, Michelle. 
Q. So that was her job. 
A. But let me clarify something about the 
133,000. Later Tammi Hall, the part-time bookkeeper, 
and I then looked into that 133,000. That was a totally 
bogus number. When we cut through all of the vacation 
time accruals that might have been improper -- first of 
all, the police chief could accrue lots of time, the 
fire chief can accrue lots of time. 
There were only a handful of people, and 1 
believe not Sharon, that had accrued vacation time to 
the tune of about $13,000, not 133,000. And that's just 
not a decimal point error. I mean, it was much lower. 
And when you think about it, what she was 
really doing -- let's assume for a moment that all 31 
staff members all had a June 1st anniversary date. For 
some odd reason they had all been hired in such a way 
that on June 1st, they started their new year. 
Well, you could postulate that -- is it May 
31st -- on May 31st that there would be no vacation 
accrual, because all of the staff people had taken their 
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vacation during that year. On June 1st you'd have 31 
people times so many hours. You could have 300 -- a 
half a million dollars' worth of vacation accrual, 
properly, because they all were assigned a new two weeks 
or a new four weeks of vacation. 
So what -- now, my impression was that 
Michelle Frostenson purposely was trying to mislead, 
especially the city council, in the report that she 
made. She was cooking the books. 
Q. How soon after the October 5th meeting did you 
come to your conclusions about the lack of veracity 
behind Ms. Frostenson's allegations? 
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: About an hour and a half of 
thinking. Because it's -- you've told me not to use 
body language, but I'm going to have to describe body 
language for you to show it. You could say, here's body 
language one: "I'm very concerned about what's been 
going on relative to Sharon Hammer's use of the car." 
Okay? And for you to put this down, say it was very 
relaxed. It was a simple straightforward conversation. 
Now, I'm going to take a conspiratorial 
approach, and I'm going to be up on the table like this 
saying, "You know what, I have these things." You see. 
And so body language does count, straight words don't. 
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I, ANDREA L. CHECK, CSR No. 748, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, certify; 
That the foregoing proceedings were taken 
before me at the time and place therein set forth, at 
which time the witness was put under oath by me; 
That the testimony and all objections made 
were recorded stenographically by me and transcribed by 
me or under my direction; 
That the foregoing is a true and correct 
record of all testimony given, to the best of my 
ability; 
I further certify that I am not a relative or 
employee of any attorney or party, nor am I financially 
interested in the action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal 
this 6th day of June, 2014. 
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ANDREA L. CHECK, C.S.R. No. 748, R.P.R. 
Notary Public 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2636 
My Commission expires July 20, 2016. 
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